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ABSTRACT 
The present study examines the decision of international hotel companies to expand using 
market versus hierarchical modes. So far, there are only a few studies that examine the 
entry mode or corporate development decision of service firms and even fewer that are 
focused specifically on the hotel industry. This study provides a robust theoretical 
discussion on the decision for corporate development in the hotel industry, combining 
both Transaction Cost Economics and Agency Theory. Moreover, it is the first to argue 
that management contracts, although a non-equity mode of organisation, should be 
viewed as a more hierarchical form of organization, and to provide empirical support for 
that statement. 
The primary objective of this study is to develop a comprehensive framework to 
determine the variables that influence the expansion strategy of international hotel firms 
and to test the respective hypotheses. Three of these hypotheses, the ones that refer to the 
influence of brand growth, proprietary knowledge (market segment) and country of origin 
of the brand, have not been examined by previous studies in the hotel industry. 
The power of Transaction Cost Economics and Agency Theory to predict the expansion 
strategy of international hotel firms is supported by the empirical results of this study. 
There is clear empirical evidence that the degree of proprietary content and idiosyncratic 
knowledge embedded in the service provided by the hotel company is one of the most 
important factors to define international hotel expansion strategy. The results of the data 
analysis also provide support for the importance of country of origin of the brand in the 
corporate development decision. 
Besides the limitations, which refer mainly to data collection and measurement issues, 
this study makes an important conceptual and methodological contribution in the existing 
literature and identifies several areas that need to be explored by future studies in order 
for our understanding regarding the strategic behaviour of international hotel firms to be 
enhanced. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The service sector has grown rapidly in importance in both developed and developing 
countries. In the past three decades the share of services in the gross domestic product of 
55 out of 78 countries has increased (World Development Indicators, 2000). 
Accordingly, a great amount of research has been done within the last twenty years 
regarding the international service sector. More specifically, a significant part of that 
research has focused on the reasons for globalisation of service firms. Industries that 
have attracted the interest of researchers include advertising (Terpstra and Yu, 1988), 
banking (Goldberg and Johnson, 1990; Sabi, 1988 and Yannopoulos, 1983) and the hotel 
industry (Dunning and McQueen, 1981; 1982). Other scholars have attempted to explain 
the interaction between international growth of services and multinational service 
enterprises (Boddewyn, Halbrich and Perry, 1986; Li and Guisinger, 1992). 
More recently, however, the interest of the researchers has shifted to the reasons for the 
increase in the multinational activity of service sector firms (Dunning and Kundu, 1995), 
the reasons for variation in the degree of internalisation (Contractor and Kundu, 1995) 
and even more intensively on the modes of entry into foreign markets (Contractor and 
Kundu, 1998a; Erramilli, 1990; 1991; Erramilli and Rao, 1990; 1993). 
Although the market entry mode is usually chosen from several alternatives, such as 
company ownership, joint ventures and licensing, scholars have lately directed their 
conceptual and empirical work to the study of non-equity (contractual) modes of entry, 
such as licensing and franchising. More specifically, there has been a great amount of 
work that focuses on explaining franchising arrangements (Brown, 1998; Dnes, 1996; 
Klein, 1995; Michael, 1996; Minkler, 1992; Norton, 1988a), as well as on the choice 
between franchising and company ownership (Brickley and Dark 1987; Combs and 
Castrogiovanni 1994; Lafontaine, 1992; Maness, 1996; Martin, 1988; Scott, 1995; 
Shane, 1996 and Thomson, 1992). 
However, despite the fact that there is sufficient research available regarding the 
determinant factors of franchising, most of this research does not make any distinctions 
between industries, even though it is widely accepted that different features would 
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influence the franchising decision in the manufacturing sector as opposed to the service 
sector. As a result, there are only few studies so far, that attempt to explain the choice 
between franchising and company ownership in the service sector (Fladmoe-Lindquist 
and Jacque 1995, Contractor and Kundu 1998b). Moreover, in the hotel industry another 
alternative to franchising exists, namely the use of management contracts (Contractor 
and Kundu 1998a, Eyster 1993,1997). Thus, when the modes of development in the 
international hotel industry are the focus of a particular research, management contracts 
should also be included in the analysis, since they present one of the most commonly 
used modes of expansion. 
Franchising is a contractual arrangement whereby one firm, the franchisor, sells the right 
to another firm, the franchisee, to operate under a particular trademark following a set of 
guidelines (Lafontaine and Masten, 1995). Additionally, when it comes to business 
format franchising, the franchisor agrees to provide managerial assistance regarding 
issues such as advertising and promotion, personnel development, operating procedures, 
whereas the franchisee runs the business in a way that has already been agreed, pays 
royalties, usually a percentage of sales, and sometimes is obliged to buy supplies from 
the franchisor or from approved suppliers (Rubin, 1978). 
A management service contract is a long-term agreement, of up to ten years or even 
longer, whereby the legal owner of the property enters into a contract with another firm, 
in this case an international hotel company that agrees to run the hotel's daily operations. 
Usually the property carries the name of the international hotel company and moreover, 
quality control, daily management, and senior staffing rest with the hotel company, not 
with the owners. This arrangement is favoured in many international settings as it allows 
the international hotel firm to establish a presence without investment in property 
ownership. 
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1.1 Problem Formulation 
The purpose of this study is to provide a robust theoretical framework in order to 
identify the factors that influence the expansion strategy of international hotel 
companies. Hotels, although classified in the service sector, are characterised by certain 
distinctive features, that differentiate them from other service industries. More 
specifically, the hotel industry has very high capital intensity, contrary to other parts of 
the service sector, such as advertising and consulting (Contractor and Kundu, 1998a). 
Moreover the logistics and supply chain can be as complex as in manufacturing 
operations. Therefore, it can be argued that the hotel industry presents a challenge and 
deserves separate research, regarding the decision on the mode of corporate 
development. 
Furthermore, as documented in the most recent study of Contractor and Kundu (1998a) 
regarding the choice of entry mode in the hospitality industry, non-equity arrangements 
(i. e. franchising and management service contracts) account for 65.5% of foreign, 
operation properties in the world as a whole. The prevalence of management contracts 
and franchising is even higher in North America, where they account together for 79% 
of the organisational forms in "foreign operations". A very important element arising 
from the data they gathered is that management contracts, a neglected mode in the 
research so far, are quite popular not only in the world as a whole, but also in each 
region separately (in North America 41%, in Europe 37% and in Asia 42%). The fact 
that contractual modes of corporate development are quite prevalent in the hotel sector 
worldwide, in combination with the lack of research that includes management contracts 
in the analysis, suggests that this study could reveal important findings regarding the 
factors that influence the expansion strategy of international hotel corporations. 
Although strategic alliances are also a non-equity form, it has been decided not to be 
examined in this study. The reason is that they are not a common mode in the hotel 
sector. Whereas in the other service industries, like the airline industry, strategic 
alliances constitute a common mode of co-operation and expansion, this is not the case 
Contractor and Kundu (1998b) define as foreign property one that is located outside the home nation. 
However, in the present study this definition will be treated with caution, since a multinational company 
does not really have home-base, especially when it comes to hotel operations. Therefore in this study the 
term international company will be used but no distinction will be made between domestic and foreign 
operations. 
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for the hotel industry. So far, the author is aware of only two strategic alliances in the 
industry, both involving Radisson Hotels (a division of Carlson Hotels), namely the one 
between Radisson Hotels and SAS (the Scandinavian Airline company) and between 
Radisson Hotels and Edwardian Hotels. Thus, it is suggested that the two contractual 
modes of expansion that need to be studied in the context of the hotel industry, along 
with the company ownership mode, are management contracts and franchising. 
Additionally, since the theoretical background of the study derives from transaction cost 
economics and agency theory, this study will also assess whether these theories can 
predict the strategic behaviour of international hotel firms. What makes this study more 
interesting and challenging is the suggestion that management contracts should be 
viewed as a more hierarchical form of organisation. Previous research considered 
franchising and management contracts as two alternative forms of contractual 
agreements that both lie towards the so-called "market" mode of organisation, whereas 
an application of transaction cost theory supports the view that management contracts 
should be placed further towards the "hierarchy" end (Dimou et. al, 2003; Williamson, 
1975). 
1.2 The main objectives of the study 
Subsequent of the analysis in the previous section, one could formulate the main 
research question of this study as follows: 
Using Transaction Cost Economics and Agency Theory, what are the main (country-) 
location- specific and firm-specific factors that influence the corporate development 
decision of international hotel firms? 
The above mentioned research question could be further decomposed into the following 
research objectives: 
" Examine whether Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and Agency Theory (AT) can 
provide an explanation for the expansion strategy of international hotel firms, i. e. for 
their choice among the three most common development modes, company 
ownership, franchising and management contracts. 
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" Identify the firm- and (country-) location- specific factors that influence the 
expansion decision, namely the factors that would favour the use of a hierarchical, 
market or hybrid mode in the hotel industry. Firm-specific factors refer to variables 
related to the structure of the firm and its competitive advantages (e. g. firn size and 
scale, experience, investment in research and development, global reservation 
systems). The location-specific factors on the other hand refer to the specific 
characteristics and conditions of the country where the company wants to expand, 
such as political and economic risk, market size and growth, level of economic 
development and degree of foreign direct investment in the country (Dunning and 
McQueen, 1982). 
" Find out whether there are interactions between any of those factors and how these 
interactions affect the initial expansion decision. 
" Identify whether hotel companies that operate in different market segments (i. e. 
upscale vs. mid-market vs. budget segment) use these modes for expansion in a 
different degree and why. 
Examine the similarities and differences between the results of this study and the 
results of previous studies in different sectors, in order to conclude whether the 
expansion decision of international firms varies according to the sector where the 
firm operates. 
1.3 Structure of the study: 
Chapter Two will provide an overview of the international hotel industry including a 
presentation of the historical and geographical development of the industry, as well as an 
analysis of the current situation. Furthermore, the various growth strategies will be 
presented and the most common strategies will be further analysed. Finally, a short 
overview of the largest international hotel companies will be provided. 
In Chapter Three the relevant theories of corporate development that are currently most 
prevalent in the literature will be presented. The usefulness of Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE), as developed by Williamson (1975,1985,1996a), has been 
extensively discussed in the literature (Anderson and Gatignon 1986, Gatignon and 
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Anderson 1988, Hennart 1988,1989; Klein, 1980; Shelanski and Klein, 1995; Teece, 
1981,1986) and several scholars have used transaction cost theory as a basis for their 
theoretical framework, to examine the entry mode decision of multinational corporations 
(Anderson and Gatignon 1986; Gatignon and Anderson 1988; Erramilli, 1991; Erramilli 
and Rao 1993; Hennart, 1991). 
Additionally, as far as the research on franchising is concerned, there has been a 
widespread use of Agency Theory (Rubin, 1978; Mathewson and Winter 1985), along 
with TCE (Caves and Murphy, 1976; Klein, 1995; Klein and Saft 1985), which attempt 
to explain various aspects of the franchise contract, including the decision to franchise or 
to own outlets (Brickley and Dark, 1987; Brickley, Dark and Weisbach, 1991; Brown, 
1998; Gallini and Lutz, 1992; Lafontaine, 1992; Norton, 1988a; Scott, 1995; and Shane, 
1996,1998), as well as the specification of the optimum use of franchise fees and 
royalty rates (Blair and Kaserman, 1983; Wimmer and Garen, 1997). 
In the same chapter, a brief presentation of alternative theories that have been applied 
recently in the research regarding especially the entry mode decision will be given: 
Internalisation Theory (Buckley and Casson, 1976, Rugman, 1986), Dunning's Eclectic 
Paradigm (Dunning 1980,1988; Dunning and McQueen, 1981) and Resource-Based 
Theory or Organisational Capabilities theory (Conner 1991, Madhok 1996,1997). Along 
with a short presentation of the above mentioned theories, an explanation for their 
exclusion from the theoretical framework of this study will be provided. As will be 
presented in the next chapter, the basic arguments presented by Internalisation Theory 
and Dunning's Paradigm can be found in the main assumptions and arguments of 
Transaction Cost Economics, therefore it is suggested that neither of these theories 
provides vital arguments that justify their inclusion in the theoretical framework. 
Furthermore, Organisational Capabilities theory (OC) will not be considered either, 
since some of its arguments are contradictory to what Transaction Cost Economics 
assert. A justification will be provided with respect to the preference for TCE arguments 
over OC theory. 
Chapter Four will present a theoretical framework that will be used for analysing the 
choice among the most commonly used modes of expansion in the international hotel 
industry, namely franchising, management contracts and company ownership. Firstly, a 
short presentation of franchising and management contracts will be given, along with an 
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analysis of the importance of control over the hotel operations. The subsequent sections 
will provide an explanation of the influence of Transaction Cost Economics and Agency 
Theory on the expansion strategy of international hotel companies. Finally, a review of 
previous studies on the choice of market entry in the hotel industry will be provided, in 
order to identify the gap in the literature and the opportunity for this research to reach 
some interesting conclusions with respect to the corporate development of international 
hotel firms. 
In Chapter Five various factors that influence the choice of the organisational mode of a 
new hotel operation will be identified. Location- as well as firm-specific variables that 
have been examined by previous researchers will be pinpointed and those that are 
relevant for this study will be included in the theoretical framework. Subsequently, the 
respective hypotheses will be formulated, using both TCE and AT arguments. 
The first sections of Chapter Six will present the population, sampling strategy and data 
collection method that will be followed in this research. Afterwards, the definitions and 
measures of the variables will be introduced and data analysis considerations will be 
discussed. Finally, the corporate development decision will be modelled and the 
appropriate software package for the analysis will be chosen. 
Chapters Seven and Eight will present the findings of this study. As will be explained in 
the research design chapter, two different models will be tested. The first model will 
treat the expansion as a one-stage process, where the hotel company chooses among the 
three alternative development modes. The second model on the other hand, will examine 
the expansion decision in two stages: in stage one the decision will be whether to 
franchise or to integrate (i. e. use a management agreement or company ownership) and 
in the second stage the decision will be between these two hierarchical modes. The last 
section of the chapter will present a comparison of the findings of the two models, 
in 
order to identify whether the data suggests that the expansion strategy of international 
hotel companies is a one- or a two-stage process. 
The last chapter of the thesis will provide a summary of the study, along with a 
discussion of the contribution of this research to the existing literature with respect to the 
expansion strategy of international hotel firms. Moreover, the 
limitations of the study 
will be analysed and directions for future research will 
be pinpointed. 
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1.4 Conclusions 
This study will examine the expansion decision of international hotel companies and 
more specifically, the choice between "hierarchical" and "market" modes of 
development. A robust theoretical discussion on the decision for corporate development 
in the hotel industry will be provided, combining both transaction cost economics and 
agency theory. A theoretical framework will be developed, identifying the location- and 
firm-specific factors that influence the choice among the three most common modes of 
development available in the hotel industry, i. e. company ownership, management 
contracts and franchise agreements. The results of the study will be presented in detail, 
in order for the contribution of this study in the existing literature to be revealed. 
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CHAPTER 2: GLOBALISATION OF THE HOTEL INDUSTRY: 
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE TRENDS 
2.1 Introduction 
The international hotel industry has undergone a tremendous development, from the 
small, privately owned, independent enterprises of the 1900s to the large, multinational 
organisations of the 21St century. The second half of the last century marked the 
beginning of the internationalisation of the lodging industry, starting with the expansion 
of U. S. companies in the American region and later in the rest of the world. As the world 
gradually converged toward a global marketplace, lodging firms began to look for 
opportunities to serve an increasing international customer base (Gee, 2000). 
Until the 1960s, the development areas of the world attracted most of the attention of the 
international hotel companies. By the end of 1970s, though, the situation started to 
change and large multinational hotel companies started to expand in developing 
countries, as well. According to Dunning and McQueen (1982), almost half of the hotels 
owned and operated by multinational hotel chains outside their home countries were 
located in developing countries. The increased presence of large corporations in the 
developing regions was the result of the saturation in developed markets, the rapid 
development of transportation and the developing countries' desire to bring in foreign 
capital. 
The 1980s were a period of intense turbulence in the hotel industry, and in the world 
economy in general. Inflation, recession, a volatile global economy, and the worldwide 
airline restructuring were some of the events that influenced the hospitality industry and 
resulted in numerous mergers and acquisitions in late 1980s (Rushmore, 2001). 
Consolidation of hotels into mega-chains became more prominent, while smaller chains 
joined marketing consortiums or partnerships in order to survive. 
The oversupply of hotel rooms, along with the saturation of the U. S. market, forced 
American hotel chains to expand in order to grow and retain their market share. 
9 
Expansion Strategies of International Hotel Firms 
Franchising, which was the first growth strategy applied by hotel chains like Holiday Inn 
and Ramada Inn, as early as the 1950s, is among the most popular strategies, along with 
management contracts, since both are means of inexpensive, rapid growth. By the turn of 
the 21St century, most of the well-established hotel companies used more than one 
expansion strategy simultaneously. In addition, there are "pure" franchise chains, like 
Cendant Corp. and companies that operate solely as hotel operators, like Hyatt and Four 
Seasons Hotels. 
In the first section of the chapter, the historical, as well as the developmental, context of 
the international hotel industry will be examined. In the second part, the various growth 
strategies available to international hotel chains will be presented. Currently, the most 
common among them are full ownership, joint ventures, franchise agreements and 
management contracts. 
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2.2 Historical and Geographical Development of the Hotel 
Industry 
For centuries, the hotel business has been characterised by the existence of independent, 
privately owned hotel properties. Occasionally, a well-known hotel would successfully 
develop a few properties under the same management but such examples were rare. The 
Ritz Group was the first to appoint and oversee the managers of separately owned luxury 
hotels in major American, European and African cities (a predecessor of the hotel 
management contracts), in the late 19th century. Then, at the beginning of the 20th 
century, it was the founder of Statler hotels who realised that operating several hotels 
under a single management provided several economic and financial advantages, due to 
centralized purchasing, cost control and marketing. 
Later, in the years following the Second World War, construction levels did not meet the 
expectations, and thus hotel investors provided capital only to the already established 
brands, like Hilton and Sheraton, which expanded their chains both by acquiring existing 
properties and by developing new hotels. At the same time, the continuing growth of 
high-end chains was matched by expansion of low-end, family-owned hotels due to the 
increase in travel in the United States, after the war. Several new lodging firms had their 
beginnings during that period: Holiday Inns, Ramada Inns, Marriott, Hyatt and 
Radisson, all successfully gained market share in their market segments (Rushmore, 
2001). 
Whilst Hilton developed the chain concept, which facilitated the growth of the 
management company, the initiators of Holiday Inn established their brand by 
franchising the Holiday Inn name and setting up a national reservations network. Rather 
than developing motel properties with their own funds, the lodging firms that adopted 
franchising sold a standardized product and package to investors who then developed 
and operated the properties as their own business. 
As the world progressively created a global marketplace, hotel and management 
companies began to look for opportunities to serve an increasing international market. 
Large lodging firms also realised that a strong presence abroad would increase brand 
awareness worldwide and help their domestic operations gain a larger share of foreign 
travel. At the same time, American corporations were encouraged by the US foreign 
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policy for economic development of lesser-developed countries to build hotels in regions 
such as Latin America, Caribbean and Europe (Gee, 2000). 
During the 1950s and 1960s, Pan American Airways - with its subsidiary Inter- 
Continental Hotels Corp. - as well as Hilton Hotels, were among the first to operate 
internationally by developing the chain concept. Inter-Continental Hotels, which had 
already developed its first hotel in Brazil, continued to expand in Latin America, while 
Hilton Hotels established its international division and began expanding operations in 
Europe and South America. The first efforts focused on developments in large gateway 
cities and world capitals, since these properties would incur the lowest financial risks 
and attracted the most investors. The general strategy was to establish the brand name in 
large cities, and then expand to secondary locations and resort areas. London, Paris and 
Rome were the primary targets, whereas cities in Ireland, Spain and Scandinavia did not 
attract much attention, mainly because domestic chains had already been established in 
those countries. 
In the early 1970s, as a result of a healthy global economy, travel in the United States 
was experiencing high growth rates, which consequently gave a boost to hotel 
occupancies and profits. High occupancy, combined with easily accessible financing, 
accelerated hotel development. At the same time many franchise companies were 
aggressively expanding to increase their national exposure. The favourable conditions 
and the confident atmosphere encouraged the development of more hotel companies. 
However, by the time these hotels entered the market, the U. S., and consequently the 
world economy, had already entered a recession phase due to the oil crisis, and the hotel 
industry did not remain unaffected. Leisure and business travel declined, construction 
costs and interest rates increased and as a result, both European as well as U. S. hotel 
chains diverted their attention to the Middle East and, gradually, to the Pacific Rim. The 
enormous increase in the wealth of Middle East oil-producing countries and the 
prosperity created by the increase in the oil prices triggered hotel construction in the 
region which continued until the late 1970s. 
As the price of oil slumped, though, at the beginning of the 1980s, so did room 
occupancy and hotel profits. The Middle East region's failure to expand its economic 
base sufficiently, along with the continuing political difficulties in certain Middle East 
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countries, turned most of the hotel development interest towards the Asia - Pacific 
region. Mass travel came late to that region and demand for accommodation has been 
supported by the highest growth rate of tourism in the world. Therefore, the international 
hotel companies that developed properties in that region focused on the upper market 
segment, that is, the properties were typically large, luxury hotels, affiliated with major, 
well-established brands. 
Initially, international hotels were developed and operated by U. S. hotel companies, like 
Hilton International, Sheraton, Hyatt International, Holiday Inn, and Inter-Continental. 
By the end of 1980s, European, Japanese and Asian brands also began hotel operations 
not only in gateway cities, but in secondary and resort locations, as well. The higher than 
average gross operating margins, made the operation of four- and five-star hotels much 
more feasible in the Asian-Pacific region than in Europe or the United States. 
In the middle of the 1980s, the stabilization of the American economy and the European 
Economic Commission's decision to move towards a single European market by 
removing trade barriers among its members caused a second wave of construction 
activity in both regions. Until then, the American hotel industry was mostly dominated 
by U. S. companies, with the exception of a few Canadian-based chains. However, the 
situation started to change with the acquisition and merging of American chains with 
European. The most important developments were the acquisition of Hilton International 
by the British Ladbroke PLC and the merger of Holiday Corporation with the hotel 
division of Bass PLC. 
At the same time, international hotel companies expanded their activities in areas that 
had received little attention during the first construction wave in the region. Since the 
prime locations were already taken in the 1960s, it became more difficult to secure 
suitable sites in well-established cities. Thus, the international hotel operators had to 
purchase existing properties in those locations or to consider developing properties 
in 
cities with growing financial importance, like Vienna and Brussels or the resort areas of 
the Mediterranean. 
The decade of the 1990s' started with a severe recession of the American economy 
which, along with overbuilding and the negative effects of the 
Gulf war caused hotel 
occupancy to drop mainly in the US, 
but in other regions as well. Management 
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companies faced severe competition as both investors and lenders were looking for well- 
established brands to operate their properties and capital sources were scarce. The 
economy started to recover by the middle of the same decade and hotel owners were 
able to raise their room rates again. The rest of the 1990s was marked by a series of 
massive takeovers, driven by US-based operators. The companies engaged in the 
takeovers were Real Estate Investment Trusts, a vehicle created by the U. S. law to give 
tax breaks to property investors. They were governed by strict rules in order to enjoy 
exemptions from corporate tax, one of which was to use a management company that 
paid corporation tax to operate their property assets. 
2.3 International Corporate Development: Advantages and 
Disadvantages 
When a hotel company decides to expand its operations, there are three different ways to 
pursue this goal: (a) to expand existing markets at home, (b) to create new products that 
target particular market niches or to (c) develop new markets in foreign countries. Most 
of the established hotel chains have applied all three strategies at some point, 
alternatively or simultaneously. Well-know hotel companies like Hilton Corp. started 
with expansion in their neighbour countries (Canada and Mexico), continued with 
developments in Latin America and Europe and at the same time created new brands to 
suite budget-conscious customers. 
One major force that has encouraged the hotel companies to aim at new markets abroad 
is the need to increase levels of profits and growth (Tse and West, 1992). When most of 
the primary locations in a particular country are taken, the key practice for a hotel 
company to enhance its growth is to expand its business in countries with a less 
developed hotel industry. This strategy has been pursued by European hotel chains that 
expanded in North Africa and the Middle East, as well as by U. S companies that 
developed operations throughout the Middle East region. 
Another reason for international expansion is brand recognition. The more locations a 
hotel company has, the more loyalty and familiarity it can build among its existing and 
potential markets (Bell, 1993). When people travel to 
foreign countries, usually they 
choose familiar hotel brands, because they 
know the quality of the products and the 
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standards of the service. A well-established brand offers some kind of reassurance, 
especially to first-time customers who are concerned about safety and comfort in a 
foreign environment. 
Finally, international corporate development creates geographic diversification of 
operations, which enhances business in prosperous countries and hedges against 
economic downturn in other countries. The more global the company, the less dependent 
it will be upon the changing circumstances of any one country or group of countries 
(Gee, 2000). 
Although global expansion offers wide opportunities for growth and increased market 
share, it is not without its drawbacks. Only in few cases has expansion in foreign 
markets been marked by immediate success and profitability, especially when success is 
measured against domestic standards. One important reason that renders success in a 
foreign environment a challenge is that the hotel company has to deal with multiple 
political, economic and legal issues, as well as to overcome the communication and co- 
ordination difficulties that accrue from geographically dispersed operations (Gee, 2000). 
Furthermore, there may be problems related to financial accounting and control, quality 
control, providing support and securing adequate resources, dealing with conflicting or 
adverse regulations regarding repatriation of royalties and profits. Also, differences in 
industrial structure and business practices render analysis of present and future 
competition in a number of countries more difficult. Finally, the degree of significant 
economic, marketing and other information required for planning varies considerably 
among countries in availability, depth and reliability. 
Overall, successful international corporate development is the outcome of various 
factors related both to the particularities of the new markets under consideration, as well 
as to the characteristics of the hotel chain and its competitive advantages. The existence 
of adequate managerial resources at headquarters to commit to the expansion, as well as 
the ability to control and co-ordinate all different locations, are among the factors that 
need to be considered. 
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2.4 Current Situation 
2.4.1 Geographical Distribution of Hotel Chains 
Until the 1980s, the United States was the most important player in the hotel industry 
and American hotels chains used to dominate not only the American, but the world hotel 
industry, as well. However, during the last two decades the extensive merger and 
acquisition activities have created significant new players that have entered the lodging 
market. European hotel operators, especially British and French, now control some of 
the well-established brands in the world: Hilton International, Inter-Continental and 
Holiday Inns, in the United Kingdom and Accor (which controls among others Sofitel, 
Novotel and Ibis hotels), Societe du Louvre and Club Mediterranee, in France. 
Additionally, the international hotel industry has been influenced by the emergent 
economic power of the Asian-Pacific region. Some of Asia's brand names, such as 
Shangri-La, Pan Pacific Hotels, Nikko Hotels, Peninsula, Mandarin Oriental and Regent 
Internationale, have started to gain brand awareness beyond Asia and the Pacific. There 
are also some of Asia's emerging conglomerates, like Aoki Corporation (the previous 
owners of Westin Hotels) that are investing in the international hotel sector. 
Still, the geographic distribution of the ownership of the major hotel companies is 
concentrated. As can be observed from the following chart, companies based in the 
United States, United Kingdom and France together account for the 87 percent of the 
total number of rooms worldwide, although the increasing activity from the Spanish and 
Asian-Pacific chains can be expected to raise their share in the future (Hotels, July 
2002). 
2 Regent International Hotels, the luxury chain that was until recently based in Hong Kong, is now part of 
Carlson Hospitality, a U. S. based lodging company, and accounts for 11 luxury hotels in 9 different 
countries. 
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Industry 
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Just as U. S. hotel chains are expanding in the international market, in the same way 
European and Asian companies have developed a strong presence in North America. 
International investments in U. S. hotels have increased extensively during the last 
decade and negotiating with international business partners has become common 
practice in many areas of the United States. Besides the fact that, like every U. S. 
company, these hotel chains want to gain international presence, another important 
reason for entering the U. S. market is, or used to be, the political and economic stability 
of the country, as well as the fact that some of the most important gateway cities in the 
world are in the United States. In order to gain market share, "foreign" hotel chains are 
willing to provide equity to negotiate joint ventures or to get a management contract, 
while others attempt to offer a distinct hotel product. 
Regarding the distribution of international hotel chains outside the country where they 
operate most of their hotels (what is call by other researchers home country), it varies 
according to the characteristics of each home country. Besides North America, chains 
that originated in the U. S. have also a strong representation in the Caribbean, in Latin 
America, as well as in Asia. Regarding the European chains, they are much more 
concentrated. French chains are well represented throughout Europe and in French- 
speaking African counties, whereas British brands are highly concentrated in Europe and 
less in African countries and the Caribbean. Finally, Japanese hotel chains have 
comparative strength in North America (mainly in the West Coast), Southeast Asia and 
more recently in Australia. 
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The diverse geographic distribution patterns of hotel chains can be explained by a 
number of political and economic factors. For example, France's presence in French 
speaking countries of Africa can be simply justified by the existence of colonial 
relationships in the past. Moreover, geographic proximity plays a significant role in the 
travellers' decisions, since holiday tourists usually choose destinations as near to their 
home country as possible, in order to economize on time and travel costs3. This pattern 
can be easily observed in practice: European hotel chains have a strong presence in other 
parts of the continent, U. S. chains have expanded their operations throughout North and 
Latin America, while Australian lodging companies are concentrated in the South 
Pacific. 
2.4.2 Industry Structure 
A hotel company that operates within the international hotel industry could fall in one of 
the following three categories (Gee, 2000): 
(a) voluntary associations, organisations that consist of independently owned and 
operated hotels which join together mainly for marketing purposes, 
(b) corporate hotel chains, namely hotel companies that have their one brand(s), which 
can be managed by the corporate chain or by a conglomerate and 
(c) conglomerates, companies that manage corporate brands or independent unbranded 
hotels. 
Voluntary associations - which, as will be explained further on, will not be examined in 
this study - are usually recognized as representative companies or consortia. Currently, 
the most well-known among those organisations is Best Western in the U. S., an 
association that consists mainly of small family-owned hotels. 
International hotel corporate chains and conglomerates are changing the international 
hotel industry rapidly through mergers and takeovers. By the end of 2001, the 20 largest 
corporate hotel chains controlled almost four million hotel rooms in over 30,000 
properties (Hotels, July 2002), almost double what it used to be ten years ago (Hotels, 
July 1993). The first five corporate chains controlled 63 percent of those rooms, as 
3 Nowadays, though, this pattern is not as strong as it used to be in the previous decades. 
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opposed to 53 percent in 1992 (Hotels, July 1993), a fact that suggests a strong trend 
towards concentration in the industry. 
Concentration is the result of mergers and acquisitions and has become a significant 
phenomenon in the hospitality industry, mainly due to the companies' need to have 
representation in key markets and access to new markets, but also as a result of 
saturation in their home market. Major chains from all areas have looked increasingly to 
Europe, North America and the Asian-Pacific region to expand their chains. 
Created through a combination of mergers, takeovers and joint ventures, these large 
corporations are likely to have several different brands, differentiated by price and 
product. Many analysts predict that the multinational "mega-chains" will grow to the 
detriment of the smaller and newer chains, as the costs of maintaining a small or start-up 
hotel company becomes prohibitive. In the end, the predominance of few large national 
and international corporations is likely to prevail, the only exception being a few small 
hotel companies that operate in the upper market segment, like the Canadian Four 
Seasons and the Asian Peninsula Hotels, which are proving they can survive with careful 
niche marketing and strong product quality control. 
2.4.3 Separation of Ownership from Management 
A characteristic of the early hotel pioneers was that they were real estate oriented, and 
thus they owned the properties and buildings they operated. The management of those 
properties was only a means to increasing their market value. Hyatt was among the first 
hotel companies to realise the benefits from separating the ownership from the 
management aspect, by setting up one company to manage the properties and another 
one to own the real estate. Many of the U. S. companies followed that practice by selling 
off much of their capital-intensive real estate, while keeping the management rights. 
Through the redeployment of assets, that process allowed hotel chains to grow more 
rapidly, with emphasis on acquisition of superior properties (Gee, 2000). 
During the 1970s and 1980s, as the role of independent hotels started to decline, chains 
worked with owners and developers to open new, 
large, upscale hotels. The combined 
effect of the significant size of the major chains with economies of scale 
has tended to 
put the independent operator at an increasing 
disadvantage. The crucial boost to chains 
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was given by lenders who were generally more willing to invest funds for new 
properties, if these properties were operated by a well-established hotel chain. 
Table 2.1: The top 15 Corporate Hotel Chains in 2001 
Rank Corporate Chains Rooms Hotels 
1 Cendant Corp (U. S. A. ) 553,771 6,624 
2 Six Continents (U. K. ) 511,072 3,274 
3 Marriott International (U. S. A. ) 435,983 2,398 
4 Accor 415,774 3,654 
5 Choice International Hotels (U. S. A) 362,549 4,545 
6 Hilton Hotels Corp. (U. S. A. ) 327,487 1,986 
7 Best Western International (U. S. A. ) 306,851 4,052 
8 Starwood Hotels & Resorts (U. S. A. ) 224,467 743 
9 Carlson Hospitality Worldwide (U. S. A. ) 135,066 788 
10 Hilton Group PLC (U. K. ) 92,778 384 
11 Hyatt Hotels Corp / Hyatt International (U. S. A. ) 88,442 204 
12 Sol Melia S. A. (Spain) 85,987 350 
13 TUI Group (Germany) 70,293 278 
14 Societe du Louvre (France) 69,049 933 
15 Wyndham International (U. S. A. ) 57,211 224 
Source: Hotels Special Report: Corporate 300, Hotels, July 2002, p. 52 
2.4.4 Major International Hotel Chains 
As already explained above, the international hotel industry went through a significant 
restructuring during the last decade, which was marked by numerous mergers and 
takeovers. As a result, some of the well-know hotel brands were acquired by competitors 
and large conglomerates started to evolve (see Table 2.1 above). For that reason many of 
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the hotel brands that will be presented in this section will be classified under a different 
country ownership than they would have, had this thesis been written a few years ago. 
(a) American Companies 
Although the early traditions of hostelry were established in Europe, it is the American 
hotel chains that are held responsible for the globalization of the hotel industry. The U. S 
hotel chains first applied the concept of standardization of products and services, the 
segmentation of operations and the separation of properties ownership from hotel 
operation. The most well-known American hotel chains are presented below. 
(i) Cendant Corp. and Choice Hotels: 
Among the largest hotel companies worldwide are Cendant and Choice Hotels, which 
are pure franchise companies, that is, both of them "rent out" their brand names to hotel 
owners in return for a fee. Choice Hotels is significantly smaller than Cendant in the 
U. S., but has made more rapid progress oversees, with more than 1,000 hotels in the rest 
of the world (TTI, 2001). Like Cendant, it focuses more on the economy market 
segment, although it also has a more developed mid-market and upscale offering. 
(ii) Hilton Hotels Corporation 
It owns the Hilton brand in North America and, through acquisitions of small hotel 
chains, it also has a range of mostly franchised mid-market brands. It has an alliance 
with the U. K. based Hilton Group, in order to facilitate marketing activities and system 
reservations and to develop the brand worldwide. By the end of the year 2000, the Hilton 
brand, which operates in the upscale segment, enjoyed the highest brand awareness and 
accounted for 500 hotels in more than 50 countries (TTI, 2001)4. 
(iii) Marriott International 
Most of the hotel brands of Marriott operate in the upper market segment. Although the 
Marriott brand has been long established outside the U. S., the true internationalisation of 
the company was marked by the acquisition of the Renaissance group 
in 1996. One of 
the most significant strategic moves of Marriott International, which was then 
followed 
' Although Hilton International is a UK-based company, it is presented together with Hilton Hotels 
Corporation. 
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by many rivals, was the separation of real estate from hotel management, with the 
creation of two companies, Host Marriott - the real estate company - and Marriott Hotels 
and Resorts, the management company. 
(iv) Hyatt Hotels Corp. and Hyatt Int'l 
Hyatt is a privately-owned hotel management company, which, as mentioned before, 
was among the first to realise the advantages of separation of property ownership from 
operating functions. It is split between Hyatt Hotels Corp. in North America and Hyatt 
International in the rest of the world. Hyatt is mostly an upscale hotel management 
company, although it also has some ownership interest in its properties. By the end of 
2000, its portfolio included more than 200 hotels in 43 countries. 
(v) Starwood 
Starwood is an owner, operator and franchisor which owns a number of well-established 
brands, including Sheraton and Westin Hotels. Both hotel brands were bought in 1998, 
in series of aggressive takeover moves. Although Starwood is a relatively new company, 
the Sheraton brand has been operating for more than 60 years (with over 50 years of 
international experience) and currently operates or franchises hotels in more than 70 
countries. 
(b) European Companies 
The European hotel chains, as opposed to the American ones, began their aggressive 
internationalisation strategy in the late 1980s, when home markets stagnated. European 
chains adopted many U. S. management techniques and made extensive use of the 
management contracts. However, they were more willing than their U. S. competitors to 
participate in equity to gain presence in major markets. Currently, the largest European 
hotel companies are based in the U. K., France and Spain. 
(i) Six Continents Hotels 
The U. K. based Six Continents Hotels (formerly Bass Hotels and Resorts) is one of the 
leaders in the international lodging industry. The most famous brand names owned by 
Six Continents are Inter-Continental and Holiday Inn Hotels. Both brands originated 
from the U. S. and were bought by Bass in 1998. Inter-Continental, the upscale brand, 
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was created by Pan American Airlines in order to accommodate its passengers in Latin 
America and the Caribbean and later in Europe, Middle East and Asia. Holiday Inn, on 
the other hand, first operated in the U. S. and was one of the first chains that applied 
franchising extensively for its expansion both in North America and abroad. By the end 
of 2000, Six Continent Hotels owned, operated and franchised almost 3,000 hotels in 
over 100 countries. 
(ii) Accor Hotels 
Accor is the dominant hotel company in France and was among the first to realise the 
value of product segmentation. It operates numerous brands, ranging from the four-star 
Sofitel, three-star Novotel and Mercure and two-star Ibis to the one-star Formule 1 and 
Motel 6. Expanding largely through acquisitions, by the mid-2000 Accor was the second 
largest hotel company in Europe (in terms of rooms) and the fourth worldwide, after 
Cendant Corp., Six Continents Hotels and Marriott International. By September 2002 it 
owned, managed or franchised over 3,700 hotels in 90 countries (www. accor. com, 
2002). 
(iii) Sol Melia S. A. 
Although Sol Melia is a hotel company with less than 20 years of international 
experience, by the middle of 2002 it was the third largest hotel company in Europe and 
twelfth worldwide, with more than 85,000 rooms (Hotels, July 2002). It is strong in city 
and resort properties and is taking the acquisition route to expansion both domestically 
and internationally. 
(c) Asian-Pacific Companies 
Asia's three major Hong Kong-based hotel brands, namely Mandarin Oriental, Shangri- 
La, and Peninsula Hotels, which consistently appear on the list of the world's best 
hotels, continue to expand within Asia and Pacific, but also venture outside the region. 
Additionally, the pioneering Tokyu Group in Japan continues to develop its upscale Pan 
Pacific brand and Japan's two airline-backed hotel chains, Nikko and ANA Hotels are 
also expanding aggressively'. Shangri-La and Pan Pacific 
Hotels are the most 
geographically diversified among the Asian companies, with 
hotels in 10 and 12 
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countries respectively (TTI, 2001). Both are mainly hotel operators although in some 
cases they do participate in the equity of the property. 
2.5 Modes of development of International Hotel Firms 
A firm seeking to expand into a new market needs to make an important strategic 
decision about which mode of development to use for that market. Development 
strategies can be classified into two main categories, according to whether there is equity 
participation in the new operation or not. Equity modes usually include full ownership, 
where the hotel company develops a new property from scratch or acquires an existing 
property, and joint ventures, which can be either majority or minority ventures. 
Contractual modes, which are the least examined so far in the hotel industry, can take 
the form of (a) franchise agreements, which leave the hotel company with the least 
control over the property and the operations, (b) management contracts, where the hotel 
company has full control over the daily operations and the quality of the service 
provided, (c) leasing, which, as will be explained later on, is quite similar to the equity 
ownership mode, and (d) strategic alliances, which usually take the form of a marketing 
agreement between a large well-established and a smaller company that wishes to enter a 
global reservation system. 
2.5.1 Equity Modes of Development 
(a) Full Ownership 
One of the ways for a hotel company to expand in new markets is sole ownership, either 
by acquiring an existing property or by developing a new building. In fully-owned 
operations, a hotel company exercises a strong amount of control both over the tangible 
and the intangible assets, namely the company has full control over the property, as well 
as the codified assets and the daily operations. However, while the hotel company enjoys 
full control, along with all the profits from the hotel operations, it also bears all the risks 
5 Ibid 2. 
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and moreover needs to secure the required financial resources for the development of the 
property (Contractor and Kundu, 1998a). 
In addition, a hotel company that plans to expand into a new market needs to take into 
consideration the fact that some developing countries' governments oppose equity 
investment by foreigners. Government policy makers in many countries find it difficult 
to accept the idea of foreign ownership of businesses, even when such investments may 
serve the country's national goals and priorities (Gee, 2000). Overall, full ownership 
allows the hotel company to gain greater economic reward, but also presents greater 
investment risk when crisis develops in a host country. 
(b) Joint Ventures 
A joint venture could be defined as a separate legal organisational entry representing 
part of the holdings of two or more parent companies (Zahra and Elhagrasey, 1994). 
Each party of a joint venture contributes assets, owns the entity to some degree and 
shares risk (Harrigan, 1984). It is important to note that there is a wide range of 
definitions for joint venture and numerous ways in which to analyse their variety. 
Although some researchers and industry practitioners usually include strategic alliances 
and technology agreements in the spectrum of joint ventures, in the context of this study 
those agreements will be treated separately, since a condition for joint ventures is equity 
participation of all the partners in the new business. 
Foreign and local hotel companies often find that one way to compete more successfully 
in the market place is to combine their different strengths in a joint venture. Among the 
most important advantages of an international joint venture is that it facilitates the 
relationship with local authorities, especially when the local government is one of the 
partners. For example, in China, several of the hotels that were developed over the past 
two decades have been joint venture initiatives between foreign hotel companies and 
China Travel Service (Gee, 2000). The joint venture used to take the form of a 
multilateral agreement, whereby the Chinese government provided the land and the 
labour, a Chinese investor secured the required capital and a hotel company provided 
some operating funds and received the management contract. 
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Moreover, even if there are no governmental restrictions, there are some important 
economic benefits that accrue from a joint venture, compared to full ownership or non- 
equity agreements. The primary benefits are added efficiency (i. e. cost reductions) and 
market-power enhancement (Hennart, 1988). Because of complementary skills, 
economies of scale and scope and the local partner's knowledge of the local 
environment, a joint venture may incur lower operating costs and become more efficient 
than a wholly-owned subsidiary (Yu and Tang, 1992). Compared to licensing, on the 
other hand, joint ventures are more efficient mechanisms for transferring know-how and 
for minimizing transaction costs (Hennart, 1988). Finally, since less investment is 
needed, joint ventures are less risky than wholly-owned subsidiaries in new markets. 
However, joint ventures, especially with governmental agencies, do not come without 
drawbacks. The most important among them are the loss of flexibility to respond quickly 
to market demands and labour needs, and the loss of control in hiring and firing staff, 
determining compensation packages and exercising discretion over the aspects of the 
hotel management (Gee, 2000). Furthermore, empirical evidence has suggested that joint 
ventures may cause conflict between the two (or more) parties, due to changes of the 
partners' objectives, lack of trust, different management styles, lack of co-operative 
behaviour or limited interest from either partner (Zahra and Elhagrasey, 1994; 
Shaughnessy, 1995). 
In addition, joint ventures usually involve complex structuring arrangements and 
difficult negotiations. The basic issues involved are (a) the determination of the value of 
what each party contributes to the joint venture, (b) the ownership advantages, (c) the 
timing and distribution of profits and (d) the sharing of risks and loses. Finally, even if 
the joint venture has been carefully planned and organised and there are no negotiations 
difficulties, it may still fail because of unexpected political, legal and economic 
conditions, hostile response from local companies, or difficulties in repatriation of 
profits. 
During the 1990s, joint ventures showed a considerable success and researchers paid 
much attention to joint ventures as a form of international business. The aspects that 
were examined include joint ventures as an entry mode (Beamish and Banks, 1987; 
Woodcock, Beamish and Makino, 1994), criteria for partner selection (Geringer, 1991) 
and factors that affect profitability and success of 
joint ventures (Geringer and Hebert, 
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1989 and 1991; Makino and Beamish, 1998). Yet, none of these studies includes or 
focuses on the hotel industry. 
2.5.2 Non-Equity Modes of Development 
(a) Franchising 
Franchising can be divided into product/trade-name franchising and business format 
franchising. Product and trade-name franchises are those in which dealers (franchisees) 
enter into a contract with suppliers (franchisors) to sell their products (or product lines), 
e. g. automobile dealers, soft drink bottlers (Combs and Castrogiovanni, 1994). 
Business format franchising on the other hand, encompasses most business operations in 
addition to the product or service itself and offers a method of operation that includes a 
strategic plan for growth and ongoing guidance (Alon, 2001). 
Franchising in the hotel industry can be classified as business format franchising, since 
the franchise agreement between a hotel chain (franchisor) and a hotel owner 
(franchisee) allows the owner to make use of the chain's name and services in return for 
a franchise fee and royalties6. Under such an agreement the hotel chain (franchisor) has 
no ownership or financial interest in the hotel and is not directly responsible for its 
economic success. The owner either operates the hotel or contracts separately with 
another management company to operate the facility (Gee, 2000). 
Hotel companies involved in franchising generally start off as small chains, consisting 
mostly by company-owned properties. Over time they develop a concept and a brand 
name that prove successful in attracting customers. When the service developed 
becomes successful and it can be demonstrated that hotel owners using the brand and 
operational procedures of the company will also be successful, the hotel company is able 
to franchise its concept (Rushmore, 2001) 
The main advantage of franchising for a hotel company that wants to expand 
internationally is that it represents an inexpensive, rapid mode of development. The 
reason is that it usually requires less capital resources compared to acquiring or 
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developing the property (Gee, 2000). Furthermore, franchising does not require the 
extensive management structure that is needed to operate a hotel management company. 
One last cost-saving aspect of franchising is that development responsibilities are shifted 
to the individual property owner (franchisee). 
The main start-up costs for a franchise company consist of the advertising and 
promotional efforts needed to sell franchises and obtain a critical mass of franchisees 
required for an economically viable chain, as well as the costs of developing the 
franchise "package". Depending on the nature of the services provided by the franchisor 
and the fees charged to the franchisee, this critical mass of properties can range from 
twenty to fifty (Rushmore, 2001). 
In addition to cost advantages, franchising provides the hotel chain with rapid and strong 
customer recognition and brand royalty. Having hotels in popular world-wide 
destinations provides potential customers with the opportunity to see the hotel and 
experience the service offered by the specific brand. Once customers recognise a hotel 
product and have been satisfied after using it, brand loyalty develops, which results in 
repeat customer visits and positive word-of-mouth promotion. 
Finally, franchising represents a profitable source of revenue for the hotel company, 
including initial fees paid by the franchisees when they join the franchise system, 
ongoing royalties, and additional payments for services they provide, such as marketing, 
advertising, reservations and training (Rushmore, 2001). Many franchise companies also 
own or manage hotels, and thus franchising allows them to spread the fixed operating 
costs of those facilities among franchised properties. 
Yet, like every mode of international expansion, franchising also has its shortcomings, 
the most important being the loss of control over daily operations and over the quality of 
service provided by the franchisees (Stanworth, 1989). Not only is it difficult for a 
franchisor to enforce its standards, but the process of terminating an unsatisfactory 
franchise agreement can be quite time-consuming. Moreover, the franchisors maybe 
restricted by their franchisees in terms of further expansion, as franchisees are concerned 
6 From hereon the term "franchising" will refer only to business format franchising, as this is the type of 
franchising applied in the hotel industry 
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about the impact of new hotels, affiliated with the same brand, being developed in the 
same area. 
In addition, the franchisor may face difficulties with the franchisees, as they may have 
different objectives regarding turnover and profits, which may result in conflicts 
between the two parties. The relationship can also become strained as franchisees may 
resent control from the franchisor, which usually cannot terminate the franchisee, but is 
only able to buy him out. Another area of disagreement between franchisee and 
franchisor is pricing. The hotel company often encounters difficulties in maintaining 
uniform room rates and pricing policies, which can confuse customers and adversely 
affect the image of the brand. 
From the owner's (franchisee's) perspective, franchise arrangements can offer a number 
of benefits in terms of obtaining the support of a large, reputable hotel chain (Gee, 
2000). The property benefits from chain advertising, access to the franchisor's 
international reservation system, group purchasing arrangements and business advice. 
The fact that a franchised product has been used tested and proven successful saves the 
franchisees time and cost. Another reason for taking on a franchise is a substantial 
advantage arising from the technical and operation expertise available from the 
franchisor. 
However, there are also disadvantages that may affect the franchisee, including 
excessive costs if the incorrect franchise is chosen, the fact that the franchise company 
has no financial stake in the property and the difficulty of transferring the franchise, if 
the property is sold to another hotel company. Furthermore, due to the franchisor's 
desire to maintain a relatively uniform product worldwide, the franchisee is usually 
unable to adapt the provided service to the local needs, unless there is an agreement from 
the hotel chain. 
Some of the hotel companies that first offered franchises were Holiday Inn, Howard 
Johnson, and Ramada Inns (Rushmore, 2001). Those companies, realizing that their 
name, image, goodwill, operating procedures and reservation systems had value, turned 
to franchising their names as a rapid, inexpensive and profitable means of expanding 
their systems. At the same time, hotel developers were drawn to this idea because it gave 
a new hotel an immediate identity and a set of established systems and procedures that 
29 
Expansion Strategies of International Hotel Firms 
provided both lenders and investors with confidence that the property would be 
financially successful. 
Until recently, a relatively small number of hotel companies considered franchising as 
an international expansion strategy, with only exception being the large US companies, 
such as Holiday Inn, Marriot, Choice and Cendant. However, during the last decade 
more hotel chains, from different home countries have started to realise the advantages 
of using franchising for their growth. Moreover, two of those companies, Choice Hotels 
and Cendant Corp. have become "pure" franchise companies, i. e. almost all their hotels 
are operated by franchisees. The world's largest hotel franchising companies are 
presented in Table 2.2: 
Table 2.2: Hotel Companies with the most Franchised Hotels (end 1999) 
Company 
Total 
Hotels 
Total 
Franchised 
% 
Franchised 
Cendant Corp (U. S. A. ) 6,315 6,258 99 % 
Choice Hotels Int'l (U. S. A. ) 4,248 4,248 100 % 
Bass Hotels and Resorts (U. K. ) 2,886 2,563 89 % 
Hilton Hotels Corp. (U. S. A. ) 1,700 1,357 80 % 
Marriott Int'l (U. S. A. ) 1,880 998 53 % 
Carlson Hospitality Worldwide (U. S. A. ) 616 581 94 % 
Accor (France) 3,234 568 18 % 
Societe du Louvre (France) 990 372 38 % 
Starwood Hotels & Resorts (U. S. A. ) 716 299 32 % 
Source: Hotels Special Report: Corporate 300, Hotels, July 2000, p. 54 
(b) Management Contracts 
A management contract is an agreement between a hotel management company and a 
hotel owner, whereby the management company agrees to operate the hotel on a daily 
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basis and takes responsibility for its business. The hotel owner, on the other hand, has no 
involvement in the operations, but may be responsible for all working capital, operating 
expenses, and debt service (Gee, 2000). The management company receives a 
combination of basic and incentive fees for its services, based on the total revenue and 
the operating profits respectively, whereas the owner gets the residual income after all 
expenses. 
The property owner can be an individual, financial institution, corporation, insurance 
company or government. The management company, on the other hand, can be either a 
first-tier, or a second-tier company (Rushmore, 2001). A first-tier management company 
manages hotel properties for a third party, assuming control for the day-to-day 
operations and providing domestic and international recognition through its brand name. 
Four Seasons Hotels, Marriott International and Hyatt Hotels and Resorts are examples 
of first tier companies. Second-tier companies also operate hotel properties under a 
contract, providing everyday supervision and management; the difference from first-tier 
companies is that they do not provide brand name recognition, but use franchise 
affiliations to generate customer identification. American General Hospitality, Interstate 
Hotels and Hospitality Equity Investors are among the largest second-tier management 
companies. In the context of this study only the first-tier companies will be examined, 
since brand name and intellectual property are among the most important factors that 
influence the modal choice of the international hotel companies. 
Management agreements are favoured in many international settings, as they allow a 
hotel chain to establish its presence quickly, with a low level of investment. In fact, 
currently, hotel companies are requested to contribute working capital in the form of a 
loan or some other small good-faith investment (Rushmore, 2001). Moreover, the hotel 
chain has no or very little financial exposure, and essentially covers its operating 
expenses and makes a small profit from the basic management fee and an even larger 
profit from any incentive fee. Yet, the most important advantage of a management 
contract for the hotel company-operator, especially when compared to franchising, is 
that it allows the hotel chain to maintain quality control over the service provided, and 
thus offers protection against brand name deterioration. 
However, when examining its strategies for expansion and growth, a hotel company 
needs to take into consideration the fact that management agreements have some 
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disadvantages as well. Any increase in the value of a hotel generated by the management 
company over the course of a management contract accrues to the benefit of the owner, 
when the hotel is sold or refinanced. Moreover, as the contract terms are getting shorter 
(Jones Lang LaSalle Hotels, 2001), there are cases where a hotel company is unable to 
renew the contract on a property and thus is unable to benefit from the increased value of 
the hotel. Compared to franchising, management contracts represents a more risky mode 
of development in terms of rents for the hotel operator. Although in both cases the hotel 
company receives fees, in the latter case the fees are much more volatile. The reason is 
that when the hotel company acts as franchisor, it is compensated with a percentage of 
total revenue, whereas when the hotel company undertakes the management of the 
property is compensated through an incentive fee, as well as a basic fee and the volatility 
of the incentive fee renders management agreements riskier than franchising. 
Regarding the property owner, management agreements provide them with the essential 
operational expertise, necessary for establishing the long-term profitability of their 
investment, while allowing them to keep ownership benefits, such as depreciation 
deductions, tax benefits, value enhancement and most importantly possession of the 
property after the contract expires. In addition, a well-established hotel company 
(operator) offers the owner immediate national identification and easier capital provision 
from lenders who require that an established management company be put in charge of 
the daily operations 
Nevertheless, the inability to unilaterally terminate a hotel management contract for poor 
performance, which may increase his exposure to financial loss, is one of the main 
disadvantages for the property owner. Even if the contract can be terminated, any delay 
in the replacement of the management company can severely harm the hotel's 
reputation. Finally, the property owner might find it more difficult to sell the property if 
it has to be sold subject to an existing management contract. 
Management Contract Services and Provisions 
The management contract services can be sold as a package, or separately (as technical 
service agreements) and usually include the following 
(Gee, 2000): 
feasibility studies and marketing surveys, 
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" advice and technical assistance on planning, design and architecture, 
" construction co-ordination, 
" recruitment and staff training, 
" marketing, advertising, promotion and reservation systems, 
" management personnel to operate the property and home office supervision and 
support. 
Moreover, a typical management contract includes the following negotiation issues: 
" Financial provisions (management fees, equity, loan and working capital 
contribution, pre-opening budget and financial goals of owner) 
" Operations provisions (services provided, quality standards and inspections, pre- 
opening management services, pricing schedule and operating plan) 
" Marketing provisions (marketing, advertising, promotion services and reservation 
systems) 
" Administration provisions (accounting system used, technical services, and legal 
requirements) and 
" General provisions (contract term, renewal and termination options, performance 
requirements, use of the hotel company's name and owner's right of sale) 
Recent Trends in Management Contracts 
Until the end of the 1970s, the balance of power was in the hands of the management 
companies. They had the right of approval of plans and specifications and the exclusive 
right to supervise and manage the property on behalf of the owner. In addition, most of 
the contracts had at least a 20 year initial term with an option for the hotel company to 
renew on the same terms for another 10 or 20 year period (Eyster, 1988b). The operators 
were usually guaranteed a base return as a percentage of gross revenue and were 
compensated for marketing and promotion, regional office and travel expenses and for 
the provision of a global reservation system. Thus, any medium-sized, well- operated 
management company could make some profit before the incentive fee of 10 to 15 
percent was added in the negotiations (Bell, 1993). 
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However, since the 1980s, a significant shift has occurred in the relative bargaining 
power of owners and operators, as a result of the following developments in the hotel 
industry (Eyster, 1988a). First, competition among hotel management companies 
increased due to the emergence of new hotel chains and the mergers of regional and 
national chains in the US. Second, the owner's knowledge about the hotel industry and 
hotel management contracts became more sophisticated and finally, the lenders assumed 
a more active role in the negotiating process. 
The most important developments in the management contract concerned the 
management fee structure and the initial term and renewal options negotiation (Eyster, 
1993 and 1997). As far as management fees are concerned, there was a shift from basic 
fees only, to a combination of basic and incentive fees, so that the owners could pass 
some of the risk onto the hotel operators. Moreover, incentive fees began to shift from 
the gross-operating-profit line to a cash-flow-after-debt-service line or some other 
negotiated net profit line. According to the most recent survey by Jones Lang LaSalle 
Hotels (2001), operators are becoming more competitive in their base fees so as to 
attract owners, while hoping to recoup their earnings via higher incentive fees. Even 
more interesting is the fact that many American agreements tie the operators' incentives 
to a minimum return on investment for the owners (as opposed to a level of gross 
profits). 
The increased bargaining power of owners is also obvious in the negotiation of the initial 
contract term and renewal options. Although in the European market the most popular 
contract term was found to be 20 years, in the Asia Pacific it was 12 years, and 
in 
America even shorter. Almost half of the American agreements examined by the 
previously mentioned study indicated an initial term of between 5 and 9 years. 
The hotel companies that operate the most properties under management agreements are 
presented in Table 2.3. As it can be observed, the hotel companies that operated the most 
hotels are those positioned in the middle and upper segment, such as Marriott 
International, Hilton and Hyatt Hotels and Resorts. It has to be added that there are a few 
more hotel companies that operated solely as management companies, 
like Four 
Seasons, Shangri-La and Pan Pacific Hotels, but they are not included in the table 
because they have a much smaller portfolio of hotels and thus are not among the first 20 
international hotel chains. 
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Table 2.3: Hotel chains that manage the most hotels 
Company Total Hotels Hotels Managed 
Marriott Int'l 1,880 759 
Societe du Louvre 990 565 
Accor 3,234 546 
Starwood Hotels & Resorts 716 204 
Hyatt Hotels & Hyatt Int'l 195 191 
Bass Hotels & Resorts 2,886 175 
Hilton Hotels Corp 1,700 173 
Source: Hotels, Special Report: Corporate 300, July 2000, p. 55 
(c) Leasing 
While the sale-leaseback concept has been extensively applied in the non-hotel property 
sector for decades, it is only recently that it has been adopted in the hotel sector (Jones 
Lang LaSalle Hotels, July 2002). A key performance benchmark in the hotel industry is 
the rate of growth and market penetration on a global basis. Hotel operators are under 
pressure from their stockholders who demand constant growth. Debt alone cannot 
finance that growth and therefore operators are facing the need for financing without 
loading their balance sheets with debt. Selling non-core hotel property assets and leasing 
them back from purchasers represents an alternative source of much needed capital. 
Moreover, listed hotel companies are under pressure from global equity markets to raise 
cash and cut debt as a means of improving debt/equity ratios and returns on capital. 
Because in most countries sale-leaseback can be treated as "off-balance sheet", financial 
ratios are improved, enhancing the company's credit profile and widening the range of 
alternative vehicles available for future financing. 
7 Typically this type of leasing is classified as operating leasing and is presented in the International 
Accounting Standards (IAS) 17. 
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Sale-leasebacks however, do not come without their drawbacks. Companies may find 
that property ownership provides them with more flexibility as opposed to sale- 
leaseback, especially when extensions and renovations are taken into consideration. It 
could also be the case that companies, which have recently sold property assets, have 
their credit downgraded as a result. In addition, there is the disadvantage of ownership 
loss when the lease expires and loss of future asset appreciation. 
Still, in Europe such deals have been gaining increasing prominence over the past two 
years. The highest profile deal was Nomura's sale-leaseback of the major part of 
Meridien chain. The Royal Bank of Scotland invested £1000 million of equity in the 
portfolio and entered into a £1.25 billion sale-leaseback of the hotel assets, enabling 
Nomura to win the contested public bid to acquire the chain (Jones Lang LaSalle Hotels, 
July 2002). Recent transactions also involve the sale of eleven Hilton Hotels to Royal 
Bank of Scotland, in 2001, and the sale of four Novotel Hotels (Accor Group) to a 
German Fund, in 2000. 
(d) Strategic Alliances 
The final mode of development available to hotel chains that want to expand in new 
markets is the formulation of strategic alliances. The fact that capital for development is 
in shortfall today, creates the need for hotel companies to participate in alliances on a 
marketing basis. For example, SAS and Radisson have created an alliance, Radisson 
SAS Hotels, through which SAS hotels can expand more rapidly in Europe and the 
Middle East. Moreover, Le Meridien and Germany's Kempinski entered a partnership 
arrangement, to enhance their presence in Europe. Usually it is the small hotel company 
that wants to affiliate with the large, well-known hotel chains and tap into their 
reservation systems. The trend reflects the need for small or regional 
hotel companies to 
form partnerships with the world's established brands if they want to survive the 
competitive global hotel industry of the new century. 
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2.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the development of the international lodging industry during the last few 
decades was examined. Due to the continuous changes of the environmental conditions 
that influence the travel and tourism industry, the hotel industry had to adapt itself to suit 
the times. Concentration, which is the result of mergers and acquisitions, has become a 
significant phenomenon in the hospitality industry, mainly due to the companies' need to 
have representation in key markets and access to new markets, but also as a result of 
saturation in their home market. 
Until the 1980s, United States were the most important player in the hotel industry and 
American hotels chains used to dominate not only the American, but the world hotel 
industry, as well. However, during the last two decades the extensive merger and 
acquisition activities have created significant new players that entered the lodging 
market. European hotel operators, especially British and French, now control some of 
the well-established brands in the world. 
In order to grow internationally, lodging firms need to make decisions regarding the 
mode of development that best suits the particular conditions. The most common modes 
of development currently are full ownership, joint ventures, management contracts and 
franchise agreements. Each mode requires different amounts of resources and implies 
different degrees of control over a new operation for the international hotel company; 
therefore the hotel company needs to match the available resources with the preferred 
levels of risk and control when deciding on the most appropriate mode for a new hotel 
operation. 
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CHAPTER 3: RELEVANT THEORIES FOR CORPORATE 
DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present and analyse the main theories of corporate 
development. A systematic examination of the main assumptions and constructs of 
Transaction Cost Economics and Agency Theory will be given, since these two will 
provide the theoretical basis for this study. Then, a short discussion on alternative 
theories that will be excluded from the theoretical framework of this research will be 
provided. Internalisation Theory, Dunning's Eclectic Framework and Organisational 
Capabilities Theory will be examined, since these theories have been used by 
researchers in several studies regarding entry mode decisions of international firms. 
Finally, these theories will be compared to Transaction Cost theory and an explanation 
for their exclusion from the current study will be provided. 
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3.2 Transaction Cost Economics: An overview 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) belongs to the "New Institutional Economics" 
paradigm, which over time has superseded some parts of traditional neoclassical 
economics. Whereas the latter viewed the firm mainly as a production function, TCE 
explicitly considers the firm as a governance structure. Coase (1937) was the first to 
identify firms and markets as alternative governance structures, which differ in their 
transaction costs. Williamson (1967,1975,1979,1985,1996a) considerably extended 
Coase's arguments during the last three decades and incorporated them in a theory of the 
economics of organisation. Williamson's (1996b, p. 138) basic framework features the 
economic organisation as an effort of "discriminating alignment: transactions, which 
differ in their attributes, align with governance structures, which differ in their costs and 
competences, so as to effect a transaction cost economizing outcome". 
Additionally, TCE adopts a contractual approach to the organisation. Simply put, it 
involves an assessment of the comparative costs of planning, monitoring, adapting and 
enforcing a certain transaction, given the alternative forms of organisation. The basic 
issues underlined by this framework are comparability (i. e. one form of organisation is 
always compared with an alternative form) and feasibility (alternatives should be 
realistic not hypothetical). In order to retain only the feasible alternatives, transaction 
cost theory advocates that certain behavioural assumptions should be made. More 
specifically, Williamson (1996a) makes a distinction between the contracting man and 
the orthodox man regarding two basic characteristics: bounded rationality and 
opportunism. 
(a) Bounded rationality: Williamson makes use of the concept of bounded rationality 
in the way that Simon (1961) first defined it: economic actors behave in a way that is 
"intendedly rational but only limitedly so". Whereas the economic orthodoxy relies on 
the fact that economic actors intend to behave rationally in order to achieve their 
economic goals, the study of institutions relies on the proposition that human beings 
have also a limited ability to foresee and to acquire knowledge and skills. 
In situations where bounded rationality is combined with environmental or behavioural 
uncertainty, organisations should abandon the market mechanisms and realise the 
advantages of internal governance, which gives the parties to a transaction the 
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opportunity to react in a sequential, adaptive way without incurring the hazards of 
opportunism that spot contracting would pose. 
(b) Opportunism: The second behavioural assumption relates to the inclination of 
economic actors not to fulfil their promises. According to TCE not every human being 
acts opportunistically; what is difficult, is to know from the outset who is trustworthy 
and who is not. Williamson (1985, p. 47) defines opportunism as "self-interest seeking 
with guile" and suggests that the definition includes actions such as lying, cheating or 
violating agreements. Opportunism poses a problem to the extent that a relationship is 
characterised by a small numbers condition (Williamson, 1975) or supported by specific 
assets, whose value is significantly reduced outside the particular relationship 
(Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Internal organisation is less vulnerable to the hazards of 
opportunism when a small numbers condition exists ex ante or arises during contract 
execution, since hierarchy is less prone to disputes between parties and is able to resolve 
most of them by appeal to fiat. 
As it has already been mentioned, the principal objective of comparative economic 
organisation is to examine each institutional form not independently, but in relation to 
feasible alternatives. The main features according to which TCE analyses each 
transaction are: (a) asset specificity, (b) the degree and type of uncertainty and (c) the 
frequency with which transactions occur. 
(a) Asset Specificity refers to the degree to which human or physical assets are locked 
into a particular use and to the extent they can be redeployed without sacrifice of 
substantial productive value (Williamson, 1996a). Asset specificity becomes an 
important issue, when it is combined with the behavioural assumptions presented above 
and in the presence of uncertainty, because it introduces bilateral dependency into the 
relationship. That is why the identity and reputation of the parties to a specific 
transaction regarding their tendency to continue the co-operation is an important issue in 
the contracting process. 
(b) Uncertainty: refers to situations arising from random acts of nature or changed 
consumer preferences (state contingent kind of uncertainty), lack of communication 
(secondary uncertainty) and most importantly situations characterised by bilateral 
dependency, where behavioural uncertainty evolves. 
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(c) Frequency: The degree and the recurrence with which a transaction occurs is also a 
relevant dimension, since the cost of a complicated governance structure could not be 
recovered in case of a single transaction, whereas it would be justified under situations 
of high transaction volume. 
TCE theory identifies the transaction instead of the individual or the industry as the basic 
unit of analysis and assesses the comparative costs of planning, adapting, monitoring, 
and enforcing task completion under different governance structures. The key 
differences between the three governance structures, i. e. market, hybrids and hierarchies, 
relate to the form of contract law that supports them, the adaptability of each mode and 
the use of incentive and control instruments that characterise them. 
Table 3.1 summarises the distinctive features of each governance mode and shows that 
the hybrid mode is located between the market and the hierarchy and is characterised as 
a more elastic and adaptive governance form compared to the market, but more legalistic 
and less adaptive than hierarchy. 
Table 3.1: Distinguishing Attributes of Market, Hybrid and Hierarchy 
Governance Structures 
Governance Structure 
Attributes Market Hybrid Hierarchy 
(a) Instruments 
Incentive Intensity ++ + 0 
Administrative Controls 0 + ++ 
(b) Performance Attributes 
Adaptation (A) ++ + 0 
Adaptation (C) 0 + ++ 
(c) Contract Law ++ + 0 
Williamson, 1996a, p. 105 
(a) Contract Law: In the case of autonomous markets, where there is no dependency 
between buyers and sellers and the identity of the parties does not matter, classical 
contract law is sufficient, since the terms of the specific transactions are explicitly 
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specified ex ante (Williamson, 1996a). However, when future contingencies cannot be 
specified at the outset, a different kind of contracting that supports the relation with an 
additional governance structure should be applied, namely neoclassical law and excuse 
doctrine. Finally, according to Williamson (1996, ch. 4), hierarchy is a more adaptive 
mode and the type of implicit "contract law" that applies to this kind of organisation is 
that of forbearance, namely a more flexible arbitration form, which allows the dispute 
outcome to be determined by mitigating factors that are not allowed when disputes are 
resolved in courts. The rationale for forbearance rests on the fact that parties to a dispute 
have knowledge that is either impossible or too costly to reveal in a court; hence the 
parties either settle their differences on their own or let the hierarchy decide on 
unresolved situations. 
(b) Adaptability: Apart from contract law that applies to each form of organisation, 
adaptability is another central problem of economic organisation. Williamson suggests 
that adaptation can be classified into two types: autonomous (A), which has spontaneous 
origins and can be successfully applied in spot contracting and coordinated (C), which is 
required in cases of contracts that are characterised by strong disturbances and therefore 
can be applied in cases of a more hierarchical governance. 
(c) Incentives and Co-ordination Instruments: These adaptation advantages, however, 
do not obtain without respective costs; in fact, internal organisation weakens incentive 
intensity and causes bureaucratic costs to rise. Within hierarchical governance, incentive 
intensity is being considered not as an objective but as an instrument. As far as the 
hybrid mode is concerned, it is characterised by moderate degrees with respect to 
adaptability features and incentive intensity (Williamson, 1996a). Finally, in the market 
mode, high intensity incentives are prevalent. 
3.3 Agency Theory: An Overview 
Starting in the 1970s, the agency theory literature extended the analysis of the risk- 
sharing problem, which referred to different attitudes towards risk between cooperating 
parties, to include the agency problem that arises when cooperating parties have 
different goals and division of labour. Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined the agency 
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relationship as a contractual arrangement between two (or more) parties, where one, 
designated as the agent, acts on behalf of, or as a representative for the other, designated 
as the principal, who delegates some decision-making authority to the agent in order to 
act in a certain domain of decision problems. 
Agency theory (AT) is mainly concerned with two basic problems that arise in the 
agency relationship. The first problem arises when the principal's and the agent's goals 
are incongruent and it is difficult for the principal to evaluate the agent's effort and 
actions. The problem in that case is that the principal cannot verify whether the agent has 
behaved appropriately. The second problem concerns risk sharing and arises when the 
principal and the agent have different attitudes toward risk. Different risk preferences 
lead the agent to take different actions from what the principal would prefer (Eisenhardt, 
1989). 
(a) The agency literature refers more often to the first problem, which usually takes two 
different forms: the problem of adverse selection and the problem of moral hazard. The 
adverse selection problem arises due to pre-contractual information asymmetries. The 
term has arisen from the insurance industry, where the selection of people that purchase 
insurance is not a random sample of the population, but rather a group of people with 
private information about their personal situations, that makes it likely they will receive 
a higher-than-average level of benefit payments under the insurance policy. 
As mentioned by Akerlof (1970) in his "Market for Lemons", the asymmetric 
information condition, when combined with unconstrained opportunism (which is one of 
the human assumptions made by agency theory) can lead to the collapse of markets, 
since there would be no price at all at which the quantity of a good supplied to the 
market by sellers would be equal to the quantity demanded by buyers. In general, 
markets may have problems functioning in situations where there is private information 
that is difficult to verify. And the person who has the private information may lose just 
as much or more than the person who does not (Noreen, 1988). 
Moral hazard usually refers to lack of effort on the part of the agent. More generally it 
refers to the risk of opportunism, i. e. self-interest seeking with guile, as defined by 
Williamson (1975). This term also originated in the insurance industry, where it referred 
to the tendency of people with insurance to change their behaviour in a way that leads to 
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larger claims against the insurance company. Moral hazard problems may arise in any 
situation in which someone is tempted to take an inefficient action or to provide 
distorted information because the individual's interests are not aligned with the group 
interest and because the action cannot be accurately monitored. 
The argument in the principal-agent context is that the agent may simply not put forth 
the agreed-upon effort. That is, the agent is shirking. Therefore, the principal's problem 
is to design a contract that rewards the agent according to the outcome, taking in to 
account any tendency the agent has to make decisions that are non-optimal for the 
principal. 
(b) Regarding the second problem in the agency relationship, risk sharing between 
principal and agent, it would still exist, even if there were no problem of asymmetric 
information between the two parties. Since both principal and agent are assumed to be 
risk averse there is a need for sharing the risk attaching to outcomes of the agent's 
actions. Indeed, if the agent were risk neutral he would bear all the risk; the principal 
would retain a fixed amount of the outcome and gave the remaining to the agent, who 
then would not have any dilution of incentives, as for example when the principal is a 
bondholder. However, since the agent, like all individuals, is averse to sufficiently large 
risks, "the solution of preserving incentives by assigning all risks to the agent fails, as 
soon as the risks are large compared with the agent's wealth" (Arrow, 1985; p. 45). 
According to Agency Theory, the unit of analysis is the contract that characterises the 
relationship between the principal and the agent. The aim of the theory is to identify the 
most efficient contract for the agency relationship, given the assumptions about human 
nature, namely bounded rationality, self interest with guile and risk aversion, about 
organisations, i. e. goal conflict between members and about information, i. e. information 
is a purchasable commodity. Basically, the question becomes whether a behaviour- 
oriented contract (e. g. salaries) is more efficient that an outcome-oriented one (e. g. 
commission, stock options). 
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Table 3.2: Agency Theory Overview 
Key idea Principal-agent relationships should reflect efficient 
organisation of information and risk-bearing costs 
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent 
Human assumptions Self interest with guile, bounded rationality and risk 
aversion 
Organisational assumptions Partial goal conflict among participants (incentive 
misalignment) 
Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion 
Information asymmetry between principal and agent 
Information assumption Information is a purchasable commodity and the more 
information available the better an action can be 
monitored and evaluated 
Contracting problems Agency (information asymmetry, moral hazard and 
adverse selection) 
Risk sharing 
Problem domain Relationship in which the principal and agent have partly 
differing goals and risk preferences (e. g. compensation, 
regulation, leadership, vertical integration, transfer 
pricing) 
Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 59, amended by the author 
From its roots in information economics, agency theory has developed along two 
streams: positivist and principal-agent. Both directions share a common unit of analysis, 
i. e. the contract, and the same assumptions about human nature, organisations and 
information. However, they have important differences that are presented in Table 3.3: 
Table 3.3: Comparison between Positivist Agency and Principal Agent Theory 
FEA TURES POSITIVIST AGENCY PRINCIPAL AGENT 
THEORY THEORY 
Relationship Owner-manager relationship in Several types of agency 
large corporations relationship 
Focus Identifies various contract Indicates which is the most 
alternatives efficient 
Approach Less mathematical Mathematical, less accessible 
to organisational scholars 
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(a) Positivist Agency Theory: The focus of most positivist researchers has been the 
identification of situations in which the principal and the agent have conflicting goals 
and the description of governance mechanisms that restrain the agent's opportunistic 
behaviour. Also, they study almost exclusively the relationship between the owners and 
managers of large corporations (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
According to this theory, there are two mechanisms that can be used to limit the agent's 
self-serving behaviour, thus mitigating the agency problem: the use of outcome-based 
contracts and the use of information systems. The benefit of outcome-based contracts is 
that they coalign the incentives of principals and agents, since the rewards for both 
depend on the same actions. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) described how 
increasing the managers' ownership stake in the firm decreases managerial opportunism. 
The alignment of interests is beneficial to the performance of the agency relationship, 
not only because it assures an appropriate level of effort on behalf of the agent, but also 
because it promotes the right choices. Thus, for example, a corporate executive who 
thinks that the future of the company lies with a certain product can be expected to place 
like-minded managers in positions of responsibility. 
When incentive alignment is difficult to achieve, monitoring the agent's behaviour can 
be another way to mitigate the agency problem. The use of information systems helps 
the principal to observe the agent's behaviour; hence the agents know that they cannot 
deceive the principal, therefore they act in an optimal way for his interests. For example, 
Fama and Jensen (1983) described the information role that boards of directors play in 
controlling managerial behaviour. 
Moreover, the literature suggests the use of multiple agents as an alternative way of 
monitoring the agent and deciding whether he has acted in accordance with the 
principal's interests (Sappington, 1991). Additional agents can provide valuable 
information about the activities of any particular agent, especially when the performance 
of each one is influenced by a common exogenous parameter that the principal cannot 
observe. In such a case the relative performance of the agents can provide a good 
indicator of their individual efforts, while controlling for the effects of the common 
environmental variables. 
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(b) Principal Agent Research: This stream of agency theory is concerned with a broader 
range of principal-agent relationships than positivist theory, such as employee-employer, 
buyer-supplier and consultant-client. Compared to positivist theory, it is based more on 
applications of information economics, hence less accessible to organisational scholars 
and includes many more testable implications. In addition, whereas the positivist theory 
sets out two alternative mechanisms for limiting agent's self-serving behaviour, i. e. 
outcome-based or behaviour-based contracts, the principal-agent theory is concerned 
with the determination of the optimal choice of contract, which implies a trade-off 
between (i) the cost of measuring the agent's behaviour and (ii) the cost of measuring 
outcomes and transferring risk to the agent. 
According to its propositions, the degree of risk aversion of the agent is positively 
related to preference for a behaviour-based contract and negatively related to preference 
for an outcome-based contract. Indeed, the less risk averse the agent, the more attractive 
it is to pass onto him or her, the risk of an outcome-based contract. The opposite is 
suggested to be the case for the principal, i. e. the degree of risk aversion of the principal 
is positively related to preference for an outcome-based contract and negatively related 
to preference for a behaviour-based contract. 
Moreover, it is suggested that goal conflict between the principal and the agent is 
positively related to outcome-based contracts and negatively related to behaviour-based 
ones. It is obvious that the same relationships are expected in case of outcome 
measurability: when outcomes are measured with difficulty, outcome-based contracts 
become less attractive. 
Whatever the approach taken, it has to be acknowledged that agency theory has 
contributed in organisational thinking in two different ways. First, it treats information 
as a commodity that has a price and can be purchased, the implication being that 
organisations can invest in information systems in order to control agent opportunism. 
The second contribution concerns its risk implications: uncertainty not only entails an 
inability to preplan but also involves a trade-off between risk and rewards. The 
implication is that the contract between principal and agent is being affected not only by 
outcome uncertainty but also by differences in their willingness to accept risk. 
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3.4 Comparison between Transaction Cost Economics and 
Agency Theory 
Both TCE and AT differ from the neoclassical theory of organisation which regards the 
firm as a production function, since the former considers the firm as a governance 
structure (Williamson 1975,1985 and Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978), while the 
latter treats it as a nexus of contracts (Jensen and Meckling 1976). As has already been 
previously discussed, TCE traces its origins to explanations of vertical integration, 
whereas AT was originally concerned with corporate control. While some believe that 
these two theories are based in different paradigms, others suggest that the differences 
are exaggerated. In addition, some scholars consider the theories to be complementary 
and use them jointly as a basis for their conceptual framework (Contractor and Kundu 
1998a). 
TCE and AT enjoy important similarities across different dimensions. Firstly, both 
derive from a "managerial discretion setup " (Williamson, 1996a; p. 173); bounded 
rationality and opportunism are basic assumptions in both theories, although agency 
theory uses the terms "moral hazard" and "agency costs" when referring to opportunism. 
Additionally, both follow an efficient contracting orientation towards economic 
efficiency: an incomplete contracting orientation is employed, since contracting parties 
are assumed to be aware of the prospective distortions and needs for incentive 
realignment and governance structures' refinement. 
Those similarities notwithstanding, there are several important differences between 
transaction costs and agency theory that should be underlined: 
La) Unit of analysis: Whereas TCE regards the transaction as the main unit of analysis, 
AT considers the individual agent to be the central unit of analysis. 
(b) Market characteristics: TCE maintains that it is not possible to write complete 
contracts due to bounded rationality; for that reason the basic assumption of the theory is 
that this leads markets to fail, under certain conditions, a situation which induces the 
firms to produce on their own (i. e. to integrate). On the contrary, agency theory 
presumes market efficiency and tries to identify the optimum contract for the exchange. 
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(c) Organisational concern: although both theories adopt an incomplete contracting 
orientation, AT examines contracts mainly from an ex ante incentive alignment point of 
view, while TCE is more concerned with providing governance structures that can 
operate ex post. Whereas AT is little concerned with disputes resolution, TCE aims in 
providing mechanisms that facilitate dispute resolution. More specifically, TCE is trying 
to assess the comparative efficacy of alternative comparative structures for harmonizing 
ex post contractual relations (Williamson, 1985). 
(d) Focal costs concern: as a consequence of their organisational focus, the theories in 
question also differ regarding their concern over costs; while AT has the residual loss as 
the centre of interest, TCE has the cost of maladaptation as its main focus. The residual 
loss is defined as the reduction in the welfare of the principal, after monitoring and 
bonding, as a result of the remaining divergence between the agent's decisions and those 
that would maximise the principal's welfare (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Residual loss 
is the key feature, since monitoring and bonding costs are incurred only in the degree to 
which they yield cost-effective reductions in the residual loss. Therefore, the main issue 
in agency theory is the ex ante alignment of incentives. 
On the other hand, although transaction costs have both ex ante and ex post components, 
the emphasis in TCE is on the ex post costs, which include maladaptation costs when 
transactions drift out of alignment, haggling costs that arise when efforts to correct ex 
post misalignment are made and setting up and running costs of governance structures to 
which disputes are referred (Williamson, 1996a). 
(d) Process distinctions: AT suggests that natural selection processes are reliably 
efficacious and relies in the assumption that ex post settling up can efficiently control 
managers. On the other hand, TCE presents two different process arguments; the first is 
fundamental transformation, as was described by Williamson (1985,1996a), and the 
second deals with the impossibility of selective intervention (Williamson, 1985). 
Fundamental transformation arises due to asset specificity and refers to a situation where 
a large numbers bidding condition at the outset is effectively transformed into one of 
bilateral dependency thereafter. The impossibility of selective intervention explains why 
internal organisation is not able to beat markets everywhere by combining replication (in 
situations where markets work well) with selective 
intervention (in situations where 
markets do poorly). In the context of this research, 
impossibility of selective intervention 
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refers to efforts to replicate high-powered incentives that are efficient in the market 
mode (i. e. franchising), when transferring transactions to a more hierarchical mode (i. e. 
management contracts or company ownership). 
Table 3.4 provides a summary of the leading differences between transaction costs and 
agency theory. 
Table 3.4: Summary of differences between TCE and AT 
Issues of Controversy Transaction Costs Theory Agency Theory 
Unit of Analysis Transaction Individual Agent 
Market Characteristics Markets can fail Markets are efficient 
Organisational Concern Ex post governance Ex ante incentives alignment 
Focal Cost Concern Maladaptation costs Residual loss 
Process Distinctions Fundamental Transformation 
Impossible selective 
intervention 
Natural selection processes 
Williamson, 1996a; p. 179 
3.5 Internalisation Theory 
The internalisation theory of market entry asserts that a firm's involvement in a 
particular foreign market is gradual and incremental. According to the theory, a firm is 
likely to enter a specific host market initially by low resource commitment to minimise 
the risk and the cost of foreign market involvement, e. g. through exporting. As the firm 
acquires knowledge and experience regarding the foreign market, it tends to shift to 
higher resource commitment and control mode, that is joint ventures and later on to 
fully 
owned subsidiaries abroad. 
The theory rests on two fundamental principles: (a) firms choose the least cost 
location 
for each activity they perform and (b) firms grow by internalising markets up to 
the 
point where the benefits of further internalisation are outweighed 
by the costs. 
At the beginning, joint ventures were not explicitly considered on the spectrum of 
governance choices, whereas non-equity forms of co-operation such as 
licensing were 
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considered to be of lesser interest. Moreover, even when the choice was expanded to 
include co-operative forms such as licensing (Buckley and Casson, 1976), it was 
suggested by the research that the multinational firm would usually prefer to internalise 
transactions via direct equity investment rather than to license its capabilities. However, 
recent work like that of Buckley and Casson (1996) considers co-operative modes of 
organisation highly likely as a mode of market entry. 
The internalisation perspective (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Rugman, 1980) is closely 
related to transaction cost theory. It is based on the premise that the greater the danger of 
a firm losing its specific knowledge, the higher is the incentive for it to internalise 
transactions. This influences the firm's ownership preference in international markets. 
For example, a firm might choose ownership over licensing if the potential of losing 
specific knowledge (specific assets) is high. 
Internalisation as well as transaction cost theory are concerned with the minimisation of 
transaction costs and the conditions underlying market failure. Both analyse the 
characteristics of the transaction in order to decide on the most efficient, i. e. cost- 
minimising, governance mode. The fundamental idea underlying the two approaches is 
that firms use internal organisation to overcome problems that are caused by market 
inefficiencies. The primary difference is that the transaction cost approach focuses on 
the single transaction, while for internalisation theory the unit of analysis is the 
firm. 
Another difference is that the focus of internalisation is on the market for know-how, 
while that of TCE is on more micro-level transaction characteristics such as asset 
specificity. 
3.6 Dunning's Eclectic Paradigm 
The eclectic theory of international production suggests that enterprises with 
headquarters in one country will have some form of involvement in companies outside 
their national boundaries whenever they have competitive 
(or ownership) advantages 
over firms of other nationalities and they 
find it economic to combine these assets with 
advantages located in foreign countries 
(Dunning, 1980). 
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The research regarding the choice of market entry mode began in the international 
business fields with the question of the choice between exporting as opposed to foreign 
direct investment. Whatever the market entry theory used, there are certain factors that 
are considered to determine the modal choice. According to Dunning (1993) these 
factors, or advantages, are classified in three basic categories: 
(a) The extent and nature of technological and managerial advantages in comparison to 
those of the indigenous firms in the country in which they are producing (ownership 
advantages). In the case of the hotel industry, ownership advantages maybe related to 
the fact that hotel services are consumed in an unfamiliar environment, where brand 
awareness guarantees a standard of service quality to the tourist. It could also refer to the 
ability of an international hotel chain to operate with a superior production function 
compared to local hotels (Dunning and McQueen, 1981). 
(b) The benefits of combining these advantages with immobile factor endowments in a 
foreign country to provide further value added activities (location advantages). In the 
context of the hotel industry, location advantages may include general political 
economic and social factors as well as factors related to tourism, such as tourism 
infrastructure, size and rate of growth of tourism and availability of hotel inputs. 
(c) The advantages of internally controlling and coordinating both the above-mentioned 
factors with factors owned by the multinational company, rather that selling this right to 
indigenous firms located in the country of production (internalisation advantages). 
Dunning and McQueen (1981) were among the first to notice that ownership and control 
in the hotel industry are not necessarily correlated with each other. They make a 
distinction between de jure control, which is a function of ownership, and de facto 
control, which can be achieved through a non-equity arrangement, such as a 
management agreement. They define internalisation 
in the hotel industry as any form of 
involvement in foreign operations, other than an "arms-length" transaction, which could 
range from subcontracting to full ownership. 
"To determine whether and how much 
internalisation is de facto practiced, one therefore needs to look at the control procedures 
of equity-based control and the terms of the contract of contract-based control. 
" 
(Dunning and McQueen, 1981, p. 205) 
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In the context of the present study, it could be argued that Dunning's paradigm does not 
provide a better explanation for the choice among franchising, management contracts 
and company ownership than TCE does. The explanatory variables of the above 
mentioned decision (as will be presented in a subsequent chapter) are indeed classified 
in a similar way to the factors that determine entry mode according to Dunning, namely 
firm-specific variables (i. e. ownership advantages) and market-specific variables 
(location advantages). However, instead of providing a third category of advantages (i. e. 
internalisation advantages), what TCE does, is to provide a more comprehensive theory 
for justifying when ownership and location advantages favour the use of a "hierarchical" 
mode of entry (or corporate development) versus a "market" mode. 
Therefore it is suggested that Dunning's paradigm can be regarded as subsumed in the 
theoretical framework of this study, hence it does not provide additional explanations of 
the corporate development choice over what is provided by TCE, and thus an extensive 
presentation of this theory is not a requisite for this study. 
3.7 Organisational Capabilities Theory 
In contrast to Transaction Cost Economics, the Organisational Capabilities perspective 
(OC) shifts the attention from the characteristics of the transaction to the capabilities of 
the firm, and the unit of analysis from the transaction to the firm, which is perceived as a 
bundle of knowledge. OC theory provides a central role to bounded rationality and to 
organisational routines in the organisation of economic activity, and considers the firm 
as a group of transferable resources, which are transformed into capabilities through 
dynamic firm-specific processes. More specifically, the theory considers as very 
important the experiences that a firm gains through its past activities, routines and 
procedures, since these are going to influence 
its subsequent actions. Therefore, the 
firm's capabilities behave as a source of advantages as well as constraints on the 
firm's 
future activities (Madhok, 1997). 
According to the OC perspective as presented by Madhok (1996,1997 and 1998), TCE 
is unable to give a comprehensive explanation 
for the existence of the firm and a theory 
of economic organisation in general. 
It asserts that TCE basically ignores the essential 
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concept of the firm as a locus of resources and capabilities and the fundamental 
processes that take place within the firm. 
The starting point of disagreement between the OC perspective and TCE is that the 
former considers the firm to be the unit of analysis, while for the latter the unit of 
analysis is the single transaction. As a result, TCE analysis focuses on the characteristics 
of the transaction, while the OC area of focus is related to firm capabilities. One of the 
main OC objections to TCE, however, is that opportunism (defined as self-seeking with 
guile) is not as important as argued by TCE; the assumption that opportunism is a 
pervasive consideration in the decision to internalise an activity (i. e. to use hierarchy 
rather than the market as a governance structure) is considered by organisational 
theorists to be too limiting (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). 
Furthermore, the OC approach asserts that TCE ignores other considerations that are 
important in corporate development, such as organisational capabilities and synergistic 
properties, and that it focuses on cost minimisation instead of management of value. The 
resource-based approach on the other hand "embraces the (positive) value-creating 
potential of the firm, rather than avoidance of the (negative) effect of opportunism" 
(Madhok, 1997). 
Table 3.5: Comparison of the TC and the OCperspectives 
The TC perspective The OC perspective 
Unit of analysis Transaction Firm 
Primary area of focus Transaction characteristics Firm capabilities 
Key assumption Opportunism Bounded rationality 
Source of competitiveness Efficient management Development and exploitation 
of transactions of capabilities 
Primary orientation in the Cost Minimization Management of Value 
management of know-how 
Key consideration to choice TC minimization; fit between Contributions towards and 
of ownership form transaction characteristics and demands placed on firm's 
form of governance capabilities 
Temporal orientation Essentially static Essentially dynamic; learning 
and equilibrium-oriented and capability building as 
developmental processes 
Source: Madhok, A. (1997): Cost, Value and Foreign Entry Mode, Strategic Management 
Journal, 18, p. 41 
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However, the OC objection that questions the importance of opportunism is not adopted 
in this study. Contrary to what is argued by Ghoshal and Moran (1996) it is suggested 
here that relationship-specific assets cannot reduce the costs of internal organisation (i. e. 
hierarchy) independent of their effects on opportunism. What differentiates hierarchy 
from the market is the ability to resolve disputes by fiat, rather than by costly haggling 
or recourse to costly procedures involving external authorities such as courts. 
Moreover, firms employ people rather than just using external contractors to do the job 
because some tacit information may be hard to communicate except by task-based 
learning. And the reason why external contractors cannot be allowed to engage in task- 
based learning is the possible exposure of that knowledge to opportunistic use. Firms on 
the other hand allow employees to access this "impacted" information because the 
employment relation offers them some protection against the opportunistic use of such 
information. Hence, this study is based on the view that opportunism has a central role in 
the organisational theory in general and the theory of corporate development in 
particular. 
As far as corporate development is concerned, the OC approach argues that entry into 
foreign markets involves the transfer of knowledge over some duration of time 
(Madhok, 1996). From this perspective, the firm boundary issue is a capability related 
one; where the firm already has the appropriate knowledge and possesses the required 
routines, internalisation will be the preferred mode of undertaking the activity, since 
incremental costs are marginal. 
In contrast, when the firm enters into unfamiliar areas of activity, according to the OC 
approach the capability constraint becomes important, since the technological and 
market distance of the target activity is further away from the firm's centre of 
knowledge. In that case, collaboration provides useful ways to improve knowledge in 
certain areas of functioning, where it cannot be developed within an acceptable time 
period or cost. Thus, in order for a firm to make decisions regarding its ownership mode, 
the development and deployment of its capabilities should be taken into consideration. 
Although the OC approach could provide a complementary theory on the economics of 
organisation, it would not be useful as an explanation of one important aspect of 
organisation, namely the choice between market and hierarchy as a governance mode, 
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which is the main focus of this study. Using this theory, one would have to classify 
management contracts as a non-equity collaborative agreement (a "market" one), rather 
than as a "hierarchy" one. However, using transaction cost economics one can easily 
understand that management contracts can be classified as a hierarchical mode of 
organisation (the following chapter gives an extensive explanation on this issue). 
Finally, it is important to notice that the research question of this study is to identify how 
international hotel firms decide on the organisational mode of each new hotel outlet, 
regardless of whether the hotel is being developed in foreign country or not, or whether 
the firm already has presence in a particular country. Thus, the focus of the study, i. e. the 
unit of analysis is a particular transaction of the hotel firm (i. e. the development of a new 
outlet). In contrast to previous studies, what is being examined here is not how a 
multinational company will enter a foreign market (e. g. through a contractual agreement 
or by developing a subsidiary in the target country). Thus, the focus of the study is not 
the firm. Therefore, OC theory is not a key theoretical approach as far as this study is 
concerned. 
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3.8 Conclusions 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and Agency Theory (AT) are two of the theories 
that are most commonly used to examine how firms decide on their entry mode or 
expansion strategies. Besides TCE and AT, there are alternative theories that are often 
applied by researchers in order to explain what factors influence international firms 
when they examine alternative modes of entry. The overview of theoretical approaches 
on the existence of multinational firms presented in this chapter shows that many 
explanations are possible. 
At the beginning, an extensive discussion of the theories that will be used in the context 
of this study, namely Transaction Cost Economics and Agency Theory, was provided, as 
well as a comparison between them. Moreover, short introductions to Internalisation 
Theory, Dunning's eclectic framework and Organisational Capabilities theory were 
given, along with a justification for their exclusion from the theoretical framework of 
this study. 
Although both Internalization Theory and Dunning's framework take the same approach 
to the entry mode/ corporate development decision as TCE, both are excluded from this 
research. As explained earlier, Internalization Theory presents many similarities to TCE 
and is considered to be an application of the Transaction Cost theory to the multinational 
corporation (Rugman, 1986). Therefore it is argued that Internalization Theory would 
not provide any additional explanations for the modal choice of international hotel firms 
and thus is not included in the theoretical framework of this research. 
Furthermore, compared to Dunning's framework, TCE provides a more comprehensive 
theory for justifying when ownership and location advantages favour the use of a 
"hierarchical" mode of entry (or corporate development) versus a "market" mode instead 
of providing a third category of advantages (i. e. internalisation advantages). Therefore it 
is suggested that the arguments provided by Dunning's eclectic paradigm have already 
been considered in the theoretical framework of this study as part of the justification 
provided by Transaction Cost Economics. 
Organisational Capabilities theory on the other hand, although it provides a 
comprehensive explanation for the existence of the firm, will also be disregarded since 
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using this theory, one would have to classify management contracts as a non-equity 
collaborative agreement (a "market" one), rather than as a "hierarchy" one. 
Finally, as far as Agency Theory is concerned, it is suggested that its inclusion in the 
study would offer a better understanding of the choice among franchising, management 
contracts and company ownership, since the relationship between an international hotel 
company and a property owner / prospective franchisee is a classic principal-agent 
relationship. Therefore, Agency Theory would act complementarily to Transaction Cost 
Economics towards a more comprehensive theoretical framework for this research. 
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CHAPTER 4: MODES OF CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT (MODAL 
CHOICE) IN THE HOTEL INDUSTRY 
4.1 Introduction 
Modes of corporate development differ from each other on several dimensions, one of 
which is the degree of control the firm can exercise. At this stage, a definition of 
ownership and control, as these concepts will be used in this report should be given. 
Ownership in international business operations refers to how much of the assets an 
international firm owns or invests in the facility. On the other hand, control refers to the 
degree to which the firm controls (or manages) the operation of the established facility. 
Traditionally, control has been perceived by researchers as a result of ownership. Thus, 
it has been suggested that the greater the firm's level of ownership, the greater the 
control it enjoys over its transactions. However, in some service sectors, such as hotels, 
control has been de-linked from equity ownership. Contractor and Kundu (1998a) 
suggest that the fact that non-equity modes of development account worldwide for 65% 
of foreign operation properties8 implies that managerial control is not weak in those 
modes. 
It is important to mention at this stage that modal choice is going to be studied in terms 
of the degree of control over the hotel operations that is provided by each one of the 
development modes. What is of great interest to the author is the managerial control, not 
the equity participation in the facility. As a consequence, the following clarification 
needs to be made: properties that are managed by an international hotel company are not 
necessarily owned by the same company. It could be that the property is owned by 
another party and that the hotel company (operator) does not have an equity stake on the 
property, or owns a small percentage. In the same way, when the international hotel firm 
acts as franchisor it could be that the hotel property is owned either by the franchisee or 
by a third party. 
8 Foreign operations as defined in footnote no. 1 
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When contractual modes are examined according to Transaction Cost Economics, 
management contracts are considered to be located towards the "hierarchy" pole of the 
market-hierarchy continuum, since this mode provides the highest degree of control over 
the facilities, in comparison to the rest of the contractual modes. More specifically, 
under a management service agreement, control over the daily operations and the 
intangible assets, i. e. human capital and intellectual property rights (knowledge capital, 
codified assets) is exercised by the hotel company. In contrast, when the hotel company 
acts as franchisor, the intangible assets are substantially under the control of the 
franchisee. Therefore, franchising is considered as a form similar to "subcontracting", 
and thus is placed towards the "market" pole of the continuum. 
In this chapter, the three modes of development that comprise the modal choice in this 
research, namely company ownership, management contracts and franchising will be 
presented from a transaction cost, as well as an agency theory perspective. 
Consequently, an explanation of control as a strategy issue in international hotel 
corporate development will be provided. The reasons for excluding some variables that 
have been examined in previous studies and the empirical results from the service sector 
will be discussed in the last two sections. 
Although the main focus of this thesis is the examination and analysis of Modal Choice, 
the reader first needs to understand how the three expansion modes that will be analysed 
in this study are placed in the market-hierarchy continuum. As it will be further 
discussed in the last chapter one of the main contributions of this study refers to the 
provision of theoretical explanation with respect to the treatment of management 
contracts as a mode that resembles "hierarchy". Therefore, an extensive analysis of the 
expansion modes using transaction cost and agency theory is considered to be a 
necessity at this stage of the thesis. The choice of the explanatory variables that will be 
included in the theoretical framework of this research will be presented in the next 
chapter (Chapter 5). 
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4.2 Modes of Corporate Development: an overview 
4.2.1 Franchising 
Since the 1980s, franchising has become an important form of international business 
format, especially in service industries. Apart from major brands originating in the USA, 
such as Holiday Inn, Marriott and Choice, only a few hotel companies so far consider 
franchising when planning their development strategy. 
Franchising is a contractual arrangement whereby one firm, the franchisor, sells the right 
to another firm, the franchisee, to operate under a particular trademark and following a 
set of guidelines (Lafontaine and Masten, 1995). Additionally, when it comes to 
business format franchising, the franchisor agrees to provide managerial assistance 
regarding issues such as advertising and promotion, personnel development, operating 
procedures, whereas the franchisee runs the business in a way that has already been 
agreed, pays royalties, usually a percentage of sales and sometimes is obliged to buy 
supplies from the franchisor or from approved suppliers (Rubin, 1978). 
Franchising is the solution to many challenges encountered by service industries, such as 
intangibility, the discretionary nature of service purchases, labour intensity, quality 
control and small size of firms (Cross and Walker, 1987). Hotel franchising comes in 
many forms, but the basic premise is that the owner of the property remains in control of 
the management, while at the same time enjoying the advantages of a large chain 
in 
terms of brand name operations guidance and marketing support. 
4.2.2 Management Contracts 
A management contract is a long-term agreement, of up to ten years or even 
longer, 
whereby the legal owner of the property enters into a contract with another 
firm, in this 
case an international hotel company that agrees to run the 
hotel's daily operations. 
Usually the property carries the name of the international hotel company and moreover, 
quality control, daily management, and senior staffing rest with 
the hotel company, not 
with the owners. 
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This arrangement is favoured in many international settings as it allows the international 
hotel firm to establish a presence without investment in property ownership. 
Additionally, it provides more stable returns compared to ownership, without real estate 
investment risk, since the hotel company (the operator) usually receives its fees as a 
percentage of both the hotel's revenues and profits (while in the case of an equity joint 
venture, returns would have been based only on profits). As already mentioned, 
management contracts allow for a separation of ownership from the control of the 
operations. With such an agreement, the owners act as investors who allow someone 
else to manage the property. The management companies (international hotel firms) 
operate in full responsibility and receive fees for providing their expertise. On the other 
hand the owners' task usually consists of the provision of the property including all 
furniture, not to mention that they undertake all legal and financial responsibilities. 
The exact arrangements vary considerably among hotel chains. Moreover, it has been 
recently identified that non-equity involvement in management contracts has become 
more and more rare, and basic fee percentages continue to decline, the greater the 
flexibility in fee formulation (Bell 1993, Eyster 1997). This is mainly due to heavy 
competition among a growing number of management contract operators, increasing 
participation of owners and lenders and greater equity requirements demanded from the 
country partners. 
4.2.3 Company Ownership 
The company ownership mode refers to hotel properties that are owned and managed by 
the international hotel firm, which can either build a new hotel or acquire an existing 
one. This is the only expansion mode that provides the hotel ownership with full control 
over the property, the intangible assets and the operations. On the other hand, though it 
requires high levels of capital investment. Thus, the hotel company that owns a hotel 
property has the advantage of receiving all the profits, but it also has to face all the 
related risks. This could be a serious drawback especially when the hotel property 
operates in a foreign environment, where political and economic risks can be quite high. 
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4.3 Control as a strategy issue 
Until recently control had been perceived as totally conjunct with ownership. Nowadays, 
though, it is argued by several researchers that there are different mechanisms whereby a 
firm can exercise control over an alliance (Geringer and Hebert 1989). In the hotel 
sector, Contractor and Kundu (1998a) classified the means of control in four 
dimensions: (a) daily operations and quality control in the hotel property; (b) control 
over the physical assets; (c) control over tacit expertise obtained through the firm's 
operations and processes and (d) control over codified assets, including computer 
reservation systems and most importantly the firm's recognised brand name. 
Table 4.1 gives the allocation of the above mentioned control criteria over the modes of 
organisation, as classified by Contractor and Kundu (1998a): 
Table 4.1: Modes of Organisation and Level of Control 
Mode High Ownership 4 P_ 
Arm's-length 
Commitment relationship 
Control Fully owned Partly owned Management Franchise 
property property Service 
Strong a, b, c, d d a, d, 
Weak a, b, c c c, d 
Non-Existent b9 a, b'° 
Contractor and Kundu, 1998a; p. 330 (modified by the author) 
(a: daily operations and quality control 
b: control over physical assets 
c: control over tacit expertise 
d: control over codified assets, i. e. CRS) 
As it can be observed in the table, management contracts imply the existence of strong 
control over daily management and quality control of the hotel property, as well as 
9 If the management company has a minority equity stake in the property then control over physical assets 
can be classified as weak. 
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control over the international hotel company's codified strategic assets, used by the hotel 
property. Moreover, management contracts provide a certain degree of control over the 
operator's tacit expertise. However, the control exercised is not strong since local 
personnel (e. g. staff and middle management) have the opportunity to acquire that 
knowledge and use it in the future as a basis for launching their own business. In most 
cases, management service agreements do not provide any control over physical assets''. 
In contrast, franchising provides the franchisee with control over daily management and 
quality control. Furthermore, control over physical and codified assets also resides with 
the franchisee and not with the international hotel firm. Hence the property owner is also 
the hotel operator12. However, since the international hotel firm provides training and 
guidance for the operations, it can be suggested that the franchisor shares some control 
over tacit expertise. 
It should not be assumed, though, that in general the franchisor exercises minimum 
control; according to Klein (1995), one of the main economic features that distinguishes 
franchising from other modes of co-operation is the degree of control exercised by the 
franchisor over the franchisees' operations, including control over product specification, 
hours of operation and operating procedures. Control over the franchisee becomes even 
tighter in the case of business format franchising, which covers the entire business 
format, i. e. quality control, operating standards, marketing strategy, personnel selection. 
4.4 Modal Choice based on Transaction Cost Economics 
In this section, modal choice in the international hotel industry will be presented and 
extensively explained, using the main concepts and assumptions of transaction cost 
theory. Although both management contracts and franchising are considered as two 
forms of organisation that lie somewhere between the "market" and the "hierarchy" pole 
(as defined in the transaction cost literature), in the current analysis franchising will be 
10 If the hotel property is owned by the franchisor (international hotel company) and 
leased to the 
franchisee, then the hotel company has a strong control over the physical assets. However, this is rarely 
the case. 
11 There are certain situations, though, where the operator is required or even prefers to participate 
in the 
property's equity. 
64 
Expansion Strategies of International Hotel Firms 
treated as being an organisational mode that lies close to the "market" one, while 
management contracts are treated as the mode that lies towards the "hierarchy" one, and 
thus in between company ownership and franchising (but closer to the former), for 
reasons that will be presented in this section. 
(a) In terms of contract law that characterises each organisational mode 
Franchising, as a mode of organisation, lies between the market and hierarchy and 
maintains characteristics of both, i. e. could also be characterised by a "hybrid" form of 
governance, however it lies significantly closer to the "market" mode of organisation. As 
can be observed from Figure 4.1 pure franchising is almost a straightforward example of 
the "market" mode, but business format franchising places restraints on franchisee 
behaviour and introduces a "hierarchical" element into the relationship. The 
international hotel company has no control over the physical or intangible assets, and 
moreover the parties to a franchise relationship are independent companies that have 
access to courts and do not use fiat and forbearance for dealing with ex post 
maladaptation. 
However, since franchising represents a long-term relationship, where the parties have 
interdependency, the "pure market" mode of organisation is not applicable. Therefore, it 
is argued that franchising lies near the "market" mode. Additionally, since most of the 
features of the transaction can be specified at the outset, the contract law that supports 
this type of governance is close to the classical one, although some elements of 
behaviour are enforced by the threat of termination of the franchise agreement (Klein, 
1995). 
A management contract is considered in general to be a "hybrid" mode of organisation: 
it refers to a long-term relationship, where the parties are mutually dependent, while still 
remaining independent companies. However, an international hotel firm that enters a 
management service agreement with a hotel property exercises in general high amount 
of control over the latter. It is important to notice that control does not usually refer to 
physical assets (such as buildings), but to intangible assets (such as human assets), 
codified assets (e. g. reservation systems) and most importantly the brand name. 
12 In rare cases the franchisee is not the owner of the property, since the 
franchising agreement can refer 
to leasing of the property from the franchisor, or even a third party. The franchisee may also 
be a 2"d-tier 
operating company brought in by the owner. 
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Figure 4.1: The market-hierarchy continuum 
Spot Pure Business Format 2nd -tier MC Complete 
Contracting Franchising Franchising companies MC Integration 
IF IF 
Market Hierarchy 
The management company usually exercises a great degree of control over all these 
types of assets, when operating a hotel property; therefore it is suggested that the 
management contract form of organisation could be regarded as a "hybrid" mode that is 
located towards the "hierarchy" pole. Moreover, the type of contract law that 
characterises management contracts is the neoclassical one, since the parties in the 
transaction, namely the hotel (property) owner and the management company 
(international hotel company) are independent companies that maintain their autonomy 
but are bilaterally dependent to a non-trivial degree. 
The organisational mode that represents "hierarchy" is company ownership, which is 
characterised by the implicit contract law of internal organisation, what Williamson 
(1996a) calls forbearance. When disputes arise between an international hotel company 
and the management team of a particular hotel property (that is owned and operated by 
the hotel company), it is the hierarchy that decides, by fiat, on unresolved issues. 
(b) In terms of asset specificity 
As noted in the previous chapter, a central issue in transaction cost analysis involves the 
notion of asset specificity; hence the parties in a transaction usually develop appropriate 
safeguards that best protect them against the hazards of opportunism that may arise due 
to asset specificity. According to Williamson (1985), protective safeguards can take one 
of the following forms: (i) incentive realignment, which usually has to do with some 
kind of severance payment or penalty for premature termination, (ii) reference to private 
ordering instead of court ordering, where allowance is usually made for contract 
incompleteness and disputes are resolved through different mechanisms, (like, for 
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example, arbitration) and (iii) embeddedness of the transaction in a more complex 
trading network, in which case the transaction is incorporated in a broader network of 
transactions, a fact that makes it difficult for either party to behave opportunistically in 
respect of that transaction. 
In the case of franchising, asset specificity takes the form of sharing an intangible asset, 
the trademark or brand. A brand name is perhaps the most important intangible asset to 
protect against potential hazards of post-contractual opportunistic behaviour, since hotel 
companies, like any other service company, cannot depend upon a patented proprietary 
technology or process, as a protection against close substitutes (Flandmoe-Lindquist and 
Jacque, 1995). 
When the international hotel company decides to expand using the franchise mode, it 
undertakes the risk of proprietary knowledge leakage (Hennart, 1988). The franchisee 
will get the guidance (e. g. training, operating manuals) that will allow him/her to operate 
the hotel at a high quality level, and as a result he/she may behave in an opportunistic 
way: when the time for negotiations over contract renewal comes the franchisee can ask 
for more advantageous contract terms or even refuse to renew the contract, since he has 
the required knowledge to operate a competing hotel. A strong brand name is an 
important safeguard against a franchisee's opportunistic behaviour, since the 
franchisee's interest is to stay with a well-know brand. 
However, if the hotel company does not posses a strong trademark, there is the 
alternative of a management service agreement, in which case the daily operations reside 
with the international hotel firm, not with the property owner. Management service 
agreements can substitute in a way for the need for ownership linking between the 
transferor of knowledge (international firm) and the recipient (owner of the hotel 
property). Although local staff is required for the hotel operations, management 
positions are held by the "parent" company (i. e. the international hotel company); 
therefore the amount of tacit knowledge appropriated by the local staff is less, than in 
case of franchising. 
Moreover, a brand name like any other intangible asset generates quasi-rents. 
As 
described by Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), quasi-rents exist due to a gap between 
an asset's value in its current use and its next best alternative. 
Part of this rent is 
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potentially appropriable by either the franchisor or the franchisee through post- 
contractual opportunistic actions. If the franchisee has to invest a significant amount for 
building the property according to the hotel chain's requirements, the quasi-rents 
potentially appropriable by the franchisor are high. If the latter decides to ask for higher 
fees during the renewal negotiations, the franchisee will find it in his interest to pay 
those fees, since the value of the building in other uses is sufficiently low in comparison 
to its use as part of the franchise. 
Although at first glance this seems to be a franchisees' problem, it can also become a 
problem for the franchisor. High risks of quasi-rents appropriation by the franchisor may 
create a difficulty for him to attract franchisees, since prospective franchisees may ask 
for higher rates of return that permit them to fully amortise the value of the specific 
assets over the duration of the contract. Using management service arrangements, the 
international hotel company can attract a property owner more easily, since in that case 
the hotel owner is not the only one to participate in the initial costs. Or again, it can be 
agreed in the contract that the international hotel company will undertake the investment 
needed for adapting the property to its global standards. 
(c) In terms of the incentives provided by each mode 
One crucial economic fact that underlies franchise contracts is that the incentives of the 
transacting parts do not always coincide. The free riding incentive is one type of 
behaviour that has been extensively analysed; it is created when franchisees jointly use 
the same trademark, which is valuable, as it gives the customers a kind of "quality 
assurance" about the product sold by different franchisees of the chain. This is where the 
classic externality problem arises: if one franchisee cheats on the quality of the product 
he will benefit from the full amount of savings from reduced quality, whereas the cost of 
reduced customer loyalty will be spread to each one of the franchisees 
(Rubin, 1978). 
Usually, the formal contract agreement, (explicit enforcement mechanisms) does not 
suffice as an enforcement mechanism for the franchisee's 
behaviour; a self-enforcement 
(implicit) mechanism needs to apply which is being facilitated additionally 
by the formal 
agreement (Klein, 1995). Hence, some elements of performance will 
be specified and 
enforced by an outside party, whereas other elements of 
behaviour will be enforced by 
the threat of termination of the transaction agreement (Klein, 1980). 
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Although it is assumed that the threat of court enforcement of the contract term is 
sufficient to ensure proper franchisee behaviour, this is usually not feasible, since it is 
not possible to specify in a legal document all the elements of appropriate behaviour nor 
is it easy to set exact proxies for behaviour. Such specifications and proxies are 
necessarily imperfect, since behaviour is complex and difficult to measure and contracts 
only partly cover the potential future contingencies. 
Therefore, a franchise contract is usually designed to ensure proper behaviour through 
facilitating a self-enforcement mechanism, namely through the threat of contract 
termination. In that case, court-enforceable contract terms facilitate the creation of 
sufficient rents to the franchisee, so that the threat of termination of the relationship by 
the franchisor gives the franchisee an incentive to behave in the agreed way. It is 
important, therefore, that the contract creates a sufficient future "premium stream", 
which will motivate the franchisee to perform as anticipated. The whole process requires 
the franchisor to monitor the franchisee continuously in order to determine if the latter 
follows the desired behaviour, before the franchisor decides to terminate the relationship 
(Klein, 1995). 
According to TCE, franchising represents a high-powered incentive, since the 
franchisee's compensation varies directly with unit performance. Williamson (1985) 
asserts that the use of high-powered incentives can reduce the administrative costs 
caused by direct monitoring of the employee-manager. As a result, the need for 
monitoring of the franchisee is reduced, since his behaviour and effort is self-enforced. 
The opposite is true for the manager employed through a management contract or 
company ownership, as he/she is driven by low-powered incentives and therefore needs 
to be monitored in order for appropriate effort to be assured. 
In accordance with the previous analysis, the international hotel company must trade-off 
the costs of quasi-rent appropriation and free riding, against the benefits achieved by the 
use of high-powered incentives of franchising when making the decision among 
franchising, management contracts or company ownership for the development of a new 
hotel outlet. It is this trade-off, according to transaction cost theory, that 
leads a 
company to choose among owning, managing, or franchising 
its outlets. 
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4.5 Modal Choice based on Agency Theory 
Agency Theory is the second theory whose basic arguments and concepts will be used 
for analysis of Modal Choice. Agency theory has been applied extensively in the 
research regarding the ownership strategy of the firm. Most of the work, however, has 
been concentrated on the factors that affect the decision of a firm to franchise or to own 
an outlet. Even fewer are the scholars whose work is focused in the service sector, not to 
mention the hotel sector. 
Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque (1995) looked at the factors that determine a service 
firm's organisational choice between equity-based control and franchising. Regarding 
the hotel industry, Contractor and Kundu (1998b) examined the firm specific and 
location specific variables that influence the hotel company in the decision to franchise. 
More recently, Erramilli et al, (2002) using a framework that was based on the 
organisational capabilities theory, examined the factors that influence the choice 
between management contracts and franchising, as entry modes in the hotel industry. 
These three studies (Contractor and Kundu, 1998a; 1998b and Erramilli, et. al., 2002) 
are the only ones so far that have included management contracts as an alternative 
organisational form that a hotel firm should consider when planning its development 
strategy. 
This study will address the issue of organisational choice from a different angle: it is not 
the question of ownership versus franchising that will be examined; what is going to be 
compared is the decision of an international hotel company to act as a franchisor as 
opposed to entering a management service agreement, or developing and operating its 
own hotel property. 
When agency theory concepts are applied, it could be argued that management contracts 
have certain similarities to ownership, therefore the decision between management 
contracts and franchising could be based on a similar rationale to the decision between 
company ownership and franchising. The main reason for this analogy is that when a 
company uses management contracts, it faces similar advantages and disadvantages that 
employee-managers bring to the company when it owns the outlet. 
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Agency Theory provides a valuable theoretical framework that explains the optimal 
organisational structure for obtaining maximum performance from agents when the 
principal cannot easily monitor the agent's performance and where the principal and the 
agent have different attitudes towards risk (Eisenhardt, 1989). Since franchisees-hotel 
owners are compensated through residual claimancy (outcome-based compensation), on 
the profits of the international hotel firm, and employees-managers are usually 
compensated through wages (behavioural-based compensation), each is motivated by 
different goals and may therefore behave in different ways. 
Goal conflict between principals and agents combined with conditions of uncertainty 
and information asymmetry create at least two basic problems: adverse selection and 
moral hazard. In the case of franchising, adverse selection occurs when the hotel firm is 
looking for suitable employee-managers to undertake the activities of new outlets. Since 
employee-managers are compensated mostly by behaviour-based contracts, i. e. fixed 
salary, there is a possibility that applicants will have an above-average tendency to over 
state their competence, making recruitment particularly hazardous in conditions of 
information asymmetry. This information asymmetry situation requires the hotel firm to 
incur costs to differentiate more qualified applicants from the less qualified. 
Franchising provides a way to overcome this adverse selection problem, although 
information asymmetry still exists between the hotel firm and prospective franchisees. 
(Over-) qualified franchisees have an incentive to signal their capabilities; by buying a 
franchised hotel a franchisee agrees to be compensated by a residual claim on the profits 
of that outlet. If the prospective franchisee is qualified, this residual claimancy will 
provide a better return than the average wage paid to an employee, whereas the opposite 
will be true if he is less qualified than required. Therefore, qualified 
individuals will 
consider buying a franchise as more remunerative than unqualified 
individuals. 
Consequently, franchising mitigates the problem of adverse selection and reduces the 
cost of determining the capabilities of outlet managers. 
The second main problem an international 
hotel firm faces due to asymmetric 
information is moral hazard. In the context of agency theory, moral hazard exists when 
the principal cannot measure the agent's performance, and 
therefore cannot know 
whether he/she puts in the appropriate effort. 
When a hotel firm looks into management 
contracts or company ownership 
for its expansion, it has to take into consideration that 
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the use of employee-managers creates the need for more information regarding their 
behaviour, which implies increased costs of monitoring their effort. 
On the other hand, franchising protects the firm against this moral hazard situation, since 
residual claimancy aligns the franchisee's goals with those of the hotel firm, and thus 
motivates the franchisee to put in the required effort. This is not to say that franchisees 
do not need to be monitored. Agents can engage in two types of moral hazard: 
suboptimal effort and misdirected effort (Shane, 1996). Since employees are paid a fixed 
salary they may decide to put only the effort that is required to make sure that they will 
get paid (suboptimal effort). Additionally they have an incentive to behave in a direction 
that will allow them to achieve personal goals, like obtaining perks or more free time 
(misdirected effort). 
In contrast, franchisees do not have the incentive to put forth suboptimal effort. The 
franchisor, though, still has to face the problem of misdirected effort, since the 
franchisee may decide to focus on profits at the expense of quality maintenance. 
Therefore franchising provides an advantage over both company ownership and 
management contracts, only to the extent that it reduces the problem of sub-optimal 
effort, since it is difficult to protect against misdirected effort. 
However, it could be argued that the hotel firm could choose either the management 
contract or company ownership form, but still partly use residual claimancy; it could 
actually use a mechanism of paying salaried managers low salaries and large bonuses 
based on outlet profit. The counterargument that renders franchising a "better" 
mechanism for incentive alignment is that the purchase of a franchise outlet puts the 
franchisee's capital at risk if he/she decides to shirk, creating a much larger downside 
risk than performance bonuses provide. 
Whether the firm will decide to use franchising, management contracts or company 
ownership will depend on the cost of monitoring employees relative to the cost of 
establishing a franchise (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Recently undertaken research has 
shown that when firms grow rapidly, franchising, which provides residual claimancy, is 
a superior mode to monitoring employees (Shane, 1996). 
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Whereas adverse selection and moral hazard are the agency problems associated with the 
decision of the firm to own the intangible assets of the outlets (i. e. the decision of the 
international hotel firm to use management contracts or company ownership for its 
expansion), there are also important problems that are associated with the decision of the 
firm to use franchising. The most crucial among them is free riding by the franchisee13, 
while inefficient risk bearing should not be ignored either. 
As far as free riding is concerned, it exists when one franchisee allows quality to 
deteriorate14. Thus, a given customer is less likely to visit again a hotel of the same 
chain, after receiving low-quality service. While the franchisee in question benefits by 
the full amount of savings from reduced quality, the costs of lower quality (e. g. costs of 
customer dissatisfaction) is spread to all franchisees and to the franchisor who will have 
a less valuable brand name to franchise in the future (Rubin, 1978). Free riding also 
refers to the franchisee incentive to reduce costs of other inputs, like advertising, if part 
of the benefits goes to other franchisees. 
The danger of free riding is even greater, where repeat customers constitute a small 
proportion of unit sales. Under these circumstances the franchisee may attract customers 
because of the recognised brand name of his/her hotel, but deliver inferior quality 
service. Such a practice may be beneficial to individual franchisees who do not rely 
upon `repeat customers' (Norton, 1988a, Brickley and Dark, 1987). 
Free riding is a problem that can be minimised, if the hotel company uses company 
ownership or management contracts instead of franchising. As in the case of company 
ownership, the employee manager has less incentive than a franchisee to offer low 
quality service, if he is compensated by fixed wage's. If certain circumstances make 
employee monitoring extremely costly, though, the hotel company can apply the 
franchise form, while using the method of area franchisee (Brickley and Dark, 1987). If 
13 Free riding by the franchisor is also a problem, as he has an incentive to provide less monitoring and to 
decrease his effort towards advertising or franchisee training. However, since the current analysis focuses 
on the organisation decision of the franchisor, this 
becomes a problem only in the extent that it creates a 
bad reputation that makes it difficult from the franchisor to attract franchisees in the future. 
14 Additionally, Mathewson and Winter (1985) make a distinction between what they call horizontal 
externalities (i. e. free riding on 
fellow franchisee's effort) and vertical externalities, which refers to 
chiselling on the franchisor's standards. 
They argue that horizontal externalities are not necessary to 
explain franchise contracts, since monitoring 
difficulties may arise for the franchisor even when there is 
only one territory. 
15 However, the manager may have an incentive to provide low-quality (i. e. cheaper) service if a large 
fraction of his/her income is profit 
incentive-based. 
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one franchisee owns all of the units in a market area, a large proportion of costs and 
benefits of his decision to free ride will be borne by him, therefore his incentive for free 
riding will be attenuated. 
Inefficient risk bearing is the second main problem associated with the decision of the 
hotel firm to use franchising as opposed to company ownership or management 
contracts. In comparison to other organisational forms, risk bearing of franchisees differs 
in two main perspectives (Norton, 1988b). First, when a management agreement is used, 
the risk bearing function is largely separate from operations. The employee-manager 
handles the daily operations, whereas the residual risk is borne by the hotel owner. In the 
case of a franchise agreement, however, a great amount of residual risk for local outlets 
is borne by the franchisees who are also closely affiliated with the everyday operations. 
Moreover, the franchisee has a large proportion of his wealth and income tied to the 
performance of the unit, hence his investment portfolio is relatively undiversified. As a 
result, inefficient risk bearing can lead to higher required rates of expected 
compensation, because the franchisee perceives that he undertakes higher risk. 
In summary, it can be argued that the organisational form chosen influences the form 
that agency problems take and the appropriate approaches to control them. Both 
company ownership and management contracts create an incentive for the manager to 
shirk on his effort, which therefore requires the hotel company to monitor his behaviour. 
This monitoring is costly, since it creates the need for the management company to hire 
individuals to monitor employees' behaviour and to invest in information systems and 
procedures that improve its ability for monitoring. 
Alternatively, the hotel firm can use franchise contracts, thereby making the franchisees 
residual claimants on the profits of the hotel. Franchising will attenuate the adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems, but will create incentives for free riding by the 
franchisee. Which organisational mode the hotel company should choose for its 
expansion depends on the costs associated with each form, costs that differ according to 
the specific circumstances. 
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4.6 The decision to exclude certain variables from the 
theoretical framework 
The purpose of this section is to justify why some independent variables that are 
included in previous studies have not been considered in the current one. As already 
analysed in section 4.4., TCE provides convenient means of distinguishing between 
franchising and management contracts, as opposed to previous studies that have 
overlooked the fact that these two expansion strategies are characterised by different 
features that place franchising towards the "market" mode, similar to outsourcing, and 
management contracts towards the "hierarchy", because of the control they provide over 
the intangible assets of the hotel firm. 
In international hotel firms, intangible assets, including brand strength, are more crucial 
and have higher asset specificity than the (tangible) hotel property which has lower asset 
specificity. Thus, leading hotel firms are primarily concerned with extracting rents from 
their intangible assets and the reason for wanting to own the property is to protect the 
rent that is derived by owning the intangible assets. 
Agency Theory, as presented in the previous section (4.5. ) provides additional 
arguments for choosing franchising over management contracts or company ownership. 
AT is also closely related to TCE, while other theories on which the variables excluded 
here are based are either (a) subsumed in TCE or (b) based on hypotheses that contradict 
the core principles of TCE. (For example, Organisational Capabilities Theory denies the 
importance of opportunism when writing or enforcing contracts, while opportunism is 
the main behavioural assumption adopted by the transaction cost theory. ) Therefore, the 
independent variables that will be discussed in the following chapter are derived from 
TCE and AT, not any other economic or sociological theory. 
Based on the literature review, other variables have been identified to influence the 
modal choice but are not suggested by either TCE or AT. The researcher though has to 
make a decision whether to include such variables in the research design. Including these 
independent variables might result in a model which explained more of the variance in 
the dependent variable, than a model which omits them. 
75 
Expansion Strategies of International Hotel Firms 
However, the word "explanation" needs to be treated with caution, since in the former 
case the independent variables in question do not form a part of a coherent theoretical 
framework. The omission of these independent variables may result in a model that 
explains less variation but what we will have is an explanation that is part of a robust 
and coherent theoretical structure. It is often asserted in the philosophy of science that 
parsimony or simplicity is a virtue in an explanatory theory (Rosenkrantz, 1997). There 
is a trade-off to be made between including additional independent variables with the 
aim of increasing the explanatory power of the model and maintaining the theoretical 
coherence of that model. In the present study, theoretical coherence is a major concern. 
TCE and AT are closely related (Williamson, 1996; ch. 7) and together form a coherent 
theoretical basis for the study. 
The first variable that will not be examined in the context of this study is cultural 
distance. Cultural distance between the home and host country is a variable that is 
usually considered to be important, and is thus examined by most of the empirical 
studies on entry mode decisions. However, it has to be noted that the construct used in 
the majority of the previous studies, namely Hofstede's Model, has been questioned and 
criticised, in some cases very strongly (Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 1997; 
McSweeney, 2002a and 2002b; Sondergaard, 1994). 
Undoubtedly, cultural distance exists between different nations. The question is why we 
would believe that national cultural differences can explain part of the modal choice 
decisively. Most of the studies so far found no relationship between cultural distance and 
the decision on organisational form. Additionally, studies in the hotel industry 
(Contractor and Kundu, 1998a, 1998b; Erramilli et. al. 2002; Zhao and Olsen, 1997) did 
not confirm a relationship between cultural distance and the decision of a hotel company 
on how to expand. 
In addition, it is quite difficult to accommodate cultural distance in the TCE framework. 
There are other country-specific variables that accommodate the issues of uncertainty 
and information impactedness which are included and examined in the study (e. g. 
country political and economic risk and level of economic 
development). For all these 
reasons presented above, it has 
been decided that the variable "cultural distance" will be 
excluded from the theoretical 
framework. 
76 
Expansion Strategies of International Hotel Firms 
A second factor that is considered to influence the corporate development decision, but 
will not be included in this study, refers to the level of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in the country under examination. However, it can be argued that the effect of the degree 
of foreign direct investment in a particular country is similar to the effect of country 
politico-economic risk: lower levels of FDI indicate higher levels of risk, and in some 
other studies the hypothesis has been examined that a hotel company would in such 
circumstances prefer to use a hierarchical mode of expansion (as will be explained in the 
first hypothesis). 
In their studies, Contractor and Kundu (1998a and 1998b) did test a hypothesis regarding 
the effect of level of FDI on the entry mode decision, but did not find support for a 
positive relationship between a country's ratio of FDI to GDP and the propensity of the 
hotel firm to use company-run operations (i. e. equity based operations). Furthermore, 
Terpstra and Yu (1988) suggested that US advertising agencies follow their customers 
abroad but they did not make any distinction regarding the degree of ownership of 
foreign operations. Thus, the degree of FDI penetration in a host market is a variable that 
will not be examined as such in this study. 
Finally, "host" market size and growth potential are factors not quite relevant to this 
study, and therefore will be excluded. In the entry mode literature, market size is one of 
the main variables that influence the modal choice of the international firm (Agarwal 
and Ramaswani 1992, Terpstra and Yu, 1988). It is suggested by the previous literature, 
that the higher the market potential (size and growth) of the target country, the greater 
the long-term profitability to an equity-based company, compared to contractual 
arrangements. 
In this study, equity ownership per se is not of interest. Rather, as explained in section 
4.1, what is of interest is the positioning of a new hotel unit in terms of the market- 
hierarchy axis. From this perspective, equity ownership and the holding of a 
management contract are both representative of "hierarchy" while franchising is 
representative of "the market". Moreover, the holding of a management contract is 
frequently accompanied by an equity holding in the property by the management 
company. Thus, while market size and potential might help to explain the choice 
between equity-based modes and other modes, this choice is not the main focus of this 
study. This study therefore does not 
include "host" market size and growth among the 
independent variables. 
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4.7. Empirical Evidence from the Service Sector 
Although there has been extensive research regarding the choice of organisational mode 
in general, as well as the choice between franchising and company ownership in 
particular, only limited research has been conducted as far as the service sector is 
concerned. Moreover, most of the scholars' interest so far has been directed towards the 
entry mode decision, and as a result location-specific factors have attracted their 
attention as influential variables. 
Boddewyn et al. (1986) analysed the entry mode choice of multinational service firms. 
They suggested that service firms rely more on licensing and management contracts, as 
opposed to manufacturing firms which utilise more foreign direct investment. 
Additionally, Li and Guisinger (1992) argued that service firms are characterised by 
unique features that should be taken into consideration, when their international 
behaviour is analysed. These characteristics refer mainly to the simultaneous production 
and consumption of some services and to the need for adaptation of the services to local 
customer taste, which usually requires more effort that in the case of manufacturing 
products. 
Dunning and McQueen (1982) used the `eclectic paradigm' to examine the international 
hotel chains with respect to their foreign involvement. The authors argued that 
international hotel chains prefer to use non-equity forms of organisation for their 
overseas expansion and identified four categories of involvement: equity interest, leasing 
agreement, management contracts and franchise or some form of marketing agreement 
(e. g. reservation systems). 
Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque (1995) used agency theory and transaction cost 
economics as their theoretical grounding for their study on control modes used by U. S. - 
based service firms. Their results indicated that the propensity to franchise 
internationally is positively related to monitoring costs associated with geographical and 
cultural distance between franchisor and franchisee, the franchisor's international 
experience and the degree of the host countries' uncertainty, but negatively related to the 
service firm's level of brand name asset specificity. 
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Focusing on the hotel sector, Contractor and Kundu (1998a) worked on the factors that 
influence the international hotel company's choice of entry mode between company 
ownership, joint ventures, franchising and management contract. They suggested that, 
higher equity and control modes were preferred by companies with longer international 
experience and geographic reach, whereas contractual modes were used in risky nations. 
In emerging economies, companies prefer high equity modes, since these nations are 
characterised by higher growth rates and weaker competition, a combination that leads 
to higher returns (when an equity mode is chosen). They also concluded that, as opposed 
to the empirical evidence from the manufacturing sector, high equity and control modes 
were not seen as crucial for large global hotel operations. 
Furthermore, in their study regarding franchising versus company ownership as a mode 
of business expansion, they proposed that franchising is directly related to the level of 
the host country economic development, the importance of the company's global 
reservation system (codified assets) and brand name, and indirectly related to the 
company's experience and extent of global coverage (Contractor and Kundu, 1998b). 
Kehoe (1996), tried to explain why three organisational modes in question coexist in the 
hotel industry, deriving his arguments mainly from agency theory. He concluded that a 
plausible explanation for the existence of management agreements is based on the 
availability of low cost capital from non-chain sources, and thus this form would be 
chosen over company ownership in the case of hotel properties with large capital inputs. 
More recently, Dimou (2003) using arguments based on transaction cost economics and 
agency theory, provided a theoretical framework that identified the factors that influence 
the choice between the two non-equity modes of development, namely management 
contracts and franchising. Finally, Erramilli et al. (2002) looked at the same issue, 
although from a different theoretical angle. Using the Organisational Capabilities 
perspective they developed a framework for choosing between management contracts 
and franchising. They, moreover, tested their propositions and confirmed that foreign 
entrants choose a non-equity mode that offers effective transference of the firm's 
capabilities to the host country venture. 
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4.8. Conclusions 
In this study, Transaction Cost Economics and Agency Theory are going to be used for 
the development of testable hypotheses regarding the choice of organisational mode, 
since both have been proven to provide a robust theoretical background for this area of 
research. The author's research interest is particularly focused on the factors that affect 
an international hotel firm's decision to expand using one of the most common modes of 
development, namely franchising, management contracts and company ownership. 
At the same time, using theoretical arguments from both TCE and AT, it is suggested 
that a management contract is an organisational mode that presents more similarities to 
company ownership than to franchising, in contrast to what previous studies have 
argued; indeed, previous researchers considered management contracts and franchising 
as contractual arrangements that have similar features, namely the characteristics of the 
"hybrid" mode of organisation (Contractor and Kundu, 1998a; 1998b). 
Although at first both franchising and management contracts seem to provide a company 
with similar advantages and disadvantages, it has been suggested in this chapter that 
there are important differences between them, regarding the degree of control they 
provide to the company. Under management contracts the operator maintains ownership 
and control of the intangibles, including transaction-specific assets, such as pre-opening 
costs, as well as non-specific codified assets (e. g. computer reservation systems). Under 
franchising the right to use these intangibles is acquired by the franchisee as part of the 
franchise "package". The franchisee incurs the transaction specific pre-opening costs 
and staff training costs, but gets the opportunity to free-ride on the codified assets, hence 
franchisor's need to monitor. 
In this chapter, an analysis of the modal choice has been provided. More specifically, a 
comparison among the three most common modes of development has been presented, 
using a theoretical justification that derives from two economic theories, i. e. transaction 
cost economics and agency theory, in order to identify under which circumstances an 
international hotel company should choose each of these expansion modes. The last 
section provided an overview of the few published studies that examine the entry mode 
decision in the service sector, in general and in the hotel industry, more specifically. 
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CHAPTER 5: HYPOTHESES FORMULATION 
5.1 Introduction 
A central issue regarding hypothesis formulation in this study is that franchising will be 
regarded as the "default" choice, i. e. is considered to be normally the preferred option, 
while the alternative choice is the use of a hierarchical mode of development, i. e. 
management contracts or company ownership. The reason why franchising is regarded 
as the default choice is that it represents the "market" mode, whereas management 
agreements and company ownership represent the "hierarchy" mode 16 
According to transaction cost economics, one needs to consider using a hierarchical 
mode only when the "market" mode of organisation becomes more costly to use. In 
situations where asset specificity and uncertainty are high, the cost of using the "market" 
becomes higher than the cost of applying a hierarchical mode. Therefore, in the context 
of this study, a management contract or company ownership should be favoured over 
franchising when certain conditions render the latter more costly. 
As mentioned previously, in the context of this study, management contracts are 
considered as a mode closer to "hierarchy" because, when used, they provide the 
international hotel company with high degree of control over operations and intangible 
assets, similar to the control that results from the use of company ownership. However, 
although both management contracts and company ownership provide the hotel 
company with similar degree of control over the everyday operations, it has to be 
admitted that (equity) ownership offers stronger control over tacit knowledge and 
intangible assets. Moreover company ownership offers full control over the physical 
assets (the hotel property) as well, while in the case of management contracts this type of 
control is quite limited. 
Therefore in the analysis that follows, management contracts are not always treated in 
the same way as company ownership; it will be clear that while some of the independent 
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variables are influencing the choice between "market" and "hierarchy" (i. e. between 
franchising on one hand and management contracts or company ownership on the other), 
other variables create a modal choice among three alternatives, namely the market mode 
(i. e. franchising), the semi-hierarchical one (i. e. management contracts) and the 
hierarchy mode (i. e. company ownership). 
As will be explained in a subsequent section, two models will be applied regarding the 
empirical testing of the hypotheses: a one-stage and a two-stage model. In the former 
model it is assumed that the expansion decision is made in one stage, where all the 
available alternatives are considered (in this case company ownership, management 
contracts and franchise agreements). In the two-stage model, hotel executives first 
choose between high- and low- control modes, i. e. between franchising and "non- 
franchising" and at the second stage a choice is made between the two high-control 
modes, i. e. management contracts and company ownership. 
5.2 The independent variables included in the theoretical 
framework 
On the other hand, the factors that are going to be considered in this research are the 
following: (i) location-specific: politico-economic (location) risk, legal (property rights) 
risk, (which is referred to as country risk in the previous literature), and level of 
economic development of the market (country) under consideration, and (ii) firm- 
specific: firm size and firm growth, firm's international experience, firm's proprietary 
content and geographical concentration of the firm's hotel properties. 
What needs to be clarified at this stage, is that in the context of this study the unit of 
analysis will be the hotel brand instead of the hotel company. The reason is that most 
hotel companies own or operate more than one brand, and these brands are usually 
located in different market segments of operation (i. e. budget, mid-market or upscale). 
As it will be explained later in this chapter, hotel brands that operate in different market 
segments (i. e. budget, mid-market, upscale) are characterised by different levels of asset 
specificity and idiosyncratic knowledge, and thus have a different strategic behaviour 
16 In fact management contracts represent a "hybrid" mode. However, as has been extensively discussed in 
previous sections, MCs in the hotel industry 
have certain characteristics that locate them close to the 
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with respect to their corporate development. Although the unit of analysis will be the 
brand, the terms brand and firm will be used interchangeably in this study. 
5.2.1. Location (Country) - Specific Factors 
a) Location (Country) Risk 
There is a great amount of literature on entry mode that focuses on the influence of 
country risk on the entry mode choice (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Erramilli, 1990; 
Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988). Basically, country risk refers to 
the degree of environmental uncertainty i. e. the extent to which a country's political, 
legal and economic environment threatens the stability of a business operation. In the 
context of this study, we refer to risk of the target market as location risk, not country 
risk, since we examine not only the entry mode decision with respect to a "foreign" 
country, but also the company's decision to undertake new operations in both "foreign" 
and "domestic" markets 17. 
Previous researchers have examined the influence of location risk on the choice between 
ownership and franchising, or equity modes and contractual arrangements. Gatignon and 
Anderson (1988) proposed that equity investment is negatively related to country risk, 
while Agarwal and Ramaswani (1992) suggested that entry modes with lower resource 
commitment would be favoured in high-risk countries. However, in their study of 
several service sector firms, Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque (1995) could not provide any 
evidence of relationship between currency (economic) risk and franchising, and 
moreover the relationship between political turmoil and franchising was found to be 
opposite to that expected. Also in the hotel industry, Contractor and Kundu (1998b) 
found no support for the relationship between country risk and mode of entry. 
The first dimension of market uncertainty that is going to be examined in this study is 
politico-economic uncertainty. Political risk arises due to the likelihood of unexpected 
changes in governmental policies from a friendly to an unfavourable attitude, and also 
when the political regime is characterised by turmoil. It also refers to the restrictions 
hierarchical pole. 
17 By new market we refer to a new geographical market, as well as a new product/service market in an 
existing geographical market. 
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concerning the ownership and control of corporate assets, as well as repatriation of 
profits, interest and royalties. Economic uncertainty refers to currency risk arising from 
fluctuating exchange rates (between the currency in the country where the hotel 
company is based and the country where a hotel property is located), which may result in 
reduced income for the international hotel firm. It also includes situations of local 
demand variability, where the international hotel company cannot assess whether low 
performance is caused by low demand in the local markets or lack of managers' effort. 
Transaction cost theory considers external uncertainty as one of the reasons for 
undertaking a transaction under the hierarchy mode (Williamson 1975,1985). Yet it is 
recognised that environmental factors, such as uncertainty, need not alone impede 
market exchange; it is the combination of uncertainty with asset specificity that causes 
the "market" to fail (Williamson, 1991). Hence, it is argued that environmental 
uncertainty itself favours the use of market modes, the reason being that in situations of 
high uncertainty, higher equity and control modes (hierarchical modes) incur higher 
switching costs (e. g. exit costs) in case undesirable events occur (Gatignon and 
Anderson, 1988), and thus a more "flexible" form of organisation (i. e. a low equity 
ownership mode) is requiredlg. Therefore, when there is a high degree of 
political/economic risk in a potential market, the hotel company should consider a mode 
of expansion that will allow for flexibility, (i. e. a "switchable" form). 
The development modes that are examined here are company ownership, management 
contracts and franchise agreements. Previous studies suggested that both management 
contracts and franchise agreements allow for similar degrees of flexibility in comparison 
to equity ownership. However, in this study it is argued that franchising is a more 
"flexible" form of organisation than management contracts. Although the latter do not 
involve the need for high investment, nevertheless, there is still a non-trivial need for 
resource commitment, i. e. investment in transaction-specific assets, such as managerial 
staff and staff training, personnel transfer from one country to another, cost of acquiring 
local information, pre-opening costs and cost of redecoration/refurbishment. 
18 The term flexibility, as used here, has a different meaning from the one that is employed by Williamson 
(1985,1991). Williamson contends that flexibility is an advantage of hierarchical organisation, as it allows 
for adaptation to repeated disturbances. 
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According to Eyster (1993) and Sangree and Hathaway (1996), management operators' 
equity contributions, often in terms of technical services (e. g. architecture, interior 
design and lighting, food facilities layout and equipment) and pre-opening management 
assistance (e. g. personnel training, operating systems installation and marketing) have 
considerably increased during the last decade, compared to what used to be the practice 
in the 1980s. Moreover, one important finding of Eyster's (1997) research on 
management contract terms, was that hotel operators were required to contribute 
additional pre-opening management fees and/or cash to built a certain equity percentage. 
The operator equity percentage was found to range from as low as 3 percent up to 50 
percent of total equity, however the median was 8 percent. 
When it comes to franchising, the amount of resources required for the company's 
expansion is significantly reduced, since the marginal cost of adding a franchised outlet 
to the chain (including training and provision of operating manuals and assistance) is 
quite low. Franchising represents the low asset-specificity mode, since the franchisor is 
trading assets already at hand (sunk costs) instead of investing in new and specific 
assets. Moreover, franchising lowers the cost of acquiring knowledge about local 
markets, since the company does not have to invest resources to learn about local input 
suppliers, marketing strategies, consumer preferences and labour market. Search cost 
theory emphasises the role of franchisees as searchers for information (Minkler, 1992). 
The acquisition of information may be quite costly and is likely to increase when the 
unfamiliarity and the political and economic risk in a local market increases. 
It has to be admitted that the expected negative impact of politico-economic risk on the 
use of management contracts is not so strong as in the case of using company-owned 
outlets; the level of investment is higher in the latter case, and it is more difficult for the 
hotel company to withdraw its operation from a risky market when the hotel properties 
are owned. Yet it could be argued that, although management operations imply less 
investment than company ownership, this investment is high enough to discourage the 
use of management contracts and dictates a low-specificity mode, 
i. e. franchising 
(ceteris paribus). 
Agency theory leads to similar predictions regarding the choice of organisational form 
under environmental uncertainty. More specifically, the theory predicts that 
franchising 
would be the preferred mode of organisation 
in risky markets, since the adverse selection 
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and moral hazard problems are mainly taken on by the franchisees (Norton, 1988a; 
Martin, 1988). In risky markets there is a greater possibility of higher demand 
variability. When demand is not stable the agency costs of monitoring managers rise, 
because principals cannot cheaply distinguish shirking from low demand (Norton, 
1988a). Under the franchising mode, the hotel firm does not need to invest in time and 
money to identify suitable potential employees or to establish outcome measures for 
assessing their performance, as would be the case under a management contract (or 
company ownership). 
Finally, franchising would be the preferred mode over a hierarchical mode, in markets 
that are characterised by demand variability situations, because franchise fees are linked 
to hotel turnover not profits (Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque, 1995). Sales are less 
volatile over the business cycle compared to profits. However, when it comes to a 
comparison of franchising with management contracts, this argument is not necessarily 
valid; it depends on the management contract fee structure. In most situations 
management contract fees are calculated as percentages of both gross revenues and 
operating profits (Eyster, 1993). During the last decade, there has been a considerable 
decrease of base fees, i. e. fees based on turnover, in favour of incentive fees, i. e. fees 
calculated as a percentage of gross operating profits (Eyster, 1997; Jones Lang LaSalle 
Hotels, 2001). As a result management fees are considered to be considerably more 
volatile than franchise fees (since the latter are based solely on the hotel's turnover) and 
less volatile than returns from ownership, since the latter are related to profits rather than 
revenues. 
It can thus be concluded, that in markets characterised by a high degree of political and 
economic instability, hotel firms would be more likely to opt for a 
lower resource 
commitment organisational mode of development, which would allow 
for lower 
switching costs and less volatile rents in the presence of undesirable situations. 
Therefore, it is suggested that under these circumstances, franchising rather than 
company ownership or management contracts would 
be the preferred mode (i. e. the 
default mode should be chosen). 
It has to be noticed at this point, that franchising is the default choice and thus the 
preferred choice (other things 
being equal) not only in situations where the country risk 
is relatively high, but also in situation where the risk 
is low. Yet, the point of this 
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hypothesis is that although franchising would be the preferred expansion mode in low- 
risk situations, the tendency to use this mode is even higher in moderate- and high-risk 
countries. Hence the first hypothesis: 
HI: There is a negative correlation between location political and economic risk and 
propensity to use higher control modes (i. e. company ownership or management 
contract) in a hotel property (as opposed to franchising). 
The second dimension of location uncertainty that will be examined refers to legal 
(intellectual property rights) risk. In the context of this study, legal risk refers to both 
local regulations and policies regarding trademark and intellectual property rights 
protection, as well as to court enforcement. The less developed the legal system of a host 
country, the weaker is the protection of intellectual property and brand names and the 
more difficult is contract enforcement. 
However, brand name protection is of great importance to international hotel chains and 
the use of franchising entails the risk of quality debasement, thus jeopardising the 
reputation of the hotel company, especially in the local market. If the franchisee behaves 
in an opportunistic way, by deciding to become a competitor, he/she might apply the 
knowledge and operating procedures provided by the franchise system. Management 
contracts do not entail this risk, since the middle and senior management team is 
employed by the operator, and thus it is more difficult for the local employees to re- 
deploy the company's standards and procedures. Finally, protection of brand name and 
idiosyncratic procedures reaches the highest degree when internal organisation 
(company ownership) is employed. 
Therefore, the hotel company would prefer to expand using franchising in markets that 
are characterised by low legal risk, where the termination of an unsatisfactory franchise 
agreement would be easier and less costly and company ownership or management 
contracts in markets with less advanced legal system. 
H2: There is a positive correlation between a market's legal (intellectual property 
rights) risk and the propensity to use higher control modes (i. e. company ownership or 
a management contract) in a hotel property (as opposed to franchising). 
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b) Level of economic development 
Recent studies regarding entry mode decisions in the hotel industry have suggested that 
lower control modes of development are preferred in more economically developed 
nations (Contractor and Kundu 1998a and 1998b). More specifically, those studies 
examine the relationship between the level of economic development in "host" countries 
and levels of equity and control when entry mode is considered. The authors suggest that 
the more developed a nation in economic terms, the higher the hotel firm's inclination to 
use contractual modes of development, as opposed to equity ownership. While in the 
previous studies, high control modes usually imply high company ownership, in the 
context of this research high control modes are represented by both ownership and 
management agreements, and franchising is considered to be the low control mode of 
expansion. 
Transaction cost theory provides several arguments that could support a negative 
relationship between the level of development in a target market and the degree of 
control. The first argument refers to the transaction costs incurred when tacit knowledge 
is transferred from a particular market to a less developed one. International hotel chains 
usually need to transfer specific knowledge and expertise when a new hotel is about to 
operate in a different market. The population's educational level in developing countries 
is considered to be relatively low, and thus prospective franchisees are usually 
characterised by lower absorptive capacity, a situation that implies higher costs of 
adaptation and knowledge transfer. 
Williamson (1975) refers to those situations by the term "information impactedness" and 
argues that such conditions tend to favour "hierarchy" over the "market". Therefore 
company ownership or management contracts would be favoured over franchising in 
less developed markets, since it would allow the international hotel firm to supervise and 
control more closely the transfer of knowledge and the proper use of its codified assets 
(e. g. reservation systems, operating procedures). 
Another argument, which is put forward by the internationalisation theory as well, refers 
to the relationship between economic development and level of returns from equity 
ownership. More specifically, it is suggested that there 
is a negative relationship between 
economic development and high ownership/control modes. 
The reason is that emerging 
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markets are characterised by weaker competition, faster growth and thus higher returns 
from equity ownership than from franchising, while management agreements are located 
in between the two in terms of returns, since management fees are derived as a 
percentage of both revenues and profits. 
H3: There is a negative correlation between the level of economic development of the 
target market and the propensity to use a higher-control mode (management contract 
or ownership) in a hotel property (as opposed to franchising). 
5.2.2. Firm-Specific Factors 
Whether a hotel firm will choose to own, franchise or enter into a management service 
agreement as a means of corporate development, also depends on firm-specific factors. 
Research undertaken in various industries has revealed a range of variables that could 
influence this decision, variables that may differ according to the specific industry under 
examination. In this research the factors that will be examined are: firm size and growth, 
international experience, proprietary knowledge and geographic dispersion of hotel 
properties. 
a) Brand Size and Brand Growth 
The previous literature offers contradictory findings regarding the relationship between 
firm size and decisions for expansion. Larger and more experienced firms were found to 
opt for higher equity entry modes (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992). On the other hand, 
in the hotel industry, Contractor and Kundu (1998a and 1998b) suggested that larger 
hotel companies would choose lower control modes for their foreign operations. More 
specifically, regarding the choice between franchising and company ownership, 
Contractor and Kundu (1998b) concluded that larger hotel companies would have a 
greater likelihood of using franchising as an entry-mode. 
More interestingly, Shane (1998) identified a curvilinear relationship between firm size 
and mix of franchised and company owned outlets and proposed that this mix is very 
different for large and small franchise systems. On the other hand, Lafontaine and Shaw 
(2001) argued that the proportion of company-owned outlets decreases during the first 
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few years after a company first engages in franchising, but a stable mix of franchised 
and company outlets is maintained after this period. Azevedo and Silva (2001) also 
confirmed a stable ownership mix in their study of Brazilian franchisors. 
The basic argument in the internationalisation literature is that integration requires 
higher resource commitment and poses greater risks than a non-equity mode; therefore, 
larger firms are more likely to go for a high-control form of organisation, whereas 
smaller firms would prefer to expand using a lower-control mode, such as a minority 
equity (joint venture) or non-equity mode. However, according to transaction cost 
economics, it is not the firm size per se that determines whether to contract out or 
integrate; it is the characteristics of the particular transaction that influence the decision 
of a small or a large firm to integrate or not. High asset specificity firms would be 
willing to bear the additional costs of integration (corporate ownership), regardless of 
their size, whereas firms characterised by low degrees of asset specificity would not be 
willing to bear those costs, and would opt for an equity-based mode e. g. Joint venture, or 
a contractual mode, e. g. franchising or management contract (other things being equal). 
In the case of international hotel companies, asset specificity takes the form of brand 
name and associated knowledge-based assets, which characterises both small and large 
firms, although to a different extent. Therefore, in the context of this study, it could be 
argued that transaction cost economics do not provide any theoretical arguments for the 
effect of firm size per se on the corporate development decision. 
Agency theory on the other hand, provides significant reasoning regarding the influence 
of firm size on the modal choice. The theory suggests that adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems grow as a firm becomes larger, therefore the larger a firm is the more 
likely it would prefer to use franchising as opposed to an ownership mode for its 
expansion. Moreover, whereas managers' effort needs to be monitored by frequent direct 
on-site monitoring, franchisees' free riding on quality can be prevented by other means 
than monitoring, such as quality provision in the contract, minimum required level of 
input use (e. g. advertising) or multiple ownership by the franchisee, i. e. master 
franchising (Brickley and Dark, 1987). 
While larger brands would favour the use of franchising, a small brand on the other hand 
would use company-owned outlets to signal the value of its intangible assets (Gallini and 
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Lutz, 1992). By investing in its own operation a new franchisor provides a credible 
commitment to the value of those operations. As the system grows, though, the value of 
its intangible assets becomes better known, reducing the need for the company-owned- 
outlet signal (Lafontaine, 1992; Scott, 1995). 
In addition to the above arguments that compare franchise agreements to company 
ownership, one also needs to identify how management contracts influence the corporate 
development decision of large versus small firms. The signalling argument could equally 
be applied as a supporting argument for the use of management contracts over 
franchising, since small companies could very well use managed outlets to signal their 
quality level. These companies are usually run by capable individuals who used to be 
successful managers in high-quality hotel properties or ex-managers in well-know hotel 
brands. These individuals gather their know-how and experience and form small 
companies that offer management service agreements to national and international hotel 
firms. In order to attract hotel companies they may offer their services at a lower cost 
than a well-known management company. After a reputation for maintaining a certain 
level of quality has been established, these companies could aim for a proportion of 
franchised outlets, which over time can increase compared to the managed outlets. 
Additionally, small hotel companies would choose to use management contracts, since 
small companies are usually young companies without an established brand name. A 
company that does not yet have a well-known brand name has difficulty in attracting 
franchisees, whereas it is easier to attract potential investors/property owners by offering 
better terms compared to traditional operating hotel companies. When the company 
becomes larger it acquires broader brand recognition, and thus finds it easier to attract 
franchisees. Overall, it is proposed that small brands would prefer to use either 
management contracts or company ownership as means for corporate development, as 
opposed to larger brands that would opt for franchise agreements. Hence the following 
hypothesis: 
H4: There is a negative correlation between hotel brand size and the proclivity to use a 
higher control mode (management contract or company ownership) in a hotel 
property (as opposed to franchising). 
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Yet, an issue that is not easily identifiable when the relationship between brand size and 
mode of corporate development is examined, is whether a company uses a particular 
mode because of its size, or whether size is a result of using this organisational mode for 
expansion. Hence, in the context of this study, one has to be careful when testing a 
hypothesis regarding the relationship between brand size and franchising. One should be 
cautious when suggesting that franchising is used by larger brands because they are 
larger, since it could be that those brands became larger due to the extensive use of 
franchising for their expansion. 
Since the relationship between brand size and choice of organisational mode is still 
ambiguous, one could additionally examine the relationship between brand growth rate 
and corporate development, which has not been tested in the hotel industry so far. 
Previous research in other industries has suggested that when brands use franchising, 
they grow faster than when they use company ownership (Carney and Gedaj lovic, 1991; 
Shane, 1996). 
Transaction cost economics provides an interesting argument regarding the relationship 
between brand growth and the use of franchising; it is suggested that franchisees may 
become vulnerable to franchisor opportunism if the system remains stagnant or presents 
negative growth (Klein and Saft, 1985). The reason is that if the franchise system cannot 
grow any further, the franchisor may have little incentive to comply with his obligation 
regarding the required inputs (e. g. advertising or quality monitoring across franchisees). 
Reduced effort on behalf of the franchisor could lead to brand name devaluation with a 
twofold effect: sell back of outlets by existing franchisees and refusal of potential 
franchisees to join the system, since they anticipate opportunistic behaviour on the part 
of the franchisor. 
Minkler and Park (1994) tested the relationship between negative growth (i. e. shrinkage) 
of franchise systems and number of company-owned outlets in the system, yet their 
results did not confirm a positive relationship between shrinkage of the franchise system 
and increased use of company-owned outlets. On the contrary they found that firms with 
positive growth (rather than firms with negative growth) tend to favour the use of owned 
outlets as opposed to franchised ones. However, since previous research, along with the 
theory suggests a positive relationship between growth and franchising, the hypothesis 
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that will be tested will propose that the faster a brand is growing, the more likely it is 
that franchising is the prevalent mode of development: 
HS: There is a negative correlation between the hotel brand's growth rate and 
proclivity to use higher control modes in a hotel property (as opposed to franchising). 
b) International Experience 
The effect of a firm's international experience on its decision regarding the mode of 
entry or expansion is also controversial. The traditional argument in the FDI literature, 
which so far focuses mainly on the manufacturing sector, suggests that an inexperienced 
firm will start its penetration into a new market using non-equity forms, such as 
exporting or licensing, and as it gains experience it will move to higher control modes, 
i. e. joint ventures or company ownership (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992; Gatignon 
and Anderson, 1988 and Terpstra and Yu, 1988). A positive relationship between 
degrees of control and international experience has also been suggested by the more 
recent study in the hotel industry as well (Contractor and Kundu 1998a). On the other 
hand, there are studies supporting the opposite direction of the relationship. Fladmoe- 
Lindquist and Jacque (1995) concluded that service firms are more likely to franchise 
when they have gained international business experience. 
Transaction cost theory suggests that lack of international experience causes high 
organisational uncertainty, which renders monitoring and performance measurement of 
employee/managers quite difficult and costly. Due to high costs of monitoring a 
subsidiary or affiliated investment, the inexperienced (manufacturing or retail) firm 
would prefer to start with a contractual mode, such as exporting, and then move to 
higher control modes. Although exporting involves the use of an agent in the host 
market, and thus raises the issue of monitoring his performance, it still provides a more 
efficient alternative than franchising or joint ventures. Compared to franchising, it 
involves less concern about quality assurance and easier monitoring of performance due 
to less opportunities for free-riding, while compared to joint ventures it requires less 
capital investment and provides a simpler method of gathering knowledge. 
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These arguments have been confirmed by previous research (Arderson and Gatignon, 
1986; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988). However, while this might be the case in the 
manufacturing or even the retail sector, most consumer services (e. g. a hotel firm) are 
site-dependent and cannot use exporting to learn about potential partners and foreign 
practices (Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque, 1995). In this study, it will be argued that a 
hotel brand with limited international experience would use a high-control mode of 
development for the following reasons. As explained above, franchising presupposes a 
heavy investment in sunk costs, in order for the franchise package to be "built", which 
usually requires experience to extend internationally. Moreover, more experienced 
brands accumulate international brand name recognition and may become more 
desirable as franchisors (Scott, 1995). Last but not least, a hotel company with limited 
international experience may find it more difficult to attract and select qualified agents 
(i. e. franchisees), as well as to assess their performance, than to employ staff and 
monitor its effort, and therefore may prefer to opt for a more hierarchical (high-control) 
mode. Hence, the following hypothesis: 
H6: There is a negative correlation between international experience of a hotel brand 
and the propensity to use a higher-control mode in a hotel property (as opposed to 
franchising). 
c) Proprietary Content (Market Segment of Operation) 
There are two main reasons why market segment of operations influences the decision of 
a hotel company to use a hierarchical mode of development (i. e. management contract or 
company ownership) as opposed to a franchise agreement. The first one is derived from 
the transaction cost literature and refers to the level of proprietary content that 
characterises the service provided by the international hotel company, as well as the 
investment in specific assets. The second one has been extensively analysed and 
empirically tested mainly by agency theorists and concerns the value of the brand name 
and more specifically the importance of maintaining the brand name quality for the 
success of the business. The analysis hereafter will provide an explicit reasoning why 
these two arguments jointly provide the justification of the market segment variable, 
rather than being two distinct hypotheses that should be tested separately. 
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According to the first argument, international hotel chains (in their upscale outlets) 
usually provide highly idiosyncratic services, which are characterised by specialised 
know-how, high levels of professional skills and managerial expertise, and also services, 
which require the use of codified assets, e. g. central reservation systems. Services that 
require professional skills are usually associated with significant human investments. 
According to transaction cost theory (Williamson 1985), high asset specificity is 
considered as one of the main features of a transaction that favours "hierarchy" over the 
"market". Therefore, the greater the specialised know-how characterising a service, and 
the required investment in human and high-specific physical assets, the more likely it is 
that a hierarchical form of organisation will be used for the provision of that service. 
Moreover, the transfer of specialised know-how and idiosyncratic knowledge faces the 
additional problem of "information impactedness", which also tends to favour 
"hierarchy" over the "market". According to Williamson (1975) "information 
impactedness" refers not only to information asymmetry between the two parties of the 
transaction, but also to the high costs of achieving information parity, the proclivity of 
the parties to behave opportunistically and the small numbers contracting situation 
developed due to the distribution of information among the parties (Williamson 1975, 
Ch. 2). 
There is some evidence that firms exert more control as proprietary content increases, 
but none of this evidence refers to hotel firms or even service industries in general. More 
specifically, Anderson and Coughlan (1986), in their study of wholly owned versus 
independent distribution channels of US semiconductor manufacturers, found that high 
control is often employed for technically sophisticated products, which tend to have 
higher proprietary knowledge content. Furthermore, Gatignon and Anderson (1988) 
concluded that proprietary content (measured via R&D expenditure) influences the 
decision whether to vertically integrate or not, but does not influence the decision as to 
what type of partnership to select (majority or minority JV), if full ownership is not the 
preferred mode. 
In the context of this study, where the decision between a franchised and a managed or 
owned outlet is examined, if a hotel firm wants to exercise more control when 
transferring its specialised knowledge to a new property operation, it would rather own 
the property or enter a management contract than use a franchise agreement. At this 
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stage, it will be argued that high proprietary content is not a characteristic of hotels in all 
market segments; hotel brands placed in the upscale and deluxe market are characterised 
more by specialised staff and knowledge than hotel brands operating in the budget 
segment. The reason is that service is usually more basic in the "lower" categories, i. e. 
budget and mid-market segment, than in upper categories, i. e. upper market and deluxe. 
On the other hand, when it comes to "lower market" categories, the features of services 
provided and the required skills can be codified and transferred using operating manuals, 
and staff training is also more feasible, therefore franchising can be easily applied. 
Accordingly, the provision of service in the "upper market" categories requires more 
training and higher skills than in "lower" categories, a fact that renders the transfer of 
knowledge more complicated and difficult in the former categories than in the latter. 
The lower market segment of limited service units requires a set of standard operating 
procedures from which there is no reason to deviate, because the service is limited. The 
upper market segment has its standard operating procedures, but because of the level of 
more personalised service being offered, staff have to be trained to use their discretion in 
dealing with guests in individual situations so as to achieve that level of service. This 
type of knowledge cannot be reduced to standard operating procedures which can be 
`sold off as franchise packages, and requires front-line staff of the appropriate quality 
who can understand the training and apply it intelligently so as to uphold the quality 
image of the brand (proprietary content, tacit knowledge, information impactedness). 
Another reason why hotel companies that operate in the upper and deluxe market would 
prefer to expand using a hierarchical mode instead of franchising may be connected with 
quality assurance and free riding issues. Quality assurance is one of the main concerns of 
every service firm; therefore hotel companies consider quality maintenance as one of the 
most important issues when a decision for expansion has to be made. High-control 
modes of expansion are considered to entail less risk regarding quality depreciation. 
According to transaction cost theory, when the same brand name is used jointly by many 
franchisees, the classic externality problem arises: if one franchisee cheats on the quality 
of the product he/she will benefit from the full amount of savings from reduced quality, 
whereas the cost of decreased customer loyalty will be spread to each one of the 
franchisees (Williamson, 1985). Transaction cost theory suggests that when the value of 
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a brand name is great, there is a high potential for free riding, therefore higher degrees of 
control are more efficient (Klein, 1980). 
Agency theory leads to a similar reasoning: the franchisee has an incentive to free ride 
on input quality and consequently to pass the costs associated with lost customer 
confidence to other franchisees in the system and to the franchisor who will have a less 
valuable trademark to franchise in the future (Brickley and Dark 1987; Caves and 
Murphy 1976). On the other hand, managers of a company-owned outlet have less 
incentive than a franchisee to provide cheaper and lower quality services, since they 
derive no financial benefit from "cheapening" the quality if they are compensated by a 
fixed salary. Even if they have a profit-related bonus, any financial benefit from 
increasing profit by "cheapening" quality will be limited, while customer complaints 
could cost them their jobs. 
The danger of free riding is even greater in locations where repeat customers constitute a 
small proportion of unit sales, e. g. motorways, or tourist areas (Brickley and Dark 1987, 
Carney and Gedajlovic 1991, Norton 1988a). Under these circumstances the franchisee 
may attract customers using an established brand name, with reputation for high quality 
service, while providing inferior and cheaper service. Such a practice may be beneficial 
to franchisees that do not rely upon repeat customers. Therefore, the international hotel 
firm will be more concerned about free riding on its brand name in locations where its 
clientele consists mostly of non-repeat customers. 
Agency theory provides an additional reason that justifies the existence of company- 
owned outlets, when quality assurance is of great importance to the franchise system, 
and that is the franchisor's free riding. Lafontaine (1992) and Scott (1995) have 
identified two factors that influence a franchisor's incentives to monitor and maintain 
quality across outlets, the percentage of royalty rates and the operation of company 
owned outlets. When there is a mix of franchised and company owned outlets, it is in the 
franchisor's best interest to take all the steps required to maintain the expected quality 
levels within the brand. "The interdependency of demand across outlets gives 
franchisors a mechanism to assure franchisees that they will not shirk their monitoring 
duties and let system-wide quality deteriorates" (Scott 1995, p. 75). This situation is also 
explained in the TCE literature as "hostage posting" (Williamson, 1985). 
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Lafontaine and Shaw (2001) suggested that if this is a mechanism for providing 
franchisors with incentives to maintain quality, then the more important the effort of the 
franchisor to maintain quality and the greater the difficulty of monitoring him/her, the 
higher the proportion of company owned units should be. Thus, company ownership 
should be favoured over franchising, the higher the importance of the brand reputation 
for service quality in the success of the business. 
However, the above arguments proposed by agency theory do not always apply in the 
hotel industry, since there are well known international hotel companies, whose brand 
names are quite important for their success, yet they rely mostly or entirely on 
franchising. This applies to most of the economy and mid-market hotel brands, like Days 
Inn and Holiday Inn respectively, which operate the majority of their outlets through 
franchising. According to Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque (1995) there are industries, 
such as the hotel and restaurant ones, that are concerned with their brand name 
reputation more than others. Hence, it is suggested in the context of this study, that the 
value of a brand name is quite important for the success of the hotel brand regardless of 
the market segment in which the brand operates, and thus brand name value will not be 
included as an independent variable that explains the choice between franchising and a 
higher-control mode. 
The agency theoretic argument that is related to this study is the one that refers to free- 
riding by the franchisees. It is proposed that a hotel firm would be more concerned about 
free riding in its higher quality brands (i. e. brands that are located in higher market 
segments) than in the lower ones, because the higher the market where the hotel chain is 
positioned, the higher the chance for variation between expected and perceived quality 
and the greater the importance of this difference to the customer. And since the risk of 
free riding favours the use of "hierarchy", i. e. management contracts or company 
ownership, it could be suggested that the higher the level of the category in which a 
certain hotel company/brand is positioned the greater the concern about quality 
assurance and thus more likely that "hierarchy" (i. e. management agreement or 
ownership) will be chosen over the market (i. e. franchising). Thus, it is hypothesised 
that: 
ý 
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H7: There is a positive correlation between the level of the category (market segment) 
in which a hotel brand is operating and its proclivity to own the property or use a 
management contract in a new development (as opposed to franchising). 
d) Geographic Concentration 
Physical concentration (or dispersion) of operations is the last relevant country 
parameter influencing the choice between internal organisation and franchising as a 
mode of hotel corporate development, that is going to be examined for the purpose of 
this research. According to transaction cost theory, physical dispersion creates what 
Williamson (1985) calls "internal uncertainty", since it creates a difficulty in assessing 
employees'/agents' performance, therefore increases the costs of "hierarchical" as 
opposed to "market" modes of expansion. In international operations, distance and time 
increase the level of uncertainty by widening the information gap. 
Geographically dispersed outlets make performance evaluation more difficult and, 
therefore, control over employees' effort becomes more desirable. As a result of the high 
costs of information incurred, an international hotel firm would prefer a mode of 
expansion that aligns its incentives with the employees' incentives. Therefore, the more 
geographically dispersed the hotel properties are, the more likely that franchising would 
be the preferred mode of corporate development (other things being equal), while the 
more concentrated the properties are, the more likely that company ownership or 
management contracts would be chosen over franchising. 
Agency theory also supports this prediction. The higher the physical distance between 
principal and agent, the more difficult it is for the principal to ensure that the outlet 
manager exercises the required effort and the higher the cost of monitoring his/her 
behaviour. By making outlet managers residual claimants on the proceeds of their 
outlets, franchising provides them with the incentive to work harder, since the costs of 
shirking are mainly borne by them through the reduction of their net income. Studies 
have shown that firms expanding geographically favour franchising (Brickley and Dark, 
1987; Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque, 1995; Lafontaine, 1992; Lafontaine and Shaw, 
2001; Martin, 1988; Norton, 1988a). 
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However, in the case of the hotel industry examined in this study, it is doubtful whether 
management contracts (and ownership) imply the same problems as ownership in other 
industries. It has to be acknowledged that middle and senior management (of both 
managed and owned hotels) in well-known hotel chains usually consist of very highly 
motivated people, who have worked hard in order to reach that position and also have 
ambitions for their future careers. Hence, there is a general belief that hotel managers 
have stronger incentives towards desirable behaviour than managers in local fast food or 
retail outlets. Therefore, it can be proposed that in the case of the hotel industry, the 
proclivity of hotel managers to shirk (in managed or owned outlets) may be weaker than 
is predicted by agency theory. 
Nevertheless, the prediction by the theory might still hold true when it comes to the 
relationship between preferred organisational mode and geographic concentration of the 
hotel units. It could be argued that the more geographically concentrated the properties 
are, the higher the likelihood that the international hotel company will use management 
agreements or company ownership for its expansion. The reason is that monitoring of 
agents/managers requires lower effort and cost than it would, had the outlets been more 
dispersed, therefore conceding residual claimancy to the franchisee becomes relatively 
more costly compared to management agreements. Accordingly, the more dispersed the 
hotel outlets, the more likely that franchising will be preferred over management 
contracts (or ownership), due to high monitoring costs in the latter case. 
Using transaction cost theory, the prediction regarding the relationship between 
properties' geographic dispersion and choice between franchising and high-control 
modes (management contracts or ownership) would be in the similar direction: 
transaction cost economics would regard franchising as the "default" choice, while a 
reason must exist for using a hierarchical mode. In fact, one would expect higher 
monitoring costs if properties were dispersed, plus perhaps absence of various other 
scale economies that are available with high geographic concentration (e. g. switching 
staff between properties when required). 
Hence, since the literature drawn from both transaction cost economics and agency 
theory suggests that geographic concentration favours the use of internal organisation 
(i. e. ownership or management agreements), the same view will be adopted in the next 
hypothesis: 
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H8: There is a positive correlation between geographic concentration of hotel 
properties and propensity to use a higher control mode (management contract or 
company ownership) in a hotel property (as opposed to franchising). 
e) Country of Origin 
Previous research has placed a great interest in the cultural distance between the home 
and the host country as an influencing factor of the entry mode strategy (Agarwal, 
Erramilli and Chev, 2002; Contractor and Kundu, 1998a and 1998b; Gatignon and 
Anderson, 1998). Yet none of the studies so far has included any proposition or evidence 
regarding how the country of origin of an international hotel company influences its 
entry mode or expansion decision. 
During the review of descriptive data it became apparent that Latin-European companies 
were more inclined in using company ownership rather than franchising compared to 
Anglo-Saxon companies, suggesting that their focus is on tangible rather than intangible 
assets19. The purpose of this hypothesis is to examine if this tendency is indeed 
supported by the statistical analysis. Since, according to TCE one can extract rents form 
just owning the intangibles, any statistical support of this hypothesis would necessitate a 
further analysis and discussion with respect to the preference of owning tangible assets 
(i. e. the hotel property). 
A possible explanation could be related to the development of the franchise concept 
during the previous decade: the first international companies to use low-control modes, 
like franchising were the North American, as early as in 1950s. They were followed by 
their Asian-Pacific counterparts, while Continental European companies only fairly 
recently started to use non-equity arrangements. It could be that hotel companies with 
longer experience in using franchising, such as the American companies would be more 
familiar with the use of such agreements and thus more inclined to use franchising, 
compared to companies with shorter experience, such as the French and Spanish 
companies (other things equal). Hence the last hypothesis: 
19 What applies at a company level, it also applies at a brand level, and thus in the context of this 
hypothesis the words company and brand can be used interchangeably. 
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H9: Anglo-Saxon companies20 are more likely to use lower-control modes of 
development (as opposed to hierarchical modes), compared to Continental European 
and Asian-Pacific companies. 
20 Anglo-Saxon countries usually include the U. S, the U. K or other English-speaking countries that are 
related to those two, such as countries that 
belong to the commonwealth (e. g. Canada, Australia). Latin- 
European countries are those European countries that have Latin roots, such as Spain, Portugal, France 
and Italy. 
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5.3. Conclusions 
In this chapter, various factors that influence the expansion strategy of international 
hotel firms (modal choice) were identified. Using Transaction Cost Economics and 
Agency Theory, several location- and firm-specific variables have been chosen in order 
to test how these factors favour the use of franchising, management contracts and 
company ownership. A central issue regarding the hypotheses is that franchising is 
regarded as the "default" choice, i. e. is considered to be normally the preferred option, 
while the alternative hypothesis refers to the use of a hierarchical mode of development, 
i. e. management contracts or company ownership. 
More specifically, three location-specific factors were identified: location politico- 
economic risk, legal risk and level of economic development. It was suggested by the 
relevant hypotheses that the lower the politico-economic risk, the higher the legal risk 
and the lower the level of economic development in the target country, the more likely it 
is that company ownership will be the preferred mode and the less likely that franchising 
will be chosen, while management contracts would be favoured in situations with 
medium risk and economic development. 
As far as the firm-specific factors are concerned, it was suggested that small hotel 
brands, with slow growth and little international experience are more likely to expand 
using company ownership or management contracts while larger brands with high 
annual growth rates and more international experience would favour franchising (other 
things equal). Moreover, hotel brands that operate in higher market segments (i. e. 
upscale, deluxe) are more likely to choose management contracts or company ownership 
while budget brands would prefer to expand using franchising. Finally, geographical 
concentration of hotel outlets seems to favour the use of hierarchical modes of 
development rather than franchising. 
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CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH DESIGN 
In this chapter the research design to be applied will be presented. In the first sections, 
the population, sampling strategy and data collection method will be presented. 
Subsequently, the variables' definitions and measures will be introduced and data 
analysis considerations will be discussed. Finally, the corporate development decision 
will be modelled and the appropriate software package for the analysis will be chosen. 
6.1 Population and sampling strategy 
In order to identify the population of this study, the meanings of the terms "hotel 
company" and "international hotel company" need to be clarified. According to Lewis 
(1995), a hotel company can actually fit in any of the following three categories: 
" Companies involved in constructing, developing and owning hotel buildings, 
" Companies involved in managing hotels (with or without holding equity in the hotels 
under management) 
" Franchising companies, which develop hotel chains without being involved in either 
owning hotel buildings or managing hotels. 
The next step is to clarify the term "multinational hotel company". To be truly 
international, clearly depends on a combination of several factors. The criteria for 
inclusion in the Tourism and Travel Intelligence (TTI) listing of the top international 
hotel companies "The International Hotel Industry ", are the following: 
" more than 5000 rooms in total 
" at least 10 hotels 
" international presence (representation in at least five countries) 
The purpose of this study is to identify the factors that influence the choice among 
franchise agreements, management contracts and company ownership as a mode of 
international hotel corporate development. Therefore, the population includes all the 
hotel companies that operate at least one unit under one or more of the following modes: 
management contract, franchise agreement or company ownership. 
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Thus, in this study the following types of hotel corporations will be included: 
" hotel management companies who own the brand(s) of the hotels they manage 
" hotel franchising companies (franchisors), 
that operate at least one unit under either franchising, management agreement or 
company ownership. 
It is equally important to refer to the companies that will be excluded from this study, 
justifying the decision for doing so. Firstly, marketing consortia or affiliations will not 
be included for two reasons: (a) to avoid double counting of hotel properties since there 
are quite a few hotels that belong to an international chain and at the same time 
participate in such alliances for marketing and reservation purposes; and (b) because 
those affiliations do not function as franchisors, management operators or owners and 
therefore do not satisfy one of the main criteria for inclusion in the population, i. e. to 
own, manage or franchise at least one unit. (For those reasons "Best Western" will be 
excluded, although the TTI has listed it 3rd in the list of the world's major international 
hotel groups. ) 
Furthermore, one should exclude independent management operators, i. e. companies 
that specialise in providing hotel management services, since those companies do not 
have their corporations' or brands' names attached to the hotel properties, and therefore 
do not belong to any of the categories mentioned above. The reason why those 
companies should not be included is that the aim of this study is, among others, to 
evaluate the effect that brand name has on a hotel firm's corporate development 
decision. 
Finally there is another issue that should be clarified, regarding international hotel 
companies that own several brands. Most of the hotel companies listed as leaders in the 
"International Hotel Industry" directory are actually companies with more than one 
brand, each of them aiming in a different market segment. For example, Marriott 
International owns Marriott Hotels, Resorts and Suites and Ritz-Carlton that operate in 
the upscale market, Courtyard by Marriott that operates as the moderate-priced three star 
hotel brand and Fairfield inn that aims at the budget market. 
In this study each brand will be examined separately since it has been suggested that 
brand type and level of idiosyncratic knowledge are two main firm-specific variables 
that influence the expansion decision. 
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One could argue that corporate identity is an important factor that influences the 
decision for corporate development and thus an additional variable should be included in 
the model that accounts for the effect of being a brand that belongs to a particular 
company. Hence, it might be expected that hotel brands within the same corporate 
portfolio are influenced by certain corporate characteristics that are similar for all its 
hotel brands regardless of the market segment where these brands operate. For example, 
one might argue that Accor brands (in this case Sofitel, Novotel, Mercure and Ibis) are 
not independent of one another as far as the development of new properties of each 
brand is concerned. 
However, there are two reasons why it is suggested that this argument will not influence 
the model that will be examined in this study: The first and most important is related to 
the fact that during the last couple of decades hotel brands changed ownership fairly 
easily and within short periods of time, and thus it would be reasonable to argue that the 
effect of corporate identity is not significant, since hotel properties that have developed 
in different years under different company portfolios have been influenced by various 
corporate environments and not only by the corporate profile of the company that 
currently owns the brand. 
Second, a careful inspection of the data reveals that only three of the companies in the 
sample own more than two brands, that is Accor (a French company), Six Continents (a 
British company) and Marriott (a U. S. company). The effect of Accor's and Six 
Continent's corporate identity though is captured by the LATINEUROP variable, the 
dummy variable that measures the effect of country group of origin (brand origin) on the 
modal choice, hence there is no need to include an additional company variable that will 
assess the effect of being a brand under one of these two portfolios. The same is true as 
far as the effect of Accor's and Marriott's corporate identity is concerned. Regarding the 
effect of being a Marriott as opposed to a Six Continent brand, it can be noticed that both 
companies are among those that include in their portfolios brands that were developed 
by different companies during previous decades. Thus, the effect of corporate identity is 
not significant in either case. (The rest of the companies that are included in the sample 
have only one or two brands in their portfolio. ) For the two previously mentioned 
reasons, it is suggested that there is no need to include additional dummy variables in the 
model to represent each company. 
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Table 6.1 presents the population of the study, namely the international hotel companies 
that qualify for inclusion in the study according to the previously mentioned criteria. The 
"No. of Hotels" column refers to the total of hotels of each brand in 1998. The "New 
Hotel Properties" column refers to the properties that were added in each brand in the 
period between 1998 and 2000, according to the "International Hotel Industry " 
Directory (ITT, 2001). The total number of hotel properties that were added during that 
period was 1510. However, it has to be noted that this number was the result of the 
comparison between the total of hotels in 1998 and the total in 2000. Yet it is possible 
that during this period some hotel operations have been terminated, therefore it is likely 
that the total of the hotels added is higher than the one that was calculated. 
Table 6.1: Population of the Study 
Hotel Company Hotel Brand No. of Hotels No. of 
Countries 
New Hotel 
Properties 
Accor Sofitel 113 28 31 
Novotel 317 56 12 
Mercure 387 30 253 
Ibis 452 34 86 
Barcelö Barcelö 44 10 45 
Carlson Radisson 361 48 59 
Country Inn 141 7 103 
Choice Clarion 182 15 -30 
Quality 931 30 -176 
Comfort 2301 24 -384 
Cendant Days Inn 1801 8 109 
Howard Johnson 505 12 11 
Four Seasons Four Seasons 32 13 10 
Hilton Int'l Hilton Hotels 163 49 52 
Scandic 127 9 27 
Hyatt Hyatt Hotels 183 39 16 
Iberostar Iberostar 34 6 25 
Marriott Marriott H&R 351 39 17 
Renaissance 75 27 21 
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Courtyard 415 11 78 
Ritz Carlton 35 14 3 
Millennium Millennium 12 6 2 
Copthorne Copthome 28 5 2 
NIKKO Nikko 45/61 19 9 
Nomura Le Meridien 99 48 24 
Shangri-La Shangri-La 36 10 1 
Six Continents Inter-Conti 115 63 17 
Crowne Plaza 124 39 21 
Holiday Inn 1472 54 63 
Express 841 15 289 
Societe du Louvre Campanile 359 7 1 
Sol Melia Sol & Melia 243 24 10 
Starwood Sheraton 321 58 68 
Westin 111 24 10 
Four Points 103 5 33 
Tokyu Pan Pacific 16 10 2 
The population of the study consists of 36 hotel brands (19 hotel companies). If one 
compared the above table with the respective list of the "International Hotel Industry" 
directory, one could observe that few major brands are not included in this study. Firstly, 
Best Western is not included for the reason discussed previously. Also, the Regent brand 
is excluded. The reason is that Regent Hotels are owed by Carlson Hospitality and 
managed by various hotel operators, such as Four Seasons. Although Carlson Hospitality 
owns the properties, the operation of the hotels is undertaken by different hotel 
companies and thus one of the criteria for inclusion in the study (i. e. that the company 
should manage or own and operate at least one hotel property) is not satisfied for 
Carlson in this case. Finally, Club Mediterranee is not included in the population 
because the hotel operations are only one segment of an integrated business where the 
tour operator uses its own airline to transfer the club members in the Club Med hotels. 
Although these hotel properties are owned and operated by Club Med, they are not 
included in the population, because this hotel company does not face the same 
competition issues, as do other hotel companies, when examining their expansion 
strategy. 
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6.2 Data Collection 
The data were gathered from secondary sources, including public statistics (e. g. "The 
International Hotel Industry" directory published by the European Union- International 
Travel and Tourism agency), company annual reports, press releases, journals and 
Internet sites. This directory is the only secondary source focused on the hotel industry 
that is currently updated (the 2001 edition has been used) and the one that has been used 
for the most recent hotel studies (Contractor and Kundu, 1998a and 1998b). 
Although this directory provides a comprehensive coverage of the business worldwide, it 
does not show the organisational mode for the properties added in each hotel brand. 
Thus, the hotel companies' Internet sites have been searched for information regarding 
organisational modes and missing data have been completed by personal contact to 
corresponding positions in each company. More specifically, a letter was sent to the 
Director of Development (or any other equivalent position) of each one of the population 
hotel brands, asking information about the organisational mode of each hotel property 
that had been added in the system between 1998 and 2000. 
To make the procedure easier for the person that filled in the required information, the 
new hotels and the respective countries had been identified in advance, either by using 
the hotel companies' web sites and annual reports, or by comparing the 2001 TTI 
directory with the 1998 one. Thus, the recipient of the letter was provided with a list of 
the hotels and was asked to identify whether these hotels operated under company 
ownership, management contract or franchise agreement. Additionally, they were asked 
to provide the year when the first hotel of the brand operated. Finally, it was clarified 
that the company ownership mode should also includ leased properties, as well as 
properties in which the hotel company had a major equity stake. (A sample copy of the 
letter is provided in Appendix 1. ) A reply was received from 10 out of the 19 companies. 
Within those companies there were 19 out of the 36 hotel brands respectively. 
At a second stage, the monthly journal "Hotels " was used to gather the required 
information for the hotel brands on which no reply had been received or for which the 
received information was not entirely usable. The "Hotels" magazine has a section 
which provides information about the hotel openings all around the world. Searching the 
volumes from 1994 onwards, it has been possible to identify the new developments of a 
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few hotel brands for which no information were available so far and at the same time to 
confirm and double-check the data provided by the hotel companies. 
Table 6.2 presents the hotel brands for which all the required information was gathered 
through the previously mentioned stages and also gives information on the missing data. 
Table 6.2: The hotel companies and brands used for data analysis 
Hotel Company Hotel Brand New Hotel Properties 
(no. of total obs. ) 
Obs. taken out due 
to missing data 
Final 
Obs. 
Accor Sofitel 19 3 16 
Novotel 12 0 12 
Mercure 13 2 11 
Ibis 16 0 16 
Carlson Radisson 7 0 7 
Cendant Howard Johnson 117 5 112 
Four Seasons Four Seasons 12 1 11 
Hilton Int'l Hilton Hotels 22 3 19 
Hyatt Hyatt Hotels 23 4 19 
Iberostar Iberostar 14 2 12 
Marriott Marriott H&R 27 2 25 
Courtyard 6 0 6 
Ritz Carlton 10 0 10 
Six Continents Inter-Conti 26 6 20 
Holiday Inn 83 5 78 
Express 79 0 79 
Shangri-La Shangri-la 3 0 3 
Sol Melia Sol & Melia 11 1 10 
Starwood Sheraton 7 1 6 
Westin 19 1 18 
During this process, country data was also collected. The International Country Risk 
Guide was used to identify the politico-economic risk of each country for the years 1996 
through 1998 and the UNESCO and United Nations Statistical Yearbooks for 1998 to 
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2000 were used to collect information on patents filed in each country and on GDP per 
capita. Since that information was unavailable for some small countries, the total data set 
had to be reduced by 36 observations, from 526 to 490. 
6.3 Measurement of Variables 
In this section the measures for the variables presented in the previous chapter will be 
discussed. For some of the variables, more than one measure could be used. The table at 
the end of the section (Table 6.3) gives an overview of the variables, the direction of 
their relationship with the depended variable and the measures that will be used to assess 
that relationship. 
6.3.1 Location-Specific Variables 
An issue that needs to be clarified before the measures for the location- (country) 
specific variables are presented is the fact that there is a lag between the time when the 
decision to develop a new hotel property is made and the time when the hotel starts its 
operations. This time period could range from as short as 6 months up to 3 years, 
depending mainly on the size of the property and the organisational mode used. 
According to industry specialists, one could argue that on average it takes around two 
years until the hotel launches its operations. Therefore, when the country variables' 
measures are entered in the data set a two-year lag is applied, namely for the hotels that 
launched their operations in 2000, the 1998 country data were used, and so on for the 
hotels that first operated in 1999 and in 1998. 
a) Political and Economic Risk 
Previous studies (Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988) have used the 
classification of Goodnow and Hanz (1972) to capture country political and economic 
risk. Via cluster analysis, based on fifty-nine country descriptions 
during the decade of 
the 1960s, they classified one hundred countries into three groups that correspond to 
high, medium and low country risk. 
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More recently, Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque (1995) used the Frost and Sullivan 
Country Risk service, which reported the investment risk for eighty-two countries over 
the time period of January 1988 to June 1989, to capture host countries' political risk, 
i. e. the amount of political turmoil in the country, its restrictiveness towards the 
investment of funds and the transfer of dividends, fees and royalties. They also used the 
World Currency Yearbook reports on exchange rates for 1982 to 1984 and the Price 
Waterhouse annual report on exchange rates for the years 1985 to 1989 to calculate the 
average fluctuation in the foreign exchange rate of each country's currency. 
Finally, Agarwal and Ramaswani, (1992) and Contractor and Kundu, (1998a and 1998b) 
obtained their data for political and economic risk from Frost and Sullivan International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This guide assesses a country's current political, economic 
and financial risk by assigning risk points to a pre-set group of factors termed political, 
economic and financial risk components respectively. The highest overall rating 
(theoretically 100 points) indicates the lowest risk and the lowest score (theoretically 0 
points) indicates the highest risk. The International Country Risk Guide presents up-to- 
date data for various aspects of political, financial and economic risk and moreover it is 
widely used by researchers in academia as well as in the industry. Therefore, it has been 
considered for the purpose of this study as the main data source for country political and 
economic risk. In Appendix 2, a list with the aspects considered for the calculation of 
ICRG index is provided. 
Although country risk is a continuous variable that can take any value between 0 and 
100, in this study it will be represented as a qualitative discrete variable: ICRGD1 will 
indicate countries with moderate and high political and economic risk, ICRGD2 will 
correspond to countries with low risk and ICRGD3 will denote countries with very low 
risk. A qualitative representation of the risk variable will make the interpretation of the 
findings easier, since one will be able to draw conclusions regarding the effect of 
different risk levels (low/medium/high) on the choice among the three expansion 
strategies. Moreover, another reason that renders the grouping of the country risk 
variable necessary is that the distribution of the variable does not resemble a normal 
distribution and thus is far from being linearly related to the log of the dependent 
variable (the modal choice). However, it has to be noted that grouping a continuous 
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variable also has its drawbacks, since certain amount of information regarding the effect 
of that variable on the dependent variable will be lost. 
According to ICRG report, very high and high risk countries are the countries that score 
between 0 and 59.5, moderate risk counties are the countries with score between 60 and 
69.5, low risk countries those with score between 70 and 84.5 and very low risk 
countries those with score higher than 85. The reason why in this study moderate- and 
high-risk countries are represented by the same variable (ICRGD 1), while low- and very 
low-risk countries are represented separately is that only few observations in the sample 
correspond to high and very high risk countries, while most of observations refer to 
moderate and low risk countries. Thus the moderate and high-risk countries had to be 
grouped in one variable (ICRGD 1). 
b) Legal Risk 
In the context of this study, legal risk refers to both local regulations and policies 
regarding trademark and intellectual property rights protection, as well as to court 
enforcement. To measure the legal protection of intellectual property, the number of 
patents filed in each country has been used. It could be argued that the fact that 
numerous patents are filed in a country indicates confidence regarding patent protection 
and thus confidence regarding intellectual knowledge protection in general. 
c) Level of Economic Development 
The most common measures for economic development that recent studies have 
suggested, refer to countries' Gross Domestic Product, GDP, (Gomes-Casseres 1989, 
1990 and Shane 1992), GDP per capita (Contractor and Kundu, 1998a and 1998b) or 
Gross National Product (GNP) per capita (Agarwal, 1994; Davidson and McFetridge, 
1985). In this study, GDP per capita has been used to capture the level of economic 
development of each country, since GDP growth is not a measure of level but of pace 
and GDP (or GNP) is not comparable among different countries. The World 
Development Indicators yearbooks (1998-2000) were used for this data. 
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6.3.2 Firm-Specific Variables 
a) Brand Size 
There are several measures that could be used to measure brand size. The most common 
include worldwide revenues (Contractor and Kundu 1998a and 1998b), number of 
rooms, number of employees (Gatignon and Anderson, 1988) and total assets. In the 
context of this study the last two measures could not be used. The "number of 
employees" measure is not accurate in the case of hotel companies that operate some of 
their hotel units under management service agreements, since the vast majority of 
employees in those units are employed by the hotel owner not the hotel operator. The 
same rationale applies for the "total assets" measure, since it does not include hotel 
properties that are operated (but not owned) by the international hotel company or 
properties that are operated under a franchise agreement. 
Therefore the most appropriate measures to be used in the current study were "number 
of hotels worldwide" and/or "number of rooms worldwide". In both cases, franchised 
and managed hotels and/or rooms from properties under management and franchise 
agreements have been included. The reason why the "number of rooms" measure was 
finally used is that brands in different market segments present substantial differences in 
terms of the size of the hotels they operate. For example, luxury brands are usually 
smaller than budget or mid-market brands, while upscale brands usually have the biggest 
properties in terms of rooms. If the number of hotels were used as the measure of size it 
could be that brands with comparable number of hotels in their portfolio but 
significantly larger number of rooms would appear as having similar size. Thus, it is 
suggested that the "number of rooms" measure will capture the effect of size better than 
the "number of hotels" measure. Information regarding the number of rooms of each 
hotel brand has been derived from the "International Hotel Industry " directory. 
b) Brand Growth 
Brand growth is measured by the increase (or in some cases decrease) in the brand size, 
i. e. the difference in the number of rooms between two consecutive years. For example, 
brand growth in 1999 is measured as the difference in the number of rooms of a certain 
brand between the end of 1998 and the end of 1999. In the current study, hotel brands 
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are classified in four groups according to the growth they experienced in each year 
between 1998 and 2000. The cut-off points have been selected using the quartiles of the 
brand growth distribution: FGR1 refers to brands with annual growth up to 1 percent, 
FGR2 to brands with annual growth between 1 and 2.5 percent, FGR3 to annual growth 
between 2.5 and 9.5 percent and FGR4 to annual growth higher to 9.5 percent. 
The reason for transforming brand growth to a qualitative, discrete variable is the 
existence of outliers in the distribution of this variable. Although the median growth is 
2.5 percent (the mean is 6.5 percent), there are hotel brands that presented up to 50 
percent growth in one year, and thus the growth variable is far from being linearly 
related to the log of the dependent variable. Therefore, a qualitative variable was 
constructed in relation to the quartiles of the brand growth distribution. It has to be 
admitted that the transformation of a continuous variable to a discrete variable will result 
in losing some information; however one will still be able to draw conclusions regarding 
the effect of difference brand growth levels on the modal choice. 
c) International experience 
Previous studies on entry mode choice have quantified international experience using 
mostly two measures: number of foreign markets entries (Gatignon and Anderson 1988) 
and/or number of years since a firm started its first foreign operation (Fladmoe-Lindquist 
and Jacque 1995). In their studies on the hotel industry, Contractor and Kundu (1998a 
and 1998b) have suggested the use of an additional ratio, namely the number of 
properties outside the home nation of the firm divided by the global total number. This 
measure is indeed more appropriate than the time-based measure, since some firms may 
have expanded internationally faster than others. Moreover, "mere length of time in one 
cultural setting may not prepare a firm for expansion into another country and culture" 
(Contractor and Kundu 1998a, p. 341). 
The current study does not examine "foreign" entries as such and moreover does not 
regard a certain country as "home" country for each international hotel company? 
for 
the purpose of measuring international experience. Therefore the ratio used 
by 
Contractor and Kundu cannot be applied. Hence, two alternative measures of 
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international experience were initially considered: the first referred to the "number of 
countries" in which a hotel brand operates and the second to the "number of years" since 
its first operation in more than one country. Yet the "number of countries" measure 
could also be considered as a measure of geographical dispersion therefore the "number 
of years" was finally selected as measure of international experience. Information 
regarding this measure was obtained from the "International Hotel Industry" directory, 
as well as from the companies' Internet sites and from published data. 
d) Proprietary content (Market Segment of Operations) 
As already discussed in the previous chapter (Hypothesis 7, section 5.2.2), proprietary 
knowledge is a variable that refers mainly to specialised know-how, professional skills 
and managerial expertise, as well as to the use of codified assets, e. g. central reservation 
systems. Services that require professional skills are usually associated with significant 
human investments. Therefore, yearly training expenditure is a proxy that captures 
effectively the level of human investment required, and accordingly the degree of 
proprietary content that characterises an international hotel company. Yet, this type of 
information is difficult to acquire, since many hotel companies consider it to be 
confidential. Therefore, a different measure had to be used to capture the effect of 
proprietary content on the corporate development decision. 
In the context of this study, it is suggested that hotel classification could be used as a 
proxy for the level of proprietary content in the codified assets employed by the hotel 
company (see the analysis of Hypothesis 7 in section 5.2.2). It can be argued that the 
higher the rating of a hotel (i. e. five and four star) the more likely that a high level of 
proprietary content is involved with resultant information impactedness, and thus the 
higher the likelihood that management contracts or company ownership will be chosen 
over franchising. 
Luxury hotels require their staff to have the capability to respond flexibly to guests' 
individual requirements, so as to preserve the `glamour' of the brand. This capability 
(tacit knowledge? ) needs to be transferred via careful staff selection and training 
(hierarchy mode), rather than by packaged standard operating procedures. This seems to 
21 The hotel product per se is truly multinational nowadays and therefore it is quite difficult to define the 
criteria that one should use in order to identify which country should be regarded as the company's 
116 
Expansion Strategies of International Hotel Firms 
be a fairly classic case of information impactedness inhibiting the use of the market 
mode. The lower market segment of limited service units, on the other hand, requires a 
set of standard operating procedures from which there is no reason to deviate, because 
the service is limited. 
The hotel classification used in this study is not the "star" rating, because usually hotel 
brands assign different ratings in different markets. As an example, Holiday Inn can be 
seen as a four-star, as well as a three-star hotel, according to the specific geographic 
market or country. Therefore the classification has been slightly broader, i. e. budget, 
mid-market, upscale and luxury market. Hence in the previous example, Holiday Inn 
would be classified in the mid-market, since the service provided corresponds to that 
market, despite the fact that some properties in certain countries are classified as four- 
star. The above-mentioned data sources have been used as the basis for this measure. 
e) Geographic Concentration 
Most of the previous studies on franchising examine the influence of distance between 
each unit and the company's group headquarters on the decision between franchising 
and company ownership as a mode of corporate development (Brickley and Dark 1987, 
Norton 1988b). However in the context of this study, this measure cannot be applied 
since it has been argued that international hotel chains are considered not to have a 
"home country" that could be used as the basis for distance calculations. An alternative 
would be to use the regional head offices of each brand instead of the group 
headquarters. The bigger the average distance of the hotel properties from the respective 
regional head office to which they are assigned, the more likely that franchising would 
be used over management agreements. Yet, although it was relatively easy to identify 
where the regional offices of each brand were located, this was difficult to identify the 
location of the hotel properties that were added in each hotel brand during the two-year 
period. The available information on most of the developed properties indicated only the 
country where each hotel was developed, not the city or area. Thus, the distance from the 
regional offices could not be calculated. 
An alternative to the distance between hotel properties and headquarters of regional 
offices would be to use a proxy. Previous studies that examined the effect of monitoring 
"home" country. 
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costs on the choice between franchising and company ownership used a dummy variable 
that took the value of 1 if the company already had an outlet in the country where 
additional outlets were to be developed and 0 otherwise (Alon, 2000 and Laftontaine, 
1992). The idea behind that proxy is that if the hotel property under development were 
the first in the country, the preferred mode would be one that best aligns the incentives 
of the managers/agents with the ones of the hotel company, i. e. franchising. 
Other studies have used the number of outlets a company owns or operates in each 
country. In this study a variation of that proxy will be used: geographical concentration 
is captured by the number of hotels operated by each brand in each country, deflated by 
the population of the respective country, in order to make the proxy comparable among 
different countries. The higher the ratio, the more concentrated are considered to be the 
hotel outlets in the country, and thus the more likely it is that a hierarchical mode of 
development will be preferred as opposed to franchising. 
f) Country Group of Origin 
Since the brands in the sample are classified as either "Anglo-Saxon" or "Latin- 
European", a dummy variable was used, which takes the value of 1 if the hotel brand 
originates from the Latin-European country group (Spain or France) and 0 if the hotel 
brand originates from the Anglo-Saxon country group (U. S. A. or U. K. )22. Anglo-Saxon 
countries usually include the U. S, the U. K or other English-speaking countries that are 
related to those two, such as countries that belong to the commonwealth (e. g. Canada, 
Australia). Latin-European countries are those European countries that have Latin roots, 
such as Spain, Portugal, France and Italy. 
6.3.3 Control Variables 
Two control variables were introduced in the model. The first refers to the size of the 
hotel property, which is measured by the number of rooms (RMS). Previous research in 
the internationalisation literature has suggested that the bigger the size of a new outlet, 
22 As already explained, in the context of this study no distinction is made between home and 
host 
(foreign) country. Thus, the "country group" is based on the country where the hotel brand has most of its 
hotel operations. 
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the higher the capital investment required, and thus the more likely it is that a non-equity 
or shared-equity mode would be the preferred one. 
The second variable one would need to control for is a dummy variable (LOCATION) 
that takes the value of 1 if the new hotel property was developed outside the country 
where the hotel brand has most of its operations and 0 otherwise. It could be that a hotel 
brand follows a different development strategy in the country where it operates most of 
its outlets, compared to other countries. According to the theoretical framework of this 
study, one need not distinguish between home and host operations. Thus, if hotel brands 
expand using a different strategy in the country where they have most of their 
operations, one should control for that effect. 
In the following table a summary of the variables, the direction of their relationship to 
the depended variable and the measures that will be used to assess their influence on the 
modal choice is presented. Two of the variables (politico-economic risk and legal risk) 
are expected to show an opposite sign in the regression than it is suggested by the 
respective hypotheses. The reason is that in both cases, high levels in the scales that are 
used to capture the effect of politico-economic risk and legal risk indicate very low risk 
levels. Thus for a negative relationship to be supported, a positive sign should be found 
in the analysis and visa versa. 
6.3.4 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the modal choice that is the choice among the three expansion 
strategies (company ownership, management contracts and franchising) for the 
development of a new hotel property. The statistical modelling of the dependent variable 
will be presented in detail in the next section. 
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Table 6.3: Measurement of Variables 
Market-Specific Direction of the Measures Expected 
Variables relationship Sign 
Political-Economic Int'l Country Risk Guide, 
Risk (HI) - rating from 0 (v. high risk) to + 
100 (v. low risk) 
Legal Risk (H2) + Number of patents filed in the 
_ country 
Level of Economic GDP per capita 
_ Development (H3) 
Firm-Specific Direction of the Measures Expected 
Variables relationship Sign 
Brand Size (H4) Number of rooms worldwide 
Brand Annual The difference in the number 
Growth (H5) _ of rooms between two _ 
consecutive years 
International Number of years since first 
_ Experience (H6) _ operation in a second country 
Proprietary Content + Hotel rating - Market segment + 
(H7) (budget/ mid-market / upscale) 
Geographic + No. of hotels in the country + 
Concentration (H8) divided by the population 
Country Group (H9) + Dummy Variable (1 for Latin- + 
European, 0 for Anglo-Saxon 
brands) 
6.4 Modelling the corporate development decision: The 
choice among company ownership, management 
contracts and franchise agreements 
A basic statistical method for social sciences is linear regression analysis, which requires 
a continuous dependent variable and explanatory variables that are either continuous or 
categorical. However, the classical regression model cannot be applied in situations 
where the dependent variable refers to characteristics, attitudes, behaviours and 
decisions that are measured in discrete, nominal, ordinal, or any other non-continuous 
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way. In such situations the dependent variable takes a discrete number of mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive values (Borooah, 2001). 
The statistical methods that are used to analyse such data are known as qualitative choice 
models and present a common characteristic, that is, they all model the probability of an 
event, namely, how likely the event is to occur (Liao, 1994). Examples of such methods 
of statistical analysis are "binary data analysis", "ordered analysis", or "discrete choice 
analysis", such as the logit and probit models. 
When we study a random variable Y (dependent variable) using a linear model, we 
specify its expectation as a linear combination of K independent variables (X) as 
follows: 
K 
/ý E(Y) - ILI - 
Yßkxk 
k=1 
(1) 
This is the ordinary linear model which can be used when the normality of the 
distribution of the random component in Y (i. e. the part that cannot be explained by the 
independent variables) can be assumed. 
However, when the dependent variable is measured in a non-continuous way, the 
random component in Y does not follow the normal distribution, in which case the 
ordinary linear model (1) cannot be applied. More specifically, if the dependent variable 
is a binary outcome (0/1), the random component in Y follows the binomial distribution 
and the appropriate model to be used for estimation is either logit: 
E(Y) =1og[ µ/(1-µ)] 
or probit: 
E(Y) = (D-1 (µ) 
(2) 
(3) 
where '-1 is the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function. 
When the dependent variable is a count variable, e. g. number of accidents, number of 
visits in a theme park, it is assumed that the random component 
in Y resembles the 
Poisson distribution and thus the logarithmic model is used: 
121 
Expansion Strategies o International Hotel Firms 
E(Y) =1ogµ (4) 
Finally, when the dependent variable is the outcome of more than two choices, such as 
modes of commuting to work, modes of entry, consumer choice regarding certain 
products, the multinomial distribution is assumed for the random component in Y and 
the multinomial logit model is used: 
E(Y) = log (j1/µj) (5) 
where, j indicates the jth in 1,..., J response categories. This model is an extension of 
model (2), in which J is equal to 2 (Liao, 1994). 
There are four main reasons why the classical lineal regression (and the OLS estimator) 
cannot be applied to estimate models where the dependent variable is non-continuous 
(Gujarati, 2001). The first refers to the fact that the random component in Y does not 
follow the normal distribution. Another problem is that the random component is 
heteroscedastic and thus one needs to find appropriate transformations to make it 
homoscedastic. Yet, the most important handicap of using the OLS estimator is that 
there is no guarantee that the estimated probability that the event under examination will 
occur will lie within the limits of 0 and 1. For example, if the estimated probability P; is 
negative, or greater than 1, it will have no practical meaning. Finally, by applying 
classical regression one would assume that the rate of change of probability per unit 
change in the value of the explanatory variable is constant and is given by the value of 
the slope. 
On the other hand, when a logit (or probit) model is used, the estimated probabilities will 
always fall between 0 and 1. Moreover, the probability of an event occurring does not 
increase linearly with a unit increase in the value of the explanatory variable. Rather, the 
probability approaches zero (or one) at a slower and slower rate as the value of the 
explanatory variable gets smaller (or larger) respectively. This is a more realistic pattern 
of change in the probability compared to linear models. 
It has to be noted that, traditionally, polytomous dependent variables have been handled 
with discriminant analysis. Polytomous logistic regression (i. e. logit and/or probit) may 
be preferable, however, because its results are more interpretable and there is no 
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requirement that the predictor set have the multivariate normal distribution (DeMaris, 
1992; Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque, 1995). 
When the corporate development decision is modelled, the dependent variable is a 
discrete variable, which can take the values of 0,1 and 2 referring to franchise 
agreements, management contracts and company ownership respectively. According to 
the previous discussion, one could assume that the choice among these three modes 
could be analysed using the multinomial logit model. However, the ordered logit or 
probit model should be used instead for the following reason: it has already been 
mentioned in previous chapters that different modes of entry or development are 
characterised by different degrees of control they provide over the developed property 
and more specifically that, among the three modes under examination, franchising 
provides the least control, company ownership the highest, while management contracts 
are located in between the other two modes. Hence, there is a clear order in the values 
the dependent variable can take, i. e. value 2 implies more control than value 1 and value 
1 implies more control than value 0. 
However, although there is a clear ranking among the three categories, this ranking does 
not form an interval scale, i. e. the differences among adjacent categories cannot be 
treated as the same. Therefore classical regression could not be applied, since it would 
treat the difference between 2 and 1 in the same way as the difference between I and 0, 
while actually, the numbers are only a ranking and have no essential significance 
(Borooah, 2001). 
On the other hand multinomial logit models, though they could be used, they would fail 
to account for the information conveyed by the ordered nature of the data. Ordered logit 
and ordered probit models are the most commonly used methods for analysing data 
when the dependent variable is both discrete and ordinal and takes more than two values 
(Liao, 1994; Maddala, 1983; Greene, 2000)23. 
For the ordered logit or probit model to be used to analyse the choice among the three 
corporate development modes, a critical assumption needs to be made and that is the 
parallel slopes assumption. What it is assumed is that the coefficients linking each 
23 In the case of a binary outcome (0/1), ordered logit and probit models can be used regardless of whether 
the dependent variable is ordinal or not (Borooah, 2001). 
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independent variable to the different choice outcomes will be the same across the three 
different choices. For example, it is assumed that the market segment where a hotel 
brand is positioned will affect the likelihood of choosing the franchise mode for a new 
development in the same degree as it will affect the likelihood of choosing the 
management contract or the company ownership mode. If the slope coefficients 
associated with a particular variable are not the same across the three outcomes (modes 
of corporate development), then the appropriate model to use is multinomial logit, rather 
than ordered logit or probit models (Borooah, 2001). 
Another issue that needs to be considered when the development decision is modelled is 
whether that decision is made in a single stage, or whether it is a set of sequential 
decisions, each involving a subset of options. Gatignon and Anderson (1988) suggested 
that the entry mode decision may be a 2-stage process, where in the first stage the 
international company decides whether to own the subsidiary outright and if not, in the 
second stage a choice is made among lower-control options. In their study regarding 
manufacturing multinational companies, they found that the transaction cost explanation 
performs better in the 2-stage model rather than in the single stage one. 
Accordingly, in the context of this study one could test whether transaction cost 
economics and agency theory can provide a better explanation regarding the corporate 
development decision, if that decision is modelled in two stages. More specifically, in 
line with transaction cost economics, one could suggest that at the first stage a decision 
is made between "market" and "hierarchy", namely the international hotel company 
decides whether to expand using a high- or a low-control mode. If the company prefers a 
low-control mode franchising should be chosen, which provides the least control over 
hotel operations (among the three options). If on the other hand, the hotel company opts 
for a higher-control mode, in the second stage, a choice is made between company 
ownership and management service agreements. 
If the two-stage model is followed, the decision process can be modelled by (1) a binary 
choice model of whether franchising or non-franchising will be used (the response 
variable will take the value of 1 for franchising and 2 for non-franchising) and given that 
a higher control mode has been the preferred option, by (2) a binary model of choice 
between management contracts and company ownership (the response variable will take 
the value 1 for management contracts and 2 for company ownership). 
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Since the binary choice model is a special case of the multinomial (in this study the 
ordered) logit model, the more general ordered model was examined first, followed by 
the 2-stage binary model, and the results of both are presented in the next chapter. 
However, because the binary model is the simplest probability model its specification is 
presented here first, as this would help one to better understand the specification of the 
ordered model. 
6.4.1 Binary Logit/Probit Model 
As the simplest probability model, binary logit and probit models have only two 
categories in the response variable, i. e. 0 and 1. Binary models are usually denoted as 
latent variable specifications in which the response variable y* is linearly related to a set 
of k explanatory variables, xk=(x1, x2,..., XK) and is defined by the regression relationship: 
K 
yý= Y, 8kxk+8 
k=1 
(6) 
In practice, y* is unobserved and E is systematically distributed with zero mean and has 
its cumulative density function (CDF) defined as F(c). The observed dependent variable 
is determined by whether y* exceeds a threshold value: 
1 if y*>0 
0 otherwise 
Then, the probability of observing a value of 1 is denoted by the following relationship: 
K 
Prob(y=1)=Prob(Ißkxk+E>0) 
k=1 
K 
., 
Pkxk) = Pr ob(c >-Y, 
k=1 
K 
= 1-F(- Yßkxk) 
k=1 
where F is the CDF of E. 
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The functional form of F depends on the assumption made about the distribution of the 
random component c. If the random component is assumed to follow the logistic 
distribution, then the binary model is known as the logit model, where, substituting L 
(signifying the logistic distribution) for F in equation (7): 
K 
KK exp( ßi`xk) 
Pr ob(y =1) =1- L( - 1] ßkxk) = L( ßkxk) = k-K (8) 
k=1 k=1 1+ exp(l, ')6kxk) 
k=1 
If the random component is assumed to follow the standard normal distribution, then the 
binary model is known as the probit model and Prob(y=1) is given by the following 
equation: 
Pr ob( y =1) =1- Fi -ý 
ßkXk) = F( 
ý ßkxk) 
= (D( 
ý 
ßk, ck) k=1 k=1 k=1 
6.4.2 Ordered Logit/Probit Model 
(9) 
Since the ordered model is an extension of the binary-outcome model, it is built around a 
latent variable specification in the same manner as the binary model (Borooah, 2001): 
K 
(10) y* _ 
YßkXk +6 
k=l 
As with the binary outcome model, y* is unobserved and thus can be thought of as the 
underlying tendency of an observed phenomenon, where it is assumed that c follows a 
certain distribution (such as the logistic or the normal distribution) with zero mean. 
In the context of this study the dependent variable can take three different values, i. e. 
y=0, y=1 or y-2. Although y* is unobserved, what is observed is that 
Y=O if y* -yl 
Y=1 if Y1 Y* 72 
y=2 if y* Yz (11) 
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The Y15 72 0 are unknown parameters (yl <y2) to be estimated along with the ßk of 
equation (10). Which of the three modes will be chosen by a hotel company for a new 
hotel development depends on whether or not y* crosses a threshold. The probabilities 
of y taking the values 0,1 and 2 are given by: 
KK 
Prob(y=0)=Prob(ý, ßkxk+8<_yl)=Prob(E<_yi 
-Y 
ßkxk) (1 la) 
k=1 k=1 
KKK 
Pr ob(y =1) = Pr ob(yi< 
1:, 8kxk 
+CS y2 )= Pr ob(yi - 
1,8kxk <Es y2 - 
>ßkxk) (I lb) 
k=1 k=1 k=1 
KK 
Pr ob(y = 2) = Pr ob(1 ßkxk +S >_ y2 )= Pr ob(c ? V2 -1 ßkXk) k=1 k=1 
(I IC) 
The difference between the ordered logit and probit models lies in the assumed 
distribution of c. An ordered logit is the result of assuming that c is logistically 
distributed while an ordered probit model is the result of assuming that c is normally 
distributed. 
When the random component is assumed to follow the logistic distribution the above 
probabilities take the follow form: 
K 
Pr ob(y = 0) = A(yi - 
Y, ßkxk) _ 
k=l 
1 
K 
I+ exý( E,, 
ßkxk 
- yt) 
k=1 
(I 2a) 
KK11 
Prob(y=1)=r1(y2- 1, ßkxk)-A (yi-Y, ßkxk)= - 
k=1 k=1 
+ eXp( 
ýßkxk 
- Y2) + exp 1, ßkxk - Yý 111 
k=1 k=1 
K 
Prob(y=2)=1-A(y2- Iýßkrlrc)=1- 
k=1 
1 
K 
1+exp( 1]ßkXk-y2) 
k=1 
(12c) 
) 
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When it is assumed that the error terms follow a standard normal distribution, the 
respective probabilities are as follows: 
K 
Pr ob(y = 0) = (D(yi -ý ßxx) 
k=1 
Pr ob( y =1) _ (1)(72 - 1, ßkxk) - (D( y, - Y, 8AXk) k=1 k=1 
K 
Pr ob( y- 2) =1- (D(72 -Y, 
8kxk) 
k=1 
(13a) 
(13b) 
(13c) 
The estimates of ßk, yi and y2 are obtained by maximising the following likelihood 
function using standard iterative methods (equation 14): 
I1og[Pr ob(y = 0/xi, ß, )I)] + I1og[Pr ob(y =1/xr, ß, y)] + j]1og[Pr ob(y = 2/x,, ß, y)] i3yi=0 i3yi=1 i3yi=2 
As mentioned above, an issue regarding ordered models is whether the parallel lines 
assumption holds, namely whether the ß estimates are invariant to the thresholds (in the 
case of this study, if the f3 estimates are invariant to r1 and Y2). When this assumption is 
valid, the effects of an independent variable x should be constant regardless of the choice 
of response category j. (The previous analysis refers only to the ordered model, not the 
binary one. ) 
6.4.3 Should the Logit or the Probit model be chosen? 
There is little difference between the two CDFs, i. e. the logistic (logit model) and the 
normal one (probit model). Normally, a logit model has flatter tails compared to probit. 
That is, the probability Pi approaches 1 or 0 at a slower rate in logit models than in 
probit. Given the similarities between logit and probit, either model will give very 
comparable conclusions in most applications. It is, in fact, easy to go from the one set of 
estimates to the other. If a probit estimate is multiplied by a factor of approximately 1.6, 
then the corresponding logit estimate can be obtained. 
There are situations, though, where estimates from logit and probit models may differ 
substantially, and in such cases care must be taken in choosing the more appropriate one. 
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These are cases with an extremely large number of observations and with heavy 
concentration of observations in the tails of the distribution. Logit models are more 
appropriate for distributions with heavier tails. That is, if movement towards probability 
of 0 or 1, after certain values of the regressors have reached, occurs quickly then a probit 
model provides a better approximation to the data generation process. Otherwise the 
logit model is preferred and more commonly used (Seddighi, Lawler and Katos, 2000). 
6.5 Econometric Views (E-Views 4.0) for model estimation 
There are several software packages that could be used for the analysis of qualitative 
dependent variables. SPSS, E-Views and LIMDEP are among the most commonly used. 
Although SPSS is a very user-friendly statistical package, which is widely used by social 
scientists, it could not be used for the current analysis, since it requires a maximum of 10 
dependent and independent variables (combined). In this study there are nine 
independent variables, which means that (if the dependent variable is also included) the 
maximum number of variables is reached. Yet, since in several cases, additional 
variables may be used in the analysis, SPSS could not be used, due to the above 
restriction regarding the number of variables. LIMDEP was another option, however, 
due to unavailability of the software could not be considered either. 
The Econometric Views software (version 4) is commonly used for discrete choice 
analysis, including estimation of binary and ordered choice models. In maximizing the 
log likelihood function of (14), it uses the analytical second derivative methods to obtain 
the ß and y parameters, as well as the variance matrix of the estimated coefficients. 
There are three parts to specifying an ordered variable model: the equation specification, 
the error specification, and the sample specification. First, the name of the ordered 
dependent variable followed by the list of the regressors should be specified. Next, one 
needs to select among the ordered logit, ordered probit, and the ordered extreme value 
models by choosing one of the three distributions 
for the latent error term. As already 
mentioned, for the current analysis the logit model will 
be applied. Lastly, the estimation 
sample should be specified. 
Once the estimation procedure converges, E-Views will 
display the estimation results in 
the equation window. The first part of the table contains the usual 
header information, 
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including the assumed error distribution, estimation sample, iteration and convergence 
information, number of distinct values for y, and the method of computing the 
coefficient covariance matrix. Below the header information are the coefficient estimates 
and asymptotic standard errors, and the corresponding z-statistics and significance 
levels. 
The estimated coefficients of the ordered model must be interpreted with caution, since 
the signs of the coefficients cannot be interpreted in the same way as in classical 
regression. The sign of the estimated ß coefficients shows the direction of the change in 
the probability of falling in the endpoint rankings (y-0 or y=2) when xi changes. Pr(y=0) 
changes in the opposite direction to the sign of ß and Pr(y=2) changes in the same 
direction as the sign of P. The effects on the probability of falling in any of the middle 
rankings (in this case y=1) are given by: 
aPr(y = k) aF(yk +i- x'ß) aF(yk - x'ß) 
aß; aß; aß, 
(15) 
for k=1,..., M-1. It is impossible to determine the signs of these effects, a priori (Greene, 
2000). 
The lower part of the estimation output, labeled "Limit Points", presents the estimates of 
the i coefficients and the associated standard errors and probability values. Just below 
the limit points are the summary statistics for the equation. The most important among 
those summary statistics are the Akaike information criterion (AIC), the Schwarz 
criterion (SC), the Hannan-Quinn (HC), the log-likelihood value and the likelihood ratio 
(LR) statistic. The first three (AIC, SC and HC) are the information criteria used for 
model selection; one should select the model with the smallest information criteria. The 
LR statistic tests the joint hypothesis that all slope coefficients except the constant are 
zero and thus is used to test the overall significance of the model. (More details 
regarding the use of those criteria will be provided throughout the data analysis section. ) 
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6.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the elements of the research design were extensively discussed. The 
population and the sample of the study were identified, along with the type of data and 
data sources that were used. The main focus of the chapter was on the identification of 
the appropriate measure for each variable, as well as on how the decision among the 
three organisational modes could be modelled and tested. More specifically, it has been 
decided that the appropriate method to test the corporate development decision was the 
logit model. 
Two models are going to be examined (the results of which will be presented in the next 
chapters): the one-stage ordered logit model and the two-stage binary model. For the 
first model to be applied, it is assumed that the expansion decision is made in one stage, 
where the choice is made among all the -available alternatives (in this case company 
ownership, management contracts and franchise agreements). The ordered logit model 
will be used instead of the multinomial logit one, since the latter would fail to account 
for the information conveyed by the ordinal nature of the data, and thus would not test 
for the hypothesis that the three development modes (franchising, management contracts 
and company ownership) constitute a set of increasing control modes. 
For the two-stage model to be applied, it is assumed that the development decision is 
made in two consecutive stages: at the first stage, the hotel executives choose between 
high- and low- control modes, i. e. between franchising and "non-franchising" and at the 
second stage a choice is made between the two high-control modes, i. e. management 
contracts and company ownership. 
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CHAPTER 7: DATA ANALYSIS - ORDERED MODEL 
7.1 The profile of the sample 
Before the main data analysis is performed and the results are presented, it would be 
useful to present some descriptive statistics and information regarding the sample that 
will be used for the analysis. As mentioned earlier, the hotel brands in the sample have 
been classified according to the market segment where each brand operates. Comparing 
the following table (Table 7.1) to the one presented in the previous chapter (Table 6.2), 
one could note that this table contains less data than the previous one. More specifically, 
Shangri-La hotels have been excluded from the luxury category. The reason is that this 
is the only hotel company that cannot be classified as Anglo-Saxon or Latin-European 
and moreover cannot form a separate category, since there are only three observations 
for this company. 
Furthermore, one can see that the total number of observation is 487, whereas in the 
previous table there were 526 observations. This difference is due to missing data 
regarding mainly country specific information (e. g. country risk or level of economic 
development). Finally, it has to be mentioned that the four categories in the market 
segment qualitative variable will be merged into three, namely the luxury and the 
upscale segment will form one category (luxury/upscale). The reason is that the number 
of observations in the luxury segment is too small compared to the rest of the categories 
(only 21 observations) and this could cause problems in the estimation of the model 
(Liao, 1994). 
As can be seen in table 7.1, management contracts have been the prevalent mode of 
development in the upscale segment, where 67 per cent of the developed hotels operate 
under a management contract, 24 percent are company owned and only 8.7 percent 
operate under a franchise agreement. Actually, it is worth mentioning that management 
contracts are the only mode of development in the luxury segment, as far as this sample 
is concerned. When it comes to the mid-market segment, the majority of the hotel units 
have been developed under a franchise agreement (56 percent), while management 
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contracts have also been used to a considerable degree (34.5 percent). Finally, regarding 
the budget sector, the vast majority of the developed hotels consist of franchised units, 
whereas only a 12 percent of the hotels are operated under a management contract or 
company ownership. 
Table 7.1: Modes of Development within each Market Segment 
New Hotel Properties (1998-2000) 
Total CO MC F 
Luxury 21 0 0.0% 21 100.0% 0 0.0% 
Ritz-Carlton 10 0 0.0% 10 100.0% 0 0.0% 
4 Seasons 11 0 0.0% 11 100.0% 0 0.0% 
Upscale 140 39 27.9% 87 62.1% 14 10.0% 
Hyatt 19 5 26.3% 14 73.7% 0 0.0% 
Marriott 25 7 28.0% 14 56.0% 4 16.0% 
Inter-Continental 20 5 25.0% 10 50.0% 5 25.0% 
Hilton 19 6 31.6% 13 68.4% 0 0.0% 
Radisson 7 3 42.9% 4 57.1% 0 0.0% 
Sofitel 16 9 56.3% 7 43.8% 0 0.0% 
Sheraton 6 1 16.7% 5 83.3% 0 0.0% 
Westin 18 1 5.6% 14 77.8% 3 16.7% 
Sol Melia 10 2 20.0% 6 60.0% 2 20.0% 
Total 
Lux/Upscale 161 39 24.2% 108 67.1% 14 8.7% 
Mid-market 119 11 9.2% 41 34.5% 67 56.3% 
Holiday Inn 78 1 1.3% 14 17.9% 63 80.8% 
Courtyard 6 0 0.0% 3 50.0% 3 50.0% 
Novotel 12 2 16.7% 10 83.3% 0 0.0% 
Mercure 11 4 36.4% 6 54.5% 1 9.1% 
Iberostar 12 4 33.3% 8 66.7% 0 0.0% 
Budget 207 13 6.3% 11 5.3% 183 88.4% 
Express by 
Holiday Inn 79 1 1.3% 9 11.4% 69 87.3% 
This 16 12 75.0% 2 12.5% 2 12.5% 
Howard Johnson 112 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 112 100.0% 
TOTAL 
SAMPLE 487 63 12.9% 160 32.9% 264 54.2% 
Brand names in italics indicate Latin-European brands 
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Another interesting point refers to how different modes of development are used in a 
different degree by certain hotel companies regardless of the market segment. What is 
meant by that is that the overall observation in the sample, according to which upscale 
brands use more management contracts while budget brands use more franchise 
agreements, does not hold when some hotel companies are examined separately. 
A noticeable example is Accor, which consists of the following brands: Sofitel, Novotel, 
Mercure and Ibis. It can be see that this particular hotel company uses mainly company 
ownership for the development of new units regardless of the fact that among the four 
brands, only Sofitel is positioned in the upscale market segment and thus the other three 
brands would be expected to expand mainly through franchise agreements. On the other 
hand, Six Continents, the company that owns Inter-Continental, Holiday Inn and 
Holiday Inn Express, follows the basic rule, and thus uses mainly franchise agreements 
for the expansion of the lower segment brands (i. e. Holiday Inn and Holiday Inn 
Express), while company ownership and management contracts are the preferred modes 
for the expansion of its upscale brand, Inter-Continental. 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 provide a better view of the issues raised above, which will be 
elaborated more in the next section, (where the results of the econometric analysis will 
be presented). 
Figure 7.1 Modes of Development per Segment 
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Figure 7.2: Modes of Development for the Major 
Int'l Hotel Companies 
Q Franchise Agreements 
  Management Contracts 
  Company Ownership 
7.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Before we proceed with the econometric analysis of the data and the presentation of the 
regression model, some descriptive statistics of the sample should be presented and 
analysed. These statistics usually include frequency distributions of each variable, the 
correlation matrix that will reveal any multicollinearity issues among the independent 
variables and coefficients that test the bivariate relationships between each of the 
independent and the dependent variable. The latter will provide an indication with 
respect to whether there is actually a relationship between each independent variable and 
the dependent one, and moreover will give a first impression of how each independent 
variable relates to the modal choice, i. e. the choice between franchising, management 
contracts and company ownership as a mode of development of a new hotel property. 
7.2.1. Sample Descriptive Analysis 
The following table (Table 7.2) presents the main descriptive characteristics of the 
independent variables, including mean, median, standard deviation and frequency 
distribution. 
135 
Expansion Strategies of International Hotel Firms 
Table 7.2: Descriptive Statistics of the Independent Variables 
Statistics 
country 
risk legal risk 
economic 
development 
brand 
size 
brand 
growth 
N Valid 487 487 487 487 487 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 79.4988 6.6255 19,831.43 93,993.83 
. 06513 Median 83.0000 3.1471 23,019.00 52,102.00 
. 03000 Mode 83.10 3.15 31,746 51,403 
. 020 Std. Deviation 7.3470 11.9376 11,300.86 85,100.63 
. 08869 Skewness -1.480 4.857 -. 539 1.532 2.456 
Std. Error of Skewness 
. 111 . 111 . 111 . 111 . 111 
Kurtosis 1.806 27.735 -1.257 . 788 8.309 
Std. Error of Kurtosis 
. 221 . 221 . 221 . 221 . 221 
Minimum 49.00 
. 03 290 8,085 -. 010 
Maximum 92.80 100.00 36,569 284,350 . 500 
Percentiles 25 74.3000 2.7438 8,214.00 51,403.00 . 01000 
50 83.0000 3.1471 23,019.00 52,102.00 . 03000 
75 83.8000 7.2021 30,316.00 83,563.00 . 09000 
100 92.8000 100.0033 36,569.00 284350.0 . 50000 
Table 7.2: Descriptive Statistics of the Independent Variables (cont'd) 
Statistics 
international 
experience 
market 
segment 
geogr. 
dispersion 
country group 
of origin 
N Valid 487 487 487 487 
Missing 0 0 0 0 
Mean 27.23 1.91 . 8106 1.16 
Median 34.00 2.00 . 3000 1.00 
Mode 35 1 . 00 
1 
Std. Deviation 12.66 . 87 1.0068 . 
37 
Skewness -. 542 . 183 1.367 1.880 
Std. Error of Skewness 
. 111 . 111 . 111 . 111 
Kurtosis -1.107 -1.641 1.158 1.541 
Std. Error of Kurtosis . 221 . 221 . 221 . 
221 
Minimum 4 1 . 
00 1 
Maximum 49 3 4.24 2 
Percentiles 25 16.00 1.00 3.000E-02 1.00 
50 34.00 2.00 . 3000 1.00 
75 37.00 3.00 1.5700 1.00 
100 49.00 3.00 4.2400 2.00 
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7.2.2. Correlation Matrix 
The following table (Table 7.3) gives the correlation matrix among all the independent 
variables that will be used in the regression models in this and the following chapters. 
Highlighted are the correlation coefficients that exceed 60%, while it has to be noted that 
none of these exceeds 70%, suggesting that none of the independent variables should be 
considered as highly problematic. Regarding the coefficients that exceed 60%, the 
following comments should be made: 
(a) The correlation coefficient between brand size (FSIZE) and brand growth (FGR2) is 
67.82%. This means that the size of the brand is highly related to brands that have slow 
growth (FGR2 represents the annual growth between 1 and 2.5%). That is, large brands 
are usually brands that are characterized by slow growth rates. This is actually what one 
would expect for large brands. 
(b) The correlation coefficient between FSIZE and MIDMKT is 69%. MIDMKT 
represents the mid-market brands, and take the value of 1 if the brand is located in the 
market segment and 0 otherwise, while FSIZE is a continuous variable that measures the 
size of the brand in terms of rooms. The positive, high coefficient indicates that mid- 
market brands are possibly larger brands. 
(c) Regarding the coefficient between Economic Development (GDP) and country group 
of origin (C_ORIG), it is found to be -67.74%. GDP is a continuous variable, while 
C_ORIG takes the value of 0 if the developed hotel property is located in an Anglo- 
Saxon country group and 1 if it is located in a Latin-European country group. The 
negative coefficient indicates that there is a tendency for less economic developed 
countries to be Latin-European countries, and more developed countries to be Anglo- 
Saxon. 
(d) The coefficient between FGR2 and MIDMKT is 61.37%. That is, there is a tendency 
for brands with slow annual growth (between I% and 2.5) to be mid-market brands. This 
coefficient is related to coefficients in the above cases (a) and (b). Slow growth brands 
(FGR2) tend to be large brands, and large brands tend to be mid-market brands. Thus 
slow growth (FGR2) brands tend to be located in the mid-market segment. 
137 
Expansion Strategies of International Hotel Fl jj 
C> 
O ° 0 
U 
O M 
ý... ý 
Ö 
O 
E-4 O 
O 
ýO 
Oý - 
C> 
O 
Cý 
M 
N 
ý Ö O 
Ö 
N 00 IRT 
W 
H O 
. 
O M ýO 
. 0 ý O O O 
>-4 
Lý O 
ý m 
O\ 
C) 
Oý 
00 
~ 
Ö 
_ 
'--+ 
Ö 
O 
. 
O O O 
`ý 
F-i 
O In M tt 00 [- 
P4 Ö 
It 0 
0 0 
Ö 
'- 0 
0 0 O 
C) so 1%c C) r- CIN r- 
00 
M 
Ö 
00 
dM' O 
--+ 0 0 0 O O O 
Ö N C> ý ý ý ý ý 
,V O M M Ö 
N 
Ö 
O \O O N 
Ö O O O O 
Ö 
ONO d' ýO d' O 
ýl 
I-`v-V 
O 
O 
t- 
ýG 
N 
N 
kn 
N 
d 
N 
kn 
O 
Oý\ 
\kD 
tn 
N 
. --1 N 
V) 
w 1--ý 
Ö O 
. 
O 
. 
O O Ö O 
. 
O 
O 
O 
01 
kn N kn Oý\ (14 
01 
V) 
00 N d' 
Q 
O O 01 O ý ý (0ý O O O - O 
M 
v) 
0 0 0 O O O Ö O Ö 
ý4 O 
O 
\O 
T: t 
N 
`O 
00 
- 
M 
00 
M 
N 
O 
00 
N 
M 00 00 
O 
, - 
00 
ý 
Ö ý: t Ö - 
O 
kn 
O 
ý 
O 
tr) 
O 
O 
, --i 
--ý 
r-r 
N 
O --ý N 
C7 
W ý 
O O 
. 
O O O 
. 
O 
ý 
O O 
ý 
O 
M O 
O 
(-A 
oo 
`O 
kr) 
O 
W) 
M 
kn 
kn 
N 
"-ý 
-4 
O 
--4 
t- 
M 
00 
tn 
\C 
M 
N 
O 
Fý Ö 
N 
M Ö 
O O 
[ý 
O --ý O 
N N 
O 
N 
O 
01 
O 
O O O O O O O O O 
Ný O 
O M Q\ ý ý ý 
00 
O 
Oý 
M 
00 
ý 
0 N N 
ý O vý O ýt O 
0 0 
O 
N 
O O O N 
r1' 
- 
N 
- 
N 
M 
U , . 
0 
. 
0 O 
i 
O 
i 
O 
. 
O 
. 
O 
i 
O 
. 
O 
ý 
O 
. 
N M ý4 a 
ý 
(Lý ý4 X Cý 
^^ 
ýýý 
Ü 
U ý C7 w 
w w w ý Q ý ý UI 
138 
Expansion Strategies of International Hotel Firms 
(e) The coefficient between FGR4 and international experience (INTEXP) is -64.59%. 
FGR4 represents the brands that are characterized by high annual growth (more than 
9.5%). The correlation coefficient suggests that there is a tendency for high-growth 
brands to have lower international experience. One would expect that companies with 
lower international experience are companies that are new in the international arena. 
They may be small or large brands in their country where they started their operation, 
but since they haven't got enough international experience, this means that there is 
opportunity for them to expand worldwide at a quick pace, and thus one would expect 
brands with low international experience to be brands that have large growth rate. 
(f) Finally, the coefficient between geographical concentration (DHOTELS) and 
C_ORIG is -67.4%. C_ORIG takes the value of 0 for Anglo-Saxon countries and 1 for 
Latin-European, while the higher the value of DHOTELS the more concentrated the 
properties of a hotel brand in a particular country. Thus, the coefficient suggests that 
there may be an association between highly concentrated hotel outlets and Anglo-Saxon 
countries. Namely, it could be that hotel brands are more concentrated in Anglo-Saxon 
countries than in Latin-European. However, since DHOTELS is calculated as the 
number of hotels in a particular country divided by its population, one would expect that 
there are more hotels per population in Anglo-Saxon countries than in Latin-European, 
hence the negative correlation coefficient. 
7.2.3. Bivariate Relationships 
The following table (Table 7.4) presents each of the independent variables, with respect 
to their nature (level of measurement) and the appropriate approach to analyse their 
relationship to the dependent variable. 
Although most of the above independent variables are interval variables they have to be 
transformed to ordinal variables in order to examine their relationship to the dependent 
variable due to the nature of the latter. As mentioned in the previous chapter (Chapter 6) 
the dependent variable is an ordinal one that takes the value of 1 for franchising, 2 for 
management contract and 3 for company ownership. If one wants to analyse the 
relationship between an ordinal and an interval (scale) variable, one needs to transform 
(drop) the interval one to an ordinal variable and then perform a rank correlation method 
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(Bryman and Cramer, 1999). Therefore each of the variables politico-economic risk, 
legal risk, economic development, brand size and growth, international experience and 
geographical dispersion needs to be collapsed into groups and ranks should be assigned 
to the groupings. "The chief source of concern with collapsing values of an ordinal or 
interval variable is that the choice of cut-off points is bound to be arbitrary and will have 
a direct impact on the results obtained. Accordingly, it may be better to use more than 
one method of grouping or to employ a fairly systematic procedure like quartiles as a 
means of collapsing cases into groups" (Bryman and Cramer, 1999; p. 188). 
Table 7.4: Independent variables and the appropriate bivariate analysis 
Independent Variable Type of variable Appropriate 
Analysis 
Politico-economic Country Risk Ordinal (initially interval) Rank Correlation 
Legal Risk Ordinal (initially interval) Rank Correlation 
Economic Development Ordinal (initially interval) Rank Correlation 
Brand Size Ordinal (initially interval) Rank Correlation 
Brand Growth Ordinal (initially interval) Rank Correlation 
International Experience Ordinal (initially interval) Rank Correlation 
Market Segment Ordinal Rank Correlation 
Geographical Dispersion Ordinal (initially interval) Rank Correlation 
Country Group of Origin Nominal Cross Tabulation 
In the case of this study, the following transformations will be performed in order for the 
bivariate relationships between independent variables and dependent variable to be 
examined: 
Country politico-economic risk (ICRG): originally this is an interval variable that can 
take any value between 0 (highest risk) and 100 (lowest risk). The grouping will be 
performed in accordance with the groups that Frost and Sullivan provide for their 
Composite Risk Rating (see Appendix 2). That is, 1 for very high risk (0 to 49.5), 2 for 
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high risk (50.0-59.9), 3 for moderate risk (60.0-69.5), 4 for low risk (70-79.5) and 5 for 
very low risk (80.0-100). The following histogram represents the frequency distribution 
of the grouped country risk variable. 
It can be observed from the histogram of the grouped country risk variable (Figure 7.3. ) 
that this variable follows a non-linear distribution in which case one could not employ a 
measure of linear correlation, like Pearson's r. However, since the dependent variable is 
of an ordinal nature, Pearson's r could not be employed from the outset, rather the 
Spearman's rho or the Kendall's tau should be used. Since the latter two are non- 
parametric methods, it means they make fewer assumptions about variables. Thus, there 
is no need to transform the grouped country risk variable into a logarithmic scale. 
Figure 7.3: Frequency distribution of the country politico-economic risk 
grouped variable (ICRGGP) 
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Table 7.5 presents the correlation test between all the ordinal variables (originally 
interval variables) and the dependent one, i. e. all but the correlation test between 
organisational mode and country group of origin (which is a nominal variable and thus a 
different treatment is required) and the correlation test between organisational mode and 
market segment. 
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The correlation test between the grouped country risk variable (IRCGGP) and 
organisational mode (OM) is presented in the third column. As it can be seen, the 
bivariate correlation is significant at the . 
01 level, according to both Spearman's rho and 
Kendall's tau, and thus there is an indication that country political and economic risk 
could be one of the factors that influence the modal choice. The negative sign of the 
coefficient indicates a negative relationship between mode of development and country 
risk measure, namely, there is a tendency for the use of lower control modes when the 
ICRG measure is higher (i. e. when the country risk is lower), opposite to that suggested 
by Hl. 
Table 7.5: Bivariate Correlation between ordinal independent variables and 
dependent variable 
country 
risk 
legal risk economic 
developm. 
brand 
size 
brand 
growth 
int'l 
experience 
geographic 
dispersion 
Org. mode 
(OM) 
Correl. Coef. 
Kendall's i 
-. 238** . 075* -. 231** -. 141** . 339** -. 187** -. 459** 
Sig. (1-tailed) . 000 . 031 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 
Org. mode 
(OM) 
Correl. Coef. 
Spearman's p 
-. 259** . 060* -. 256** -. 162** . 378** -. 214** -. 528** 
Sig. (1-tailed . 000 . 024 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 
N 487 487 487 487 487 487 487 
** Correlation is significant at the . 01 level (1-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the . 05 level (1-tailed). 
Legal Risk: this is also an originally interval variable that can take a value from 0 
(highest risk) to 100 (lowest risk). Since there is no objective method of setting the cut- 
off points, the quartiles procedure will be applied for collapsing values into groups. The 
figure below (Figure 7.3) presents the frequency distribution of the grouped legal risk 
variable (LGRSKGP). The rank correlation tests of the relationship between legal risk 
and model of entry (OM) indicates that relationship between these two variables is 
significant at . 
05. However, both Kendall's tau and Spearman's rho coefficients have a 
very small value. Compared to country politico-economic risk, it can be seen that legal 
risk has a weaker effect on the dependent variable and moreover there is less confidence 
that the relationship has not arisen by chance. The positive sign of the coefficient 
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indicates that there is a tendency for the use of higher control modes when the LEGRSK 
measure is higher (i. e. when legal risk is lower), opposite to what is suggested by H2. 
Level of Economic Development: as in the case of legal risk, quartiles will also be used 
for the grouping of the GDP variable. Figure 7.5 presents the frequency distribution of 
the GDP grouped variable while the fifth column of Table 7.5 shows the coefficients for 
the bivariate relationship between economic development (GDPGP) and mode of 
expansion (OM). Both coefficients indicate a strong and significant at . 01 relationship 
suggesting that there is a tendency for the use of higher control mode in countries with 
low level of development, as it is suggested by H3. 
Figure 7.4: Frequency distribution of the country legal risk grouped variable 
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Figure 7.5: Frequency distribution of the GDP grouped variable 
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Figure 7.5: Frequency distribution of the GDP grouped variable 
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Figure 7.6: Frequency distribution of the brand size grouped variable 
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Figure 7.7: Frequency distribution of the brand growth grouped variable 
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Brand Size and Brand Growth: Figures 7.5 and 7.6 show the frequency distributions for 
brand size and brand growth respectively, while the coefficient tests are presented in the 
6th and 7th column of table 7.5. Correlation coefficients indicate a strong relationship 
between both variables and the dependent one, both significant at a . 
01 level. In 
accordance with H4, the coefficients of brand size indicate that there is a tendency for 
the use of lower control modes by larger firms and visa versa. However, regarding the 
brand growth, the correlation coefficients indicate a positive relationship namely, brands 
that are characterised by higher growth rates are associated with the use of lower control 
modes, opposite to the suggestion of H5. 
International Experience: the correlation coefficients between the international 
experience grouped variable and the dependent variable are negative and significant at 
. 01 level indicating that companies characterised 
by low international experience are 
associated with the use of higher control modes (such as company ownership) and visa 
versa. The rank correlation test for the bivariate relationship between experience and 
mode of development is in line with the suggestion of H6, and thus justifies the inclusion 
of int'l experience in the regression model. 
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Figure 7.8: Frequency distribution of the int'l experience grouped variable 
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Geographical Dispersion: Figure 7.9 presents the frequency distribution of the 
geographical dispersion grouped variable while the last column of Table 7.5 shows the 
coefficients for the bivariate relationship between geographical dispersion (GDSPRSGP) 
and mode of development (OM). Both coefficients indicate a strong negative and 
significant at . 
01 relationship, suggesting that there is a tendency for the use of higher 
control mode in countries where the hotel outlets of a company are dispersed, opposite 
to what is suggested by H9. Yet, the fact that there is a strong relationship between 
geographical dispersion and organisational mode, even in the opposite than expected 
direction, justifies the inclusion of the variable in the subsequent regression analysis. 
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Figure 7.9: Frequency distribution of the geographical dispersion grouped 
variable 
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Market Segment of Operation: this is an originally ordinal variable that takes the value 
of 1 for budget hotels, 2 for mid-market and 3 for upscale and luxury properties. The 
following table (Table 7.6) presents the Kendall's tau and Spearman's rho correlation 
coefficients of the relationship between market segment and mode of development 
(organisational mode). The coefficients suggest a very strong and positive relationship 
between the market segment and the organisational mode. Thus, there is tendency for 
brands that are located in higher market segment to choose higher control modes for the 
development of a new hotel property, other things equal, in line with H8. 
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Figure 7.10: Frequency distribution of the market segment variable 
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Table 7.6: Bivariate correlation between market segment and dependent variable 
Correlations Coefficients for Market Segment 
organisational market 
mode segment 
Kendal I's tau_b organisational mode Correlation Coefficient 1.000 . 584** 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
. 000 
N 487 487 
market segment Correlation Coefficient . 584** 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
. 000 
N 487 487 
Spearman's rho organisational mode Correlation Coefficient 1.000 . 640** 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
. 000 
N 487 487 
market segment Correlation Coefficient . 640** 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
. 000 
N 487 487 
**. Correlation is significant at the . 01 
level (1-tailed). 
Country Group of Origin: it is a nominal (dichotomous) variable that takes the value of 
0 for cases where a hotel property is developed in an Anglo-Saxon country and 1 when a 
hotel property is developed in a Latin-European country. The appropriate statistical 
approach for the examination of the bivariate relationship between country group of 
origin and organisational mode is crosstabulation (Table 7.7). It can be observed in the 
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table that 63% of the "Anglo-Saxon" hotels have been developed using franchising, 
while the respective percentage for "Latin-European" hotels is only 6.5%. Management 
contracts are a popular mode of development for both country group origins, although 
the percentage is higher for Latin-European. Finally, it can be seen, that company 
ownership is used mainly by Latin-European brands, since only 7.3% of the "Anglo- 
Saxon" hotels in the sample have been developed as company-owned properties, while 
the relevant percentage for Latin-European hotels in the sample is 43%. 
Table 7.5: Organisational mode / Country group of origin Crosstabulation 
country ou of origin 
latin- 
an to-saxon european Total 
organisational franchising Count 259 5 264 
mode Expected Count 222.3 41.7 264.0 
% within country 
group of origin 
o 63.2 /0 0 6.5 /0 0 54.2 /o 
management Count 121 39 160 
contract Expected Count 134.7 25.3 160.0 
% within country 
group of origin 
o 29.5 /0 0 50.6 /0 0 32.9 /o 
company Count 30 33 63 
ownership Expected Count 53.0 10.0 63.0 
% within country 
group of origin 
7.3% 42.9% 12.9% 
Total Count 410 77 487 
Expected Count 410.0 77.0 487.0 
% within country 
rou of ori in 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
g p g I -j 
Thus, the crosstabulation between dependent variable and country group of origin 
suggests that there is a relationship between these two variables: Anglo-Saxon brands 
show a preference in the use of lower control modes, while the opposite is true for Latin- 
European brands. However, in order to be confident regarding the existence of this 
relationship in the population, one needs to perform a significance test (chi-square test). 
It can be seen in Table 7.8 that the chi-square value is 110.525 with 2 degrees of 
freedom and the significance level is 0.01. Thus, one could be confident that the 
relationship between country group of origin and organisational mode could not have 
arisen by chance. 
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Table 7.6: Chi-Square Tests 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 110.525a 2 
. 000 Likelihood Ratio 110.694 2 
. 
000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 109.785 1 . 
000 
N of Valid Cases 487 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 9.96. 
7.3 Analysis and Results - Original Specification 
As already mentioned in the previous chapter the dependent variable is a polytomous 
one and can take three values, namely 0 for franchise agreements, 1 for management 
contracts and 2 for company ownership. Since the dependent variable is a qualitative 
one, the ordered logit model will be used to analyse the corporate development decision. 
The explanatory variables are either qualitative or quantitative. More specifically, the 
market segment variable can take three values, 0 for budget hotels, 1 for mid-market and 
2 for upscale, and the origin variable (coded as Latin-European) is a dummy variable 
that takes the value 0 if the brand originates from an Anglo-Saxon country and 1 
otherwise, i. e. if it originates from a Latin-European country (France or Spain). 
Brand growth, although a continuous variable, in the context of this analysis will be 
presented as an ordered, qualitative one. The reason this approach has been taken is the 
existence of outliers in the distribution of this variable. Although the median growth is 
2.5 percent (the mean is 6.5 percent), there are hotel brands that presented up to 50 
percent growth in one year, and thus the growth variable is far from being linearly 
related to the log of the dependent variable. Therefore, a qualitative variable was 
constructed in relation to the quartiles of the brand growth distribution; FGR1 refers to 
brands with annual growth up to 1 percent, FGR2 to brands with annual growth between 
1 and 2.5 percent, FGR3 to annual growth between 2.5 and 9.5 percent and FGR4 to 
annual growth higher than 9.5 percent. The rest of the explanatory variables are 
continuous variables and have been presented in detail in the previous chapter (see 
measurement of variables). 
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Since there are also qualitative variables in the analysis, one needs to apply the 
appropriate representation in the model. Thus, in this case, the model that will be 
estimated takes the following form: 
OM =, 8o +ßiICRGD2+ß2ICRGD3+ß3LEGRSK+ß4GDP+ßsFSIZE+ 
ß6FGR2 + ß7FGR3 + ßsFGR4 + ß9INTEXP + ßioGDSPRS + ßi iMIDMKT + (1) 
ß12UPSCALE + ß13LATEUROP + ß14RMS + ßisLOCATION 
When a qualitative independent variable takes n values, it needs to be represented in the 
model by n-1 variables. Therefore, the brand growth variable is represented by (4-1) 
three variables (FGR2, FGR3 and FGR4), the market segment variable is represented by 
(3-1) two variables (MIDMKT and UPSCALE) and the origin variable by the (2-1) one 
variable (Hardy, 1993; Liao, 1994). The coefficients of FGR2, FGR3 and FGR4 are 
actually being compared to the "base" value of FGR1 and the coefficients of MIDMKT 
and UPSCALE variables are compared to the "base" value of market segment, i. e. 
BUDGET. In the following sections one will be able to better understand the meaning of 
the coefficients of qualitative variables. 
ßj & ß2 indicate the effect of low (ICRGD2) and very low risk (ICRGD3) countries on 
the decision to use F, MC or CO, compared to the base category (ICRGD 1), which refers 
to high/moderate-risk ones. 
/ß3 &, 84 indicate the effect of legal risk and economic development respectively 
rn indicates the effect of brand size, (measured by the total number of rooms in the 
system) on the choice 
ß6,87, & ß8 indicate the effect of brand growth higher than 1%, 2.5% and 9.5% 
respectively on the choice, compared to the base category, which is a hotel brand with 
annual growth lower than I% - 
ß9 indicates the effect of international experience measured in years since the brand 
assumed operations in a second country. 
f31o indicates the effect of geographical concentration, measured by the number of hotels 
the brand operates in each country (divided by the population of that country). 
Al & ß812 indicate the effect of being a mid-market (or upscale) brand on the choice, 
compared to being a budget brand. 
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, ß13 indicates the effect on the choice of being a Latin-European brand compared to an 
Anglo-Saxon brand. 
, 
814 &)615 (control variables): indicate whether the size of the developed property (RMS) 
and its location (LOCATION) influences the decision among the three corporate 
development modes24. 
The following table (Table 7.9) presents the E-Views estimation output of the above 
model (1). The last column (antilog ß) had to be added, since it is not directly estimated 
by the software. There are three issues that need to be clarified before proceeding with 
the interpretation of the output. The first refers to the use of antilog25: the reason why the 
antilogs were estimated is that in ordered logit (and probit) analysis, the coefficients (ß) 
are not intuitively appealing as in classical regression; the antilog on the other hand 
gives the marginal effect of an explanatory variable x on the odds of belonging to one 
versus the other categories of the dependent variable (Liao, 1994; Hardy, 1993). The 
second issue is to be raised is also related to the interpretation of the coefficients: as 
mentioned earlier, when the dependent variable is polytomous the sign of the estimated ß 
coefficients shows the direction of the change in the probability of falling in the endpoint 
rankings (y=1 or y=3) when xi changes. Pr(y=1) changes in the opposite direction of the 
sign of ß and Pr(y-3) changes in the same direction as the sign of P. Yet, the effects on 
the probability of falling into any of the middle rankings (in this case y=2) are not 
known a priori. The last issue that needs to be clarified refers to the probabilities 
column: the probabilities of the z-statistics calculated by E-Views always refer to a two- 
tailed test. Therefore, in order to find if any of the factors are statistically significant 
under a one-tailed test, the half of the reported probability should be used. 
The top section of the E-Views output gives some general information regarding the 
dependent variable, the model of estimation, the sample size and the convergence 
estimation. In this study, the dependent variable is the organisational mode that is chosen 
by the international hotel company for a new hotel outlet (OM), the total sample is 487 
and the ordered logit model has been used for the analysis. 
24 What is meant by "location" is whether the developed property is located in the country where the hotel 
brand operates most of its hotel properties or outside that country. In the former case LOCATION takes 
the value of 0, whereas in the latter the value of 1. 
25 The antilog is calculated by exponentiating, i. e. taking the antilogarithm where the base is e 
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Table 7.9: E-Views output of the ordered model (original representation) 
Dependent Variable: OM 
Method: ML - Ordered Logit 
Sample: 1 487 
Number of ordered indicator values: 3 
Convergence achieved after 12 iterations 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. Antilog 
ICRGD2 (count. Risk) 0.326868 0.419019 0.78008 0.4353 1.3866 
ICRGD3 (count. Risk) -0.171659 0.528723 -0.32467 0.7454 0.8423 
LEGRSK 0.003560 0.010455 0.340523 0.7335 1.0036 
GDP 0.000019 2.10E-05 0.883924 0.3767 1.0000 
FSIZE 0.000005 2.58E-06 1.900639 0.0573 1.0000 
FGR2 (Brand growth) -0.303993 0.577711 -0.5262 0.5987 0.7379 
FGR3 (Brand growth) 1.068209 0.488364 2.187321 0.0287 2.9102 
FGR4 (Brand growth) 0.853355 0.547907 1.55748 0.1194 2.3475 
INTEXP -0.011450 0.013346 -0.85793 0.3909 0.9886 
GDSPRS -1.405234 0.289238 -4.85839 0.0000 0.2453 
MIDMKT 0.286917 0.478981 0.599015 0.5492 1.3323 
UPLUX 2.658030 0.436223 6.093286 0.0000 14.2682 
LATEUROP 3.285711 0.454182 7.234347 0.0000 26.7280 
RMS 0.002435 0.000904 2.694397 0.0071 1.0024 
LOCATION -0.015563 0.46907 -0.03318 0.9735 0.9846 
Limit Points 
LIMIT 1: C(16) 2.376145 0.79068 3.005193 0.0027 
LIMIT 2: C(17) 5.795852 0.840003 6.899799 0.0000 
Akaike info criter. 1.127827 Schwarz criterion 1.274030 
Log likelihood -257.626 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.185261 
Restr. log likelihood -468.5888 Avg. log likelihood -0.529006 
LR statistic (15 df) 421.9256 LR index (Pseudo-R2) 0.450209 
Probability(LR stat) 0.00000 
The second section includes the estimated coefficients (ß), along with their z-statistics 
and the associated probabilities. As previously explained, a positive sign of a coefficient 
does not necessarily suggest a positive relationship between the explanatory and the 
response variable (and the same is true for a negative sign). This is because the ordered 
model looks at the probability associated with each value of the response variable rather 
than the relationship between the dependent variable and its determinants. 
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a) Brand Size: The findings suggest that the larger the size of the brand, the higher the 
probability that company ownership will be used for a new hotel development and the 
lower the probability that franchising will be used (other things equal), opposite to what 
is suggested by the relevant hypothesis. The coefficient of FSIZE is very low (0.00001) 
therefore the effect, although statistically significant, is extremely weak. 
b) Brand Growth: the results indicate that, compared to the reference category (brands 
with annual growth lower than 1 percent), hotel brands with annual growth higher than 
2.5% are more likely to use company ownership for a new hotel development, as 
opposed to franchising (ceteris paribus). The effect is opposite to what suggested by the 
relevant hypothesis and is more significant for brands with growth between 2.5 and 9 
percent than for brands with growth higher than 9 percent. It has to be noticed, however, 
that hotel brands with low annual growth (i. e. between 1 and 2.5 percent) are less likely 
to use company ownership and more likely to use franchising compared to the reference 
category, but the effect was not found to be significant. 
c) Geographical Concentration: As already explained earlier it is hypothesised that, 
the more dispersed the hotel outlets, the more likely it is that franchising will be the 
preferred mode of development, due to the fact that the use of franchising aligns the 
incentives of the franchisee with those of the hotel company and thus economises on 
monitoring costs. In other words, the more concentrated the hotel outlets, the more likely 
it is that "non-franchising" (i. e. a higher control mode) will be used. 
The results, however, do not support the relevant hypothesis since it is revealed that the 
more concentrated the hotel outlets of a brand in the target country, the less likely it is 
that a "non-franchising" mode will be used for the new hotel outlet. The discrepancy 
between the theory prediction and the findings of this study could be caused by the 
proxy that has been used to operationalise geographical concentration. The proxy 
(GDSPRS) is based on the number of hotels in the country (deflated by population) and 
basically what it is hypothesized based on agency theory is that the more the hotels of a 
specific brand in the target country (controlled for population), the more likely it is that 
the new property will be subject to a high control mode (company-owned or company- 
managed) because the cost of monitoring would be lower. However, one could argue per 
contra that attracting franchisees would not be an easy task in countries where the hotel 
brand operates only a few hotel properties; on the contrary brand recognition would help 
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franchisors to expand their systems in countries with more hotel operations. The latter 
suggestion is consistent with the results of this analysis. The hypothesis based on agency 
theory is not supported by this study. It should be noted, however, that the composition 
of the sample may have affected the results, for the following reason: the vast majority 
of the franchised outlets belong to three brands that have started their operations in the 
USA and which operate most of their hotels in that country, and the USA is one of the 
more geographically concentrated markets using the proxy measure employed here. 
Because using the only available proxy measure of geographical concentration leads to 
the results reported above, it would appear that geographical concentration is an 
influencing factor of the corporate development strategy, but not in the sense suggested 
by agency theory. On the other hand, had a proxy been available that better reflected the 
distances between properties, a different result regarding the agency theory-based 
hypothesis might have been obtained. 
d) Market Segment The coefficient for UPLUX is highly significant and large, 
suggesting that upscale and luxury hotel brands are indeed more likely to choose 
company ownership for a new hotel development compared to budget brands, ceteris 
paribus. On the other hand, the coefficient of MIDMKT, although in the hypothesized 
direction, was not found to be statistically significant, and thus it could not be concluded 
that being in the mid-market segment, as opposed to the budget segment, has an effect 
on the expansion decision. Hence, H6 is partly confirmed. 
e) Country Group (Brand origin): The effect of brand origin was also found to be 
highly significant, at a1 %o level. According to the results a hotel brand that originates 
from a Latin-European country group (France or Spain) is more likely to use company 
ownership (and less likely to use franchising) compared to a brand that originates from 
an Anglo-Saxon country group (North America or United Kingdom), other things equal. 
The rest of the explanatory variables (ICRG, LEGRSK, GDP, INTEXP) as well as the 
control variable LOCATION are not found to be statistically significant, when the 
original specification is used. In contrast, the control variable RMS does influence the 
choice among the three corporate modes of development. More specifically, the results 
indicate that the bigger the hotel property to be developed, the more likely it is that 
company ownership will be used, as opposed to franchising. The results provide 
additional support to previous researchers who opposed the financial constraint 
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argument and suggested that bigger outlets do not have a negative influence on the use 
of company ownership 
The third section of the output (limit points) gives the estimated y parameters in the logit 
model. Highly significant, positive y parameters indicate that the three categories in the 
response variable are indeed ordered (Liao, 1994), which is the case in this study since 
both y parameters have a probability less than 5 percent (p<0.05). Thus the 
organisational mode choice is indeed ordered with franchising being the lowest category 
(F=1) and company ownership the highest (CO=3). It can be seen in the second section 
that there is no intercept provided. This is because E-views absorbs the intercept term 
into its cutoff (limit) points (Borooah, 2001). Thus the intercept is equal to the opposite 
of the first limit point, i. e. -yj (Greene, 2000; Laio, 1994). In this case it is /. 30= -y1= - 
4.728022. 
To interpret the results from a logit model meaningfully, the model itself must first fit 
the data. Put differently, the explanatory variables included in the model must be able to 
explain the response variable significantly better than the model with the intercept only 
(Liao, 1994). (This information can be found in the last section of the output. ) While in 
classical regression the F test is used, in a logic model the most commonly used test is 
the likelihood ratio statistic (LR), which approximately follows the chi-squared 
distribution. If the LR statistic indicates that the model fits the data significantly better 
than the model with the intercept only, one can move on to interpret parameter estimates. 
In the previous table, the LR statistic probability is zero, namely one can reject the null 
hypothesis that the ,ß coefficients of the explanatory variables are jointly zero, which 
indicates that this model fits the data better than the model with the intercept only. 
The next step involves the assessment of predictive efficacy. In classical regression the 
most common goodness-of-fit measure is R2. However, although a pseudo-R2 is also 
reported in a logit model output, it would not be right to think of this as the proportion of 
variance explained by the model. Typically, the R2 reported in logistic regression 
underestimates the proportion of variation explained by the model (DeMaris, 1992). The 
R2 reported in this model is 40%. However, some additional criteria for model selection 
should be used, such as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz Criterion (SC) 
and Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HC) which are reported by the E-Views software. The 
model that best fits the data is the one with the lowest AIC, SC and HQ criteria. The 
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information criteria of this model will be compared to the criteria of the models that will 
be assessed later on. 
As mentioned earlier, the restriction in using ordered models is that the coefficients (and 
the antilogs of the coefficients) do not indicate the effect of each of the explanatory 
variables on each response value; rather they indicate the effect on the odds of choosing 
one over the rest of the response values combined. That is, as far as this study is 
concerned, the coefficients only assess the effect on the odds of choosing, say, 
franchising over management contracts and company ownership combined, or choosing 
management contracts over franchise agreements and company ownership combined, or 
company ownership over franchising and management contracts combined. 
Since the interpretation using the odds does not provide a clear indication regarding the 
effect of the explanatory variables on each one of the modes of development, one could 
calculate the marginal effect on the predicted probabilities of choosing each one of the 
development modes with a unit change in the explanatory variables26. 
The predicted probabilities can be calculated using the following formulae27: 
kk 
Pr(Y=1)=A(y1-ýßkxk)=1/[1+exp(Lßkxk-y1)] 
k=1 k=1 
kkkk 
Pr(Y = 2) = A(y2 -ý ßkxk) - A(yi - )6kxk) =1 /[1 + exp(ý )t3kxk - y2)] -1 /[1 + exp(ý ßkxk - y1)] 
k=1 k=1 k=1 k=1 
kk 
Pr(Y=3)=1-A(y2-ßkxk)=1-1/[l+exp(ßkxk- y2)] k=1 k=1 
where Y=1 is the choice of franchise agreements, Y=2 is the choice of management 
contracts, Y=3 is the choice of company ownership, k=1,..., 15. y, and y2 are the limit 
points, in this case (ordered model-original specification) 2.3762 and 5.7959 
respectively, /3k are the estimated coefficients (as presented in the estimation output) and 
xk are the mean values of each explanatory variable (expect the one whose effect on the 
probabilities is being assessed). The A function indicates the logistic distribution for the 
random component c. 
26 Only the effect of the explanatory variables that refer to supported hypotheses will be assessed here. 
27 These are the formulae for the logit model. For the probit they would be slightly different, since in the 
case of the logit model, the logistic distribution is assumed for the random component s, while for the 
probit model the standard normal distribution is assumed. 
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The following tables (Tables 7.10-7.13) give the probabilities for choosing a franchise 
agreement, management contract or company ownership for a new hotel unit, when each 
of the statistically significant variables takes several values. More specifically, the 
continuous variables FSIZE and GDSPRS (brand size and geographical concentration) 
take five different values that correspond to the quintiles of their distribution, and the 
qualitative variables FGR2, FGR4, UPLUX and LATEUROP take the values of 0 and 1. 
Table 7.10: The effect of Brand Size on the predicted probabilities of choosing each of 
the three development modes 
Pr(Y=1) Pr(Y=2) Pr(Y=3) 
(in rooms) F M/C C/O 
vý FSIZE = 47,809 67.63% 30.83% 1.54% W 
FSIZE = 51,628 67.22% 31.21% 1.57% 
FSIZE = 62,900 65.99% 32.35% 1.66% 
O FSIZE =124,600 58.92% 38.85% 2.23% 
FSIZE =284,350 39.60% 55.65% 4.75% 
Y=1 represents the franchise mode, Y=2 MCs and Y=3 Company ownership 
Although there is a positive relationship between brand size and the probability of using 
company ownership, the probability per se is very low for any brand size. Moreover, 
although the higher the size the higher the probability to use management contracts and 
the lower the probability to use franchising for a new development, it can be noticed that 
only the biggest hotel brands were found to favour management agreements over 
franchising. A hotel brand of up to 124,000 rooms has a higher probability to use 
franchising (as opposed to management contracts and company ownership). 
Table 7.11: The effect of Brand Growth on the predicted probabilities of choosing 
each of the three development modes 
Pr(Y=1) 
F 
Pr(Y=2) 
MIC 
Pr(Y=3) 
C/O 
Growth less than 1% 71.89% 26.85% 1.26% 
Growth between 2.5% and 9% 46.78% 49.64% 3.58% 
Growth higher than 9% 52.13% 44.95% 2.92% 
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Hotel brands with annual growth higher than 2.5 percent are more likely to use higher- 
control modes and less likely to use franchising than hotel brands in the reference 
category (as opposed to the relevant hypothesis). However, as in the case of brand size, 
the probability of using company ownership is very low (less than 4 percent). 
Table 7.12: The effect of Geographical Concentration 28 on the predicted probabilities 
of choosing each of the three development modes 
no. of hotel outlets/ Pr(Y=1) Pr(Y=2) Pr(Y=3) 
population F M/C C/O 
GDSPRS= 0.02 35.42% 58.95% 5.63% 
GDSPRS= 0.17 40.38% 55.01% 4.61% 
GDSPRS= 0.59 55.00% 42.40% 2.60% 
d GDSPRS= 1.59 83.28% 16.07% 0.65% 
GDSPRS= 4.24 99.52% 0.46% 0.02% 
Y=1 represents the franchise mode, Y=2 MCs and Y=3 Company ownership 
Company ownership is negatively related to the geographical concentration of the hotel 
outlets, opposite to what is suggested by the relevant economic theory. As it was 
suggested earlier, this finding could be related to the fact that the selected proxy is not 
the most appropriate to evaluate the effect of monitoring costs on the modal choice. It 
could also be related to the composition of the sample: the vast majority of the 
franchised outlets in the sample are operated by three hotel brands, namely Holiday Inn, 
Holiday Inn Express and Howard Johnson, brands that have started their operations in 
the U. S. and which operate most of their hotels in that country. The fact that hotel 
properties are quite concentrated in U. S., due to the demographic nature of the country 
may have influenced the results towards the opposite direction to what was suggested by 
the respective hypothesis. 
28 The higher the GDSPRS value the more concentrated the hotel outlets in a particular country, since the 
proxy has been calculated by dividing the number of hotels in the country by its population. 
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Table 7.13: The effect of Market Segment and Country Group of Origin on the 
predicted probabilities of choosing each of the three development modes29 
Pr(Y=1) 
F 
Pr(Y=2) 
M/C 
Pr(Y=3) 
C/O 
Upscale brands 23.17% 67.04% 9.79% 
Budget brands 81.14% 18.10% 0.76% 
Anglo-Saxon brands 73.69% 25.15% 1.16% 
Latin-europ. brands 9.49% 66.72% 23.79% 
The findings confirm the relevant hypotheses regarding the positive relationship between 
operation in higher market segments and the use of high-control modes. Upscale brands 
(on average) are more likely to use management contracts for a new hotel development, 
while budget brands are more likely to use franchising. Additionally, it can be inferred 
that Anglo-Saxon brands are more likely to use franchise agreements than their Latin- 
European counterparts, while the latter are more likely to use management contracts and 
company ownership. The results of the last table provide one more indication that there 
should be a more detailed analysis regarding the effect of country group of origin in 
different market segments and thus suggest that an interaction term between these two 
variables should be included in the model. 
29 The effect of being in the mid-market category is not presented because the coefficient of mid-market is 
not found to be statistically significant. 
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Table 7.14: Regression Analysis: Original Specification (Model 1), Extended Model 
(Model 2) and Reduced Model (Model 3) 
Variables 
ICRG2 
ICRG3 
LEGRSK 
GDP 
FSIZE 
FGR2 
FGR3 
FGR4 
INTEXP 
GDSPRS 
MIDMKT 
UPLUX 
LATEUROP 
RMS 
LOCATION 
MM_LATEU 
UP_LATEU 
CRD2_FS 
CRD3_FS 
FSIZE2 
FSIZE3 
MIDMKT2 
UPLUX2 
LATEUROP2 
LATEUROP3 
LR-statistic 
Df 
Probability 
Pseudo-R2 
Akaike info criterion 
Schwarz criterion 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 
Model 1 
Beta t-value 
0.327 0.78 
-0.172 -0.33 
0.004 0.34 
0.000 0.88 
0.000 1.90** 
-0.304 -0.53 
1.068 2.19** 
0.853 1.56* 
-0.012 -0.86 
-1.405 -4.86*** 
0.287 0.60 
2.658 6.09*** 
3.286 7.23*** 
0.002 2.69*** 
-0.016 -0.03 
421.9256 
15 
0.0000 
0.45 
1.146 
1.274 
1.185 
Model 2 
Beta 
1.276 
0.611 
-0.008 
0.000 
0.000 
-0.642 
0.401 
1.069 
-0.022 
-0.699 
1.133 
5.173 
7.022 
0.002 
1.034 
-2.590 
-6.333 
-0.000 
-0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
-1.458 
-1.160 
4.432 
0.690 
478.8659 
19 
0.0000 
0.51 
1.027 
1.208 
1.098 
t-value 
2.29** 
0.92 
-0.67 
2.28** 
3.64*** 
-1.01 
0.73 
1.82** 
-1.48* 
-2.33*** 
1.43 * 
8.30*** 
8.39*** 
1.91** 
2.04** 
-2.37*** 
-6.13*** 
-3.63*** 
-2.51*** 
0.22 
0.45 
-1.98*** 
-1.46* 
4.92*** 
1.23 
Model 3 
Beta t-value 
0.988 2.33*** 
0.000 3.26*** 
0.000 3.54*** 
-1.004 -2.35*** 
0.766 1.98** 
-0.023 -1.56* 
-0.729 -2.43*** 
1.261 1.62* 
5.271 8.98*** 
7.123 8.93*** 
0.002 1.98** 
0.984 2.12** 
-2.848 -2.67*** 
-6.450 -6.46*** 
-0.000 -3.50*** 
-0.000 -2.50*** 
0.000 0.20 
0.000 0.84 
-1.587 -2.18*** 
-1.179 -1.49* 
4.275 4.88*** 
0.673 1.21 
477.2011 
16 
0.0000 
0.51 
1.018 
1.173 
1.079 
Notes: *: ]a<. ]in a one-tailed test, ** p<0.05 in a one-tailed test, *** p<0.01 in a one-tailed test 
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7.4 Interaction effects between Market Segment/Brand origin 
and Brand Size/Country Risk - Extended model 
In the previous model (1), the simplified assumption is implied that the effect of any 
single explanatory variable X is the same across the range of any other explanatory 
variable. Occasionally, however, an independent variable has a differential effect on the 
response variable Y; across categories or values of a second independent variable Z1, and 
thus one needs to adjust the model specification to allow for the X Y, relationship to vary 
relative to values of Z1, e. g. the effect of FSIZE might be different for UPLUX, 
MIDMKT and BUDGET hotels. 
From a first inspection of the data base (see the previous chapter), one could detect that 
hotel companies from different country origins do not follow the same decision patterns 
for their brands that are positioned in different market segments. That is, one could 
suggest that the relationship between the expansion decision and the market segment 
where a hotel brand operates varies, relatively to the country origin of the brand (i. e. 
whether the hotel brand originates from an Anglo-Saxon or a Latin-European country). 
For example it would be interesting to identify whether the trend for franchise 
agreements in the budget and mid-market segment (that has been identified in the 
probability table) is the same between Latin-European and Anglo-Saxon brands or 
whether the predicted probabilities for each of the expansion modes between Latin- 
European and Anglo-Saxon brands remains relatively stable throughout the three market 
segments. 
Moreover, the results of the original specification suggested a positive relationship 
between brand size and hierarchical modes of development, namely an opposite 
relationship than the one hypothesized. It would be interesting to identify if this 
relationship had the same direction, regardless of the level of risk that characterises the 
country where the new property was going to be developed. Country political and 
economic risk is usually found to influence the modal choice and to be quite crucial in 
international business. Therefore, it has been decided to check whether there is an 
interaction effect between this country variable and brand size, i. e. if there is an effect of 
country risk on the effect of FSIZE on the modal choice. 
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In order to test those relationships, the previous model (1) needs to be adjusted for the 
interaction between the explanatory variables, origin and market segment, and brand size 
and country risk, as follows: 
OM = ßo + ßiICRGD2 + ß2ICRGD3 + ß3LEGRSK+ ß4GDP+ ßsFSIZE+ 
ß6FGR2 + ß7FGR3 + ßaFGR4 + ß9INTEXP+ ßioGDSPRS+ ßi iMIDMKT 
+ ß12UPSCALE+ ß13LATINEUROP+ ß14RMS+ ß15LOCATION+ 
ßi6MM_LATEU+ ß17UP_LATEU+ ß1gCRD2 
_ 
FS + ßi9CRD3 
_ 
FS 
(2) 
The interaction effect between market segment and country group of origin shows how 
the effect of being in the budget, mid-market or upscale segment on the decision among 
the three organisational modes differs between Latin-European companies (in this case 
French and Spanish) and Anglo-Saxon (in this case American and English) companies. 
The coefficients of the interaction terms (ß16 and ßl 7) estimate the extent to which the 
effect of being in any of the three segments differs according to the origin of the brand, 
or the extent to which the effect of being an Anglo-Saxon rather than a Latin-European 
brand differs among the three market segments. 
What needs to be clarified here is that the coefficients for market segment and origin, 
fill 
i 
ß12 and 813 do not have the same meaning and interpretation as the respective 
coefficients in the original model (1). More specifically, the t-tests for the coefficients of 
MIDMKT and UPSCALE (311 and ß12) are tests for the significant difference between 
mid-market and budget brands (and upscale and budget brands respectively) for Anglo- 
Saxon companies. That is: 
ß11 gives the difference in the effect of being in the mid-market segment rather than in 
the budget segment for the reference category, i. e. for Anglo-Saxon companies only and 
ß12 gives the difference in the effect of being in the upscale/luxury segment rather than 
in the budget segment again for the reference category, i. e. for Anglo-Saxon companies 
only. 
Furthermore, the coefficient for LATIN-EUROPEAN (/313) does not indicate the average 
effect of being a Latin-European brand rather than an Anglo-Saxon one. In the extended 
model, it indicates the difference in the effect of being a Latin-European brand operating 
in the budget segment only, as opposed to an Anglo-Saxon brand operating in the same 
segment. 
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Finally, the coefficients of the interaction terms (ß16 and ß1 ,) estimate the differential 
effect of segment by origin. More specifically, 
P16 indicates the difference in the effect of being in the mid-market rather than in the 
budget segment for Latin-European relative to Anglo-Saxon companies and 
ß17 indicates the difference in the effect of being in the upscale rather than in the budget 
segment for Latin-European relative to Anglo-Saxon companies. 
The t-tests for those coefficients show whether the net effects of market segment are 
significantly different between Latin-European and Anglo-Saxon companies. 
Regarding the coefficient of brand size (ßs), it measures the effect of brand size on the 
choice, only for the base category of country risk, i. e. in cases where the country 
political and economic risk is moderate/high. Furthermore, 
ß18 gives the difference in the effect of brand size on the modal choice, in countries 
where politico-economic risk is low (ICRGD2) relative to countries where the risk is 
high/moderate 
/319 gives the difference in the effect of brand size on the modal choice, in countries 
where politico-economic risk is very low (ICRGD3) relative to countries where the risk 
is high/moderate 
Initially, one needs to identify whether allowing differential effects of origin / market 
segment and country risk / brand size results in a statistically significant improvement of 
the fit of the model. In order to test that, one should perform a coefficient test (test for 
omitted variables) in the first model (original specification). Using this test one can add 
a set of variables to an existing equation and ask whether the set makes a significant 
contribution to explaining the variation in the dependent variable. The null hypothesis 
Ho is that the additional set of regressors are not jointly significant. The E-Views output 
of the omitted variables test is included in Appendix 3. All the necessary information for 
the evaluation of the extended model is presented in the second column (Model 2) of 
Table 7.14. 
As can be seen in the first section of the respective E-Views output in Appendix 3, the 
joint coefficients of the added variables are indeed statistically significant (the 
probability is p<0.01) and therefore the interaction effects variables should be added to 
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the specification. Moreover, the AIC, SC and HC information criteria are lower than in 
the initial model, suggesting that the extended model has better explanatory power than 
the initial one. Finally, it should be noted that pseudo- R2 has also been improved by 6%. 
As far as the coefficients of the interaction terms are concerned, all four are highly 
significant (at a1 percent level), suggesting that there is indeed an interaction effect 
between origin and market segment, and brand size and country risk. The rest of the 
coefficients give the following information regarding the effect of the explanatory 
variables on the modal choice: 
a) Political and Economic Risk: When the interaction term between brand size and 
politico-economic risk is introduced in the model, the results provide partial support for 
the respective hypothesis (HI). More specifically, the positive and significant coefficient 
of ICRGD2 suggests that the probability to use company ownership would be higher in 
low-risk countries than in high/moderate risk countries, whereas there would be a higher 
probability to use franchising in high/moderate risk countries. The coefficient of 
ICRGD3, although positive, was not found to be statistically significant. 
b) Level of Economic Development: the higher the level of economic development of 
the target country, the higher the probability for company ownership to be chosen, 
opposite to that suggested by the theories of entry mode. However, the coefficient of 
GDP is extremely low (0.000028), suggesting that the effect of economic development, 
although opposite than hypothesized, is very weak. One possible explanation for the 
awkward finding could be that the majority of the observations in this study refer to 
developed countries. 
c) International Experience: the extended model supports hypothesis H6 that hotel 
brands with more years of international experience are more likely to use franchising, 
other things equal. 
d) Brand Size: the results of the extended model justify the inclusion of the interaction 
term in the specification, since the coefficients of the interaction terms CRD2_FS and 
CRD3_FS are highly significant. The coefficient of FSIZE is highly significant but very 
low, indicating that the effect of brand size on the choice in cases where the country risk 
is high/moderate is opposite than suggested, namely, in high-risk countries the larger the 
brand the higher the probability of using company ownership and the lower the 
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probability of using franchising. In order to calculate the effect of brand size in low- and 
very low-risk countries (FSIZE2 and FSIZE3), one needs to add the coefficient of FSIZE 
to the coefficients of the interaction terms CRD2_FS and CRD3_FS respectively. The 
coefficients for FSIZE2 and FSIZE3, are not an important factor that influence the 
modal choice. The t-tests for FSIZE2 and FSIZE3 can be calculated using the following 
formula (Hardy, 1993): 
t= (ß; + (3; e)/ [Var(ß; ) + Var(ß; e) + 2Cov(ß;, (3; e)] 
where, ß refers to a coefficient for brand size and /3 refers to the coefficient for the 
product variable between the independent variable ICRGD2 and ICRGD3 respectively 
and brand size (FSIZE). The variances and covariances needed for the calculations are 
provided by the E-Views (see Coefficient - Covariance Matrix in Appendix 3, p. 221). 
e) Brand Growth: The coefficient for brand growth is significant only for brands with 
annual growth higher than 9.5 percent. More specifically, hotel brands with annual 
growth higher than 9.5% are more likely to use company ownership for the new hotel 
development, compared to the reference category (i. e. hotel brands with annual growth 
less than I%), opposite to what is suggested by H5. Although the coefficient for FGR2 
is negative, i. e. hotel brands with growth between 1 and 2.5% are more likely to use 
franchising compared to brands with slower growth (as is suggested by H5), the 
coefficient was not found to be statistically significant. 
f) Geographical Concentration: as in the original specification, geographical 
concentration seems to be negatively related to the use of company ownership and 
positively related to the use of franchising. Again the reason why the findings are not in 
line with the hypothesis could be related to the fact that most franchised outlets in the 
sample are based in the U. S., a country where hotel outlets are quite concentrated due to 
the country's demographic nature. 
g) Market Segment: When the interaction terms are included in the model, the 
interpretation of the market segment coefficients changes. The coefficient for MIDMKT 
is positive but non-significant, indicating that the effect on the modal choice of being a 
mid-market Anglo-Saxon brand is not statistically different from the effect of being a 
budget Anglo-Saxon brand. The coefficient of UPLUX is positive and highly significant, 
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suggesting that the odds of using company ownership as opposed to franchising is higher 
for an upscale Anglo-Saxon brand compared to a budget Anglo-Saxon brand. The 
relevant information for Latin-European brands is given by the coefficients MIDMKT2 
and UPLUX2 which are calculated by summing the coefficient of the respective market 
segment (MIDMKT or UPLUX) with the coefficients of the interaction terms 
(MM_LATEU and UP_LATEU respectively). Both coefficients are negative and 
significant, suggesting that as far as Spanish and French brands are concerned, both 
mid-market brands and upscale brands are less inclined to use company ownership and 
more inclined to use franchising compared to budget brands30. Thus, when the 
interaction effects are introduced, it is revealed that the market segment hypothesis (H) 
is confirmed only as far as Anglo-Saxon brands are concerned. For Spanish and French 
brands higher market segments are not associated with the use of higher control modes, 
as transaction costs economics would predict. 
h) Country Group (Brand Origin): The dummy variable LATEEROP also takes a 
different meaning due to the introduction of the interaction terms. The respective 
coefficient is positive and highly significant, suggesting that there is a higher probability 
for budget Latin-European brands to use company ownership and a lower probability to 
use franchising, compared to their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. In order to identify the 
difference in the effect on the choice of being a mid-market (or upscale) Latin-European 
brand relative to an Anglo-Saxon brand, two more coefficients need to be calculated 
(LATEUROP2 and LATEUROP3) by adding the country group of origin coefficient 
LATUEROP to the coefficients of the interaction terms MM_LATEU and UP LATEU 
respectively. Both LATEUROP2 and LATEUROP3 are positive, but only LATUEROP2 
is statistically significant, indicating that mid-market brands that originate from Spain or 
France have a higher probability to use higher control modes and lower probability to 
use franchising compared to mid-market brands originating from Anglo-Saxon 
countries. For upscale brands the same could not be argued with confidence. Overall, 
the effect of the country group on the modal choice is significant for two out of the three 
market segments: budget and mid-market brands that originate from Spain and France 
are more likely to use higher control modes than American and British brands. Therefore 
30 However, it has to be noticed that the result may be driven by the structure of the sample, since the only 
budget Latin-European brand in the sample is Ibis, which happens to have 16 new outlets, all company- 
owned. 
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the hypothesis for country group of origin (H9) is supported by the results of the 
extended model. 
Finally, when the extended model is examined, both control variables (RMS and 
LOCATION) seem to have a positive (and significant at a5 percent level) effect on the 
choice. As in the original specification, it is suggested that the bigger the hotel property, 
the higher the probability that company ownership will be used for its development. 
Moreover, the results of the extended model reveal that when the property is developed 
in the country where the hotel brand has most of its operations, it is more likely that 
franchising will be the preferred option, while if the hotel is developed in any other 
country, a hierarchical mode of development will be chosen, other things equal. 
One final issue that needs to be addressed is whether the non-significant variables should 
be dropped from the model specification. One argument is that if one believed a priori 
that a variable had a legitimate place in the equation specification, then one should 
persist with this belief and include it in the model. Another argument, however, is that 
because the purpose of estimation and prediction is to confront equation specification 
with data, to base prediction on the coefficient estimates obtained from the full 
specification may be misleading, since it would allow variables, whose legitimacy in the 
specification has been explicitly "rejected" by the data, to influence the predictions 
(Borooah, 2001). 
In this study, the non-significant variables will be dropped from the specification and the 
respective information criteria will be compared to the ones of the extended model in 
order to find out whether the reduced model provides a better fit on the data than the 
previous ones. Thus, in the following model only the variables that were found to be 
significant are included. To estimate the reduced model, one could either re-estimate the 
model after dropping the insignificant variables or run a coefficient test for redundant 
variables in the previous model specification (extended model). The second option has 
been adopted here, since by running this coefficient test, one can identify whether the 
excluded variables have indeed a zero joint coefficient. The output of the reduced model 
is included in Appendix 3, and the main information is presented in the third column of 
Table 7.14 above. 
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The log likelihood ratio for the coefficients of the dropped variables is 1.6648 with 
probability 0.645, indicating that the joint coefficient of ICRGD3, LEGRSK and FGR3 
is not significantly different from zero, therefore these variables could be excluded from 
the model estimation. Additionally, the information criteria (AIC, SC and H-Q) have 
been improved compared to the previous two models, suggesting that the reduced model 
has a better explanatory power. (The pseudo- R2 remained at the same levels as in the 
previous specification). 
Besides the improvement in terms of information criteria, the reduced model partly 
confirms one more hypothesis, the one that examines the effect of brand growth on the 
modal choice. More specifically, the coefficient of FGR2 is found to be negative and 
statistically significant at a1 percent level, indicating that there is a higher probability of 
using franchising and lower probability of using company ownership for hotel brands 
with growth between 1 and 2.5%, compared to the reference category, i. e. brands with 
growth less that 1 percent. Thus the relevant hypothesis (H5) is partly confirmed (i. e. 
only as far as slow-growth hotel brands are concerned). 
The marginal effect on the predicted probabilities of choosing each one of the 
development modes with a unit change in the explanatory variables could also be 
calculated for the reduced model31. The following tables (Tables 7.15-7.22) give the 
probabilities for choosing a franchise agreement, management contract or company 
ownership for a new hotel unit, when each of the statistically significant variables take 
several values. Again, the continuous variables FSIZE1, FSIZE2, INTEXP, GDP and 
GDSPRS (size, international experience, level of economic development and 
geographical concentration) take five different values that correspond to the quintiles of 
their distribution, and the qualitative variables ICRGD2, FGR2, FGR4, MIDMKT, 
UPLUX and LATEUROP take the values of 0 and 1. 
31 Since the reduced model provides support for all the hypotheses that are also confirmed by the extended 
model, there is no need to calculate the predicted probabilities for both the extended and the reduced 
model. 
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Table 7.15: The effect of Country Risk (ICRGD2) on the predicted probabilities of 
choosing each of the three development modes 
Pr(Y=1) 
F 
Pr(Y=2) 
M/C 
Pr(Y=3) 
C/O 
Low Risk Countries (ICRGD2=1) 42.91% 54.37% 2.72% 
High/Moderate Risk Countries (base 
category) 54.63% 43.65% 1.72% 
Y=1 represents the franchise mode, Y=2 MCs and Y=3 Company ownership 
In low-risk countries there is a somewhat higher probability of using company 
ownership or management agreements and a lower probability of using franchising 
compared to a high-risk country. The findings regarding country risk support the 
relevant hypothesis HI. 
Table 7.16: The effect of Economic Development (GDP) on the predicted probabilities 
of choosing each of the three development modes 
(per capita GDP) Pr(Y=1) Pr(Y=2) Pr(Y=3) 
F M/C C/O 
vý GDP= 4,360 0 79.03% 0 20.41% 0 0.56% 
GDP= 20,207 78.94% 20.50% 0.56% 
GDP= 26,684 50.75% 47.25% 2.00% 
O GDP= 30,316 45.48% 52.06% 2.46% 
GDP= 36,569 T 36.71% 59.79% 3.50% 
Y=1 represents the franchise mode, Y=2 MCs and Y=3 Company ownership 
The lower the level of economic development, the higher the probability of choosing 
franchising, while the probability of using a management agreement or company 
ownership franchising is positively related to the level of economic development. 
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Table 7.17: The effect of Brand Size on the predicted probabilities of choosing each of 
the three development modes in high/moderate-risk and low-risk countries 
High-Risk countries Pr(Y=1) Pr(Y=2) Pr(Y=3) 
F M/C C/O 
Cn FSIZEI = 47,809 62.67% 36.09% 1.24% 
FSIZE1 = 51,628 61.52% 37.18% 1.30% 
Ö FSIZEI = 62,900 58.05% 40.45% 1.50% 
r 
FSIZE1 =124,600 38.58% 58.18% 3.24% 
FSIZEI =284,350 7.52% 71.93% 20.55% 
Low-Risk Countries 
FSIZE2 = 47,809 25.46% 68.74% 5.80% 
FSIZE2 = 51,628 22.27% 70.89% 6.84% 
FSIZE2 = 62,900 14.56% 74.46% 10.98% 
FSIZE2 =124,600 0.98% 31.06% 67.96% 
Or FSIZE2 =284,350 0.00% 0.03% 99.97% 
Y=1 represents the franchise mode, Y=2 MCs and Y=3 Company ownership 
Although there is a positive relationship between brand size and the probability of using 
company ownership in both high- and low-risk countries, it can be noticed in the above 
table that in high-risk countries, only very large companies would choose high-control 
modes over franchising, whereas in low-risk countries, even small and medium-sized 
brands would favour the use of higher control modes. In other words, for brands of 
similar size (e. g. FSIZE=51,628), the probability of using franchising is higher in high- 
risk countries than in low-risk countries. This is in line with the hypothesis regarding the 
effect of country risk on the modal choice, according to which, the higher the country 
politico-economic risk, the higher the probability to use franchising and the lower the 
probability to use company ownership. Namely, in high-risk countries the probability of 
using franchising is higher than the probability of using company ownership for all but 
the very large brands. 
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Table 7.18: The effect of Brand Growth on the predicted probabilities of choosing 
each of the three development modes 
Pr(Y=1) 
F 
Pr(Y=2) 
M/C 
Pr(Y=3) 
C/O 
Growth less than 1% 71.89% 26.85% 1.26% 
Growth between 1% and 2.5% 80.91% 18.33% 0.76% 
Growth higher than 9.5% 52.13% 44.95% 2.92% 
Y=1 represents the franchise mode, Y=2 MCs and Y=3 Company ownership 
Hotel brands with annual growth between 1 and 2.5 percent are more likely to use 
franchising than the hotel brands in the reference category (in line with the respective 
hypothesis). However hotel brands with rapid growth (higher than 9 percent) are less 
likely to use franchising than hotel brands with a very slow growth rate. It could be that 
high growth is the effect of using franchising extensively, rather than the use of 
franchising is the preferred mode in cases where brands are characterised by high growth 
rates. As in the case of brand size, the probability of using company ownership is very 
low (less than 3 percent). 
Table 7.19: The effect of International Experience on the predicted probabilities of 
choosing each of the three development modes 
Pr(Y=1) Pr(Y=2) Pr(Y=3) 
(in years) F M/C C/O 
INTEXP =8 49.64% 48.27% 2.09% 
INTEXP = 27 60.41% 38.23% 1.36% 
INTEXP = 35 64.72% 34.15% 1.13% 
INTEXP = 38 66.28% 32.66% 1.06% 
INTEXP = 49 71.68% 27.49% 0.83% 
Y=1 represents the franchise mode, Y=2 MCs and Y=3 Company ownership 
More years of international experience are associated with higher probability of 
choosing franchising for the development of new hotel operations and lower 
probabilities of choosing management contracts or company ownership (other things 
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equal). In addition, as can be seen in the last column of Table 7.19, the effect of 
international experience on the probability of choosing company ownership is small at 
all levels of experience. 
Table 7.20: The effect of Geographical Concentration 32 on the predicted 
probabilities of choosing each of the three development modes 
(no. of hotel Pr(Y=1) Pr(Y=2) Pr(Y=3) 
outlets/ population) F M/C C/O 
vý GDSPRS= 0.02 35.42% 58.95% 5.63% 
GDSPRS= 0.17 40.38% 55.01% 4.61% 
GDSPRS= 0.59 55.00% 42.40% 2.60% 
GDSPRS= 1.59 83.28% 16.07% 0.65% 
GDSPRS= 4.24 99.52% 0.46% 0.02% 
Y=1 represents the franchise mode, Y=2 MCs and Y=3 Company ownership 
Company ownership is negatively related to the geographical concentration of the hotel 
outlets, opposite to what is suggested by the relevant economic theory. As it was argued 
earlier, the reason for this unexpected finding could be related to the composition of the 
sample: 90 percent of the franchised outlets in the sample are operated by three hotel 
brands that started their operations in the U. S. and which operate most of their hotels in 
that country. The fact that hotels properties are quite concentrated in the U. S. may have 
influenced the results towards the opposite direction to what was suggested by the 
respective hypothesis. 
32 The higher the GDSPRS value the more concentrated the hotel outlets in a particular country, since the 
proxy has been calculated by dividing the number of hotels in the country by its population. 
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Table 7.21: The effect of Market Segment on the predicted probabilities of choosing 
each of the three development modes for Anglo-Saxon and Latin- 
European Brands33 
Pr(Y=1) 
F 
Pr(Y=2) 
M/C 
Pr(Y=3) 
C/O 
A-S Budget brands 87.3% 12.4% 0.3% 
A-S Mid-Market brands 66.1% 32.8% 1.1% 
A-S Upscale brands 3.4% 59.3% 37.3% 
L-E Budget brands 0.2% 9.3% 90.5% 
L-E Mid-Market brands 22.1% 37.1% 40.8% 
L-E Upscale brands 19.5% 50.4% 30.1% 
Y=1 represents the franchise mode, Y=2 MCs and Y=3 Company ownership 
It is clear from Table 7.21 that the higher the market segment where an Anglo-Saxon 
company operates, the higher the probability that company ownership will be the 
preferred mode for a new hotel property, and the lower the probability that franchising 
will be chosen. On the other hand though, the opposite is true as far as Latin-European 
brands are concerned. Brands in the mid-market as well as the upscale segment are more 
likely to use franchising and less likely to use company ownership compared to brands 
that operate in the budget segment34 
33 The probabilities for upscale Latin-European brands have not been calculated, since the respective 
coefficient was not found to be statistically significant. 
34 The fact that P(Y=1) for upscale L/E brands is not higher than the one for mid-market brands is not a 
mistake. The reason is that both upscale and mid-market probabilities are compared to the budget ones. 
There is no continuous relationship between market segment and the use of each mode. 
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Table 7.22: The effect of Country Group of Origin on the predicted probabilities of 
choosing each of the three development modes35 
Pr(Y=1) 
F 
Pr(Y=2) 
M/C 
Pr(Y=3) 
C/O 
A-S Budget brands 87.3% 12.4% 0.3% 
L-E Budget brands 0.2% 9.3% 90.5% 
A-S Mid-Market brands 66.1% 32.8% 1.1% 
L-E Mid-Market brands 22.1% 37.1% 40.8% 
Y=1 represents the franchise mode, Y=2 MCs and Y=3 Company ownership 
As can be seen in the above table, there is a clear preference for the use of franchising as 
far as budget Anglo-Saxon brands are concerned and a preference for company 
ownership as far as budget Latin-European brands are concerned. In the mid-market 
segment, it can be seen that Spanish and French brands are more inclined to use 
company ownership compared to American and British brands, while the use of 
franchising is the preferred choice for the latter. As far as the upscale segment is 
concerned, there is no statistical difference in the modal choice between Anglo-Saxon 
and Latin-European brands. 
35 The probabilities for upscale Latin-European brands have not been calculated, since the respective 
coefficient was not found to be statistically significant. 
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7.5 Discussion of the results of the ordered model 
The discussion of the results will be based on both the original model and on the model 
that includes the interaction effects between (a) the market segment where a hotel brand 
operates and the country group of origin and (b) the brand size and the country politico- 
economic risk. Consequently, the discussion will lead in a conclusion regarding the form 
of the ordered model that gives the best results. 
In the original model (the model that does not include any interaction terms) none of the 
country-specific variables was found to influence the choice among the three modes of 
development. Regarding the effect of legal risk, the reason why it was not found to 
influence the modal choice could be the fact that a proxy has been used for its 
measurement. Although in the context of this study legal risk refers to local regulations 
and policies regarding trademark and intellectual property rights protection, it could be 
that the use of "patents filed" in each country was not the appropriate one to capture the 
level of protection of intellectual property rights (in the hotel industry, at least). 
The effect of economic development in a particular country was also not supported, 
although previous studies both in the manufacturing and in the service sector have 
provided results that confirm the negative relationship between a nation's economic 
development and the use of high-control modes. The same is the case for the effect of 
political and economic risk. 
Regarding the firm-specific variables, the results of the original model reveal that brand 
size and growth do influence the modal choice, though in the opposite than expected 
direction. Both coefficients are significant at a5 percent level; yet the coefficient of 
FSIZE is very close to zero, suggesting that although statistically significant, brand size 
has a very weak effect on the modal choice. As already mentioned in the theoretical 
framework, the effect of size on the entry/development mode is controversial. In line 
with the theoretical framework of this study, it is argued that there is a negative 
association between brand size and high-control modes, yet the results suggest that, 
although there is a very little effect of brand size on the modal choice, this effect is in the 
opposite direction to that suggested by the hypothesis. 
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Although the results reveal that the probability of choosing company ownership is very 
low for any brand size, still, when it comes to the comparison between franchise 
agreements and management contracts, it was found that all but the very large brands 
would prefer to use franchising for a new development. The largest brands prefer 
management contracts. These results may be an indication that franchising is a means for 
brand growth: hotel companies use franchising until they reach a very large size, at 
which stage their rate of growth slows down (smaller international brands would tend to 
be faster-growing than the very large ones). After that stage, management contracts 
become the preferred mode for new properties. A further reason for that could be that 
property owners would prefer to give a management contract to an established hotel 
management company that already had a well-known brand name and world-wide 
recognition. 
When the effect of brand growth is examined, the findings indicate that it is the slower 
growing brands that prefer franchising for a new hotel property, contrary to what is 
suggested by the respective hypothesis. 
The hypotheses that were strongly supported by the ordered logit model are the ones that 
test the effect of market segment where a brand is positioned and country group of origin 
of the brand. More specifically it was found that in higher market segments of operation 
(upscale and luxury segments), it is more likely that a high-control mode of development 
will be preferred (as opposed to franchising). Hence, the results are in line with the main 
transaction cost argument, that upscale hotel brands would expand using a hierarchical 
mode. The services provided by upscale and luxury brands require specialised 
knowledge and managerial expertise both of which are associated with high levels of 
human asset specificity, a situation that favours the use of higher-control modes. 
More specifically, the lower market segment of limited service units requires a set of 
standard operating procedures from which there is no reason to deviate, because the 
service is limited. The upper market segment has its standard operating procedures, but 
because of the level of more personalised service being offered, staff have to be trained 
to use their discretion in dealing with guests in individual situations so as to achieve that 
level of service. This type of knowledge cannot be reduced to standard operating 
procedures which can be `sold off as franchise packages, and requires front-line staff of 
the appropriate quality who can understand the training and apply it intelligently so as to 
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uphold the quality image of the brand (proprietary content, tacit knowledge, information 
impactedness). The vulnerability of the brand to failures in this respect, the information 
impactedness and the moral hazard aspects of franchising, are the major reasons why 
franchising is rarely used in this market segment. 
As for the country group of origin, the findings indicate that Anglo-Saxon brands are 
less likely to use company ownership and more likely to use franchising, than their 
Latin-European counterparts. Hence, the results are in line with the hypothesis that 
American and British hotel companies, which are more familiar with the use of low- 
control modes, are less willing to invest equity capital for their expansion and that they 
try to maximize the return on their knowledge-based assets. Spanish and French 
companies, on the other hand are more reluctant to use franchising, since they became 
involved with this expansion mode more recently than their American and British 
counterparts. In addition, it appears that for those companies high control is still 
associated with equity participation rather than with management contracts. 
The last hypothesis refers to the effect of geographic concentration of the hotel outlets in 
a particular country on the modal choice, and has not been confirmed by the results of 
the analysis. As already explained in the section about the measurement of variables, 
geographic concentration of outlets is very difficult to estimate, therefore a proxy has 
been used instead. More specifically, the "number of hotels divided by the country's 
population" measure has been used. It could be the case that this proxy cannot capture 
the effects of outlet concentration (or dispersion) on the monitoring costs and on the 
expansion decision, hence the awkward findings regarding H8. In addition, as was 
argued earlier in this chapter, the fact that most franchised hotels in the sample are U. S- 
36 located may influence the results of the study, since U. S. hotels are quite concentrated 
The extended ordered model included in the model specification the interaction effects 
between country politico-economic risk / brand size and market segment / country group 
of origin. The results of that model specification indicate that there is a strong interaction 
effect between the market segment where a brand is positioned and the country group of 
origin of that brand, as well as the interaction between brand size and country risk. 
36 Concentration is measured as the number of hotel outlets in a country divided by the country's 
population. Since the U. S. has a large number of hotels (per capita) it is considered to have a high 
geographic concentration index. 
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The reduced model (which came from the extended model after the exclusion of the 
non-significant variables) revealed some interesting results regarding mainly the market 
segment and the country group of origin hypotheses, i. e. the hypotheses that were 
strongly supported by the original model. 
In particular, it can be noticed that the market segment hypothesis is supported only as 
far as the Anglo-Saxon brands are concerned; for Latin-European brands, the findings 
indicate that both mid-market and upscale brands would prefer to use franchising rather 
than company ownership for a new hotel property (other things equal). Yet an interesting 
observation is that management contracts are the preferred option the higher the market 
segment also for Latin-European brands. Thus, the main difference between Anglo- 
Saxon and Latin-European brands refers to the expansion strategy followed by budget 
brands: Spanish and French budget brands choose mainly company ownership for a new 
hotel property, while American and British brands prefer to expand using franchising. 
The same trend can be observed also in the mid-market segment, but not in the same 
extend as in the budget one. Finally, there is no significant difference as far as the 
upscale brands are concerned: management contracts are the prevalent mode of 
development for both American/British and Spanish/French brands, while company 
ownership is also used to a great extend, and franchising is the least preferred option. 
Besides the additional information on the market segment and country group of origin 
variables, the reduced model provided support for the effect of two more variables 
(compared to the original model), country politico-economic risk and brand growth. 
More specifically, the results indicated that in low-risk countries there is a higher 
probability that management contracts or company ownership will be used for a new 
hotel development and a lower probability that franchising will be the preferred mode 
(compared to high/moderate-risk countries), in line with the theory propositions. Yet, in 
both risk levels, the probability of using company ownership is very low (less than 3%). 
With respect to the brand growth hypothesis, the reduced model suggests that, compared 
to brands with annual growth less than 1 percent, brands with growth between 1 and 2.5 
percent are more likely to use franchising and less likely to use company ownership or 
management contracts. In other words, brands with higher growth would choose 
franchising for a new hotel development as opposed to company ownership or a 
management contract. However, when it comes to brands with very high annual growth 
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(higher that 9 percent), the results indicate that they would more likely choose company 
ownership or management contracts as opposed to franchising (compared to the very- 
slow growth brands). Thus, the brand growth hypothesis is only partly confirmed. 
A possible explanation for the awkward findings as far as the higher-growth brands are 
concerned can be related to sample and the time frame of the study: during the data 
collection, it was noticed that in the time frame under examination (i. e. 1998-2000), 
there were hotel companies that expanded using takeovers, like Accor for example 
which bought a hotel chain in Brazil and converted it to Mercure Hotels. Takeovers of 
large hotel chains within one year might have biased the results of the analysis. The 
results might have been different if a longitudinal analysis had been undertaken instead 
of a cross-sectional one. 
In conclusion, one could suggest that when the corporate development decision is made 
at one stage, namely the decision is made among franchising, management contracts and 
company ownership, transaction cost economics and agency theory provide sufficient 
reasoning on what factors influence that decision and why. The reduced model (i. e. the 
model that includes the interaction effects between independent variables and excludes 
the non-significant variables) provides the strongest support for the examined 
hypotheses. Table 7.23 below gives a summary of the results of the ordered model (the 
reduced specification) regarding the nine hypotheses of this study. Once again, the 
reason why the results of the reduced model are presented in this table is that the reduced 
specification fits the data better than the other two specifications. It has to be noted that, 
since there are variables that have been found to influence the expansion decision but in 
the opposite direction from the one suggested by the respective hypotheses, a separate 
column has been created for those variables. 
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Table 7.23: Summary of the results of the ordered model (reduced specification) 37 
Hypotheses Supported38 Rejected 
Significant Non- 
significant 
Negative correlation between political and  
economic risk and use of high control modes 
Positive correlation between legal risk and X 
use of high control modes 
Negative correlation between the level of X 
economic development of the target market 
and the propensity to use a high-control mode 
Negative correlation between hotel brand size X 
and the proclivity to use a high control mode 
Negative correlation between hotel brand  
growth and the proclivity to use a high control 
mode 
Negative correlation between brand's int'l  
experience and the proclivity to use a high 
control mode 
Positive correlation between the market  
segment in which a hotel brand operates and 
the use of a high control mode (only for 
Anglo-Saxon brands) 
Positive correlation between geographic X 
concentration of hotel properties and the use 
of a high control mode 
Latin-European companies are more likely to  
use company ownership, while Anglo-Saxon 
are more likely to use franchising 
A final interesting remark regarding the ordered model is that the findings of this model 
provide an indication that a two-stage analysis might be more informative on the 
expansion strategy of international hotel firms. More specifically, the effect of most 
explanatory variables on the predicted probabilities (Tables 7.3? -7.15? ) has the same 
direction as far as both management contracts and company ownership are concerned. 
For example, when the effect of geographical concentration (GDSPRS) on the predicted 
37 The results of the final (i. e. the reduced) model are presented in the table 
38 A single mark () refers to hypotheses that were partly confirmed, while a double mark () refers to 
those that were strongly confirmed. 
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probabilities of choosing each of the three modes is examined Tables 7.13?, it can be 
seen that while the probability of choosing franchising is positively related to the degree 
of geographical concentration, the opposite is true for both management contracts and 
franchising. Namely, in most cases, the probability of choosing either a management 
contract or company ownership for a new hotel property is in the same direction in both 
cases and in the opposite direction to the probability of choosing franchising. 
This is actually a starting point for considering that the choice is between franchising 
and non-franchising rather than among the three development modes. Thus, one should 
consider the application of a two-stage model, instead of the one-stage ordered model. 
At the first stage the decision concerns the level of desired control over the hotel 
operations. If high-control is required then a hierarchical mode should be considered, 
whereas franchising should be the preferred mode if a low-control mode is more 
desirable. In the second stage, a decision is made between the two hierarchical modes of 
development, management contracts and company ownership. In the next chapter, the 
results of the two-stage model will be presented and discussed. 
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CHAPTER 8: ANALYSIS - THE TWO STAGE BINARY MODEL 
As already presented in the previous chapter, the two stage model takes the form of two 
sequential binary logit models. At the first stage the choice between "market" and 
"hierarchy" is examined, namely the choice between franchising and "non-franchising" 
(management contracts and company ownership). 
8.1 Results of the First Stage (Choice between franchising 
and "non-franchising") 
All the developed hypotheses of this study are actually tested in the first stage of the 
model, the stage where the decision between the use of a "market" versus a "hierachical" 
mode is made, as this is the stage that assesses the explanatory power of transaction cost 
economics and agency theory. At the second stage, the choice between management 
agreements and company ownership will be examined. It has been explained earlier that 
management contracts is a mode of development that resembles company ownership in 
terms of the control provided to the international hotel company, and thus is considered 
as a mode that lies towards the "hierarchy", rather than the "market" mode. Thus, at the 
second stage of the model, the variables that influence the choice between the two 
hierarchical modes of development will be examined. 
The results of the second stage will actually provide some additional information 
regarding the ability of transaction cost economics and agency theory to explain the 
modal choice when this choice refers to the hierarchical alternatives. Thus, the results of 
the second stage will have an exploratory nature rather than an inferential ability. That 
is, the ability of the second stage to test the validity of the TCE and AT theories will be 
quite limited. 
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8.1.1 The Original Specification 
The binary model takes the same form as the ordered model, the only difference being 
that the response variable, i. e. the modal choice (OM) now takes only two values, Y=1 
or Y=2: 
OM =)6o +)61ICRGD2+ß2ICRGD3+)133LEGRSK+, 8aGDP+)ßsFSIZE+ 
ß6FGR2+ß7FGR3+ß8FGR4+ß9INTEXP+ß1oGDSPRS+ß11MIDMKT + 
ß12UPSCALE + ß13LATINEUROPEAN + ß1aRMS +, 815 L0 CATION 
where: 
(1) 
ßl & ß2 indicate the effect of low- (ICRGD2) and very low-risk countries (ICRGD3) on 
the decision to use franchising as opposed to non-franchising, compared to the base 
category, which is the high (and moderate) - risk one. 
, 63& 84 indicate the effects of legal risk (LEGRSK) and level of economic development 
(GDP) respectively on the modal choice 
ßs indicates the effect of brand size on the choice 
ß6, ß7, & ß8 indicate the effect of brand growth between 1 and 2.5% (FGR2), 2.5 and 9% 
(FGR3) and over 9.5% (FGR4) on the choice between franchising and non-franchising, 
compared to the base category, which is hotel brands with annual growth lower than 1 %. 
ß9 indicates the effect of international experience measured in years since the first 
operation in a country other than the original was established 
ß10 indicates the effect of geographical concentration, measured by the number of hotels 
in each country (divided by the population of the country). 
ß/l & ß12 indicate the effect on the choice of being a mid-market (or upscale) brand, 
compared to being a budget brand (reference category). 
ß13 indicates the effect on the choice of being a Latin-European brand compared to being 
an Anglo-Saxon brand. 
ß14 & ß1s (control variables) indicate whether (i) the size of the developed property 
(RMS) and (ii) its location (LOCATION), namely whether the developed hotel will be 
developed in the country where the hotel brand operates most of its hotel properties 
(LOCATION=O) or in another country (LOCATION=1), influence the decision between 
the two corporate development modes. 
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The first column of the following table presents the main information in the E-Views 
output, regarding the first stage of the model, i. e. the choice between franchising and 
"non-franchising". 
The main difference between the binary and the ordered E-Views output is that in the 
binary model, the sign of the estimated coefficients does show the direction of the 
change in the probability of falling into any of the two categories of the response 
variable. Thus, a positive coefficient sign indicates that an increase in the explanatory 
variable will increase the probability of choosing "non-franchising" (Y=1) over 
franchising (Y=O), while a negative sign indicates a negative effect of the respective 
explanatory variable on the response variable. Therefore, the interpretation of the 
estimated coefficients is more straightforward in the binary model, than it is in the 
ordered one. 
To start with the interpretation of the output, one should identify whether the model with 
the explanatory variables fits the data better than the model with the intercept alone. 
Since the probability of the LR statistic is zero, one can reject the null hypothesis that 
the model does not have greater explanatory power than the "intercept only" model. An 
additional goodness-of-fit statistic would be the McFadden R2. It can take any value 
between 0 and 1 and its value increases as the fit of the model improves. In this case the 
McFadden R2 is 0.68, which indicates a very sufficient goodness-of-fit. 
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Table 8.1: Regression Analysis for the first stage of the binary model: Original 
Specification (Model 1), Extended Model (Model 2) and Reduced Model (Model 3) 
Variables 
ICRG2 
ICRG3 
LEGRSK 
GDP 
FSIZE 
FGR2 
FGR3 
FGR4 
INTEXP 
GDSPRS 
MIDMKT 
UPLUX 
LATEUROP 
RMS 
LOCATION 
MM_LATEU 
UP_LATEU 
CRD2_FS 
CRD3_FS 
FSIZE2 
FSIZE3 
MIDMKT2 
UPLUX2 
LATEUROP2 
LATEUROP3 
LR-statistic 
Df 
Probability 
McFadden-R2 
Akaike info criterion 
Schwarz criterion 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 
H-L Statistic 
Probability x2 
Andrews Statistic 
Probability 
Model 1 
Beta 
-0.282 
-0.622 
-0.005 
0.000 
0.000 
0.262 
1.602 
1.575 
-0.034 
-1.644 
1.056 
3.309 
3.610 
0.008 
-0.471 
457.17 
15 
0.000 
0.681 
0.506 
0.644 
0.560 
8.6702 
0.3709 
134.1598 
0.0000 
Notes: *=p<. 1 in a one-tailed test, **= 
t-value 
-0.42 
-0.72 
-0.32 
0.53 
0.76 
0.31 
2.00** 
1.75** 
-1.45* 
-4.03*** 
1.48* 
4.56*** 
4.74*** 
3.21*** 
-0.59 
Model 2 Model 3 
Beta t-value Beta t-value 
1.170 1.25 1.494 2.01** 
1.408 1.16 1.650 1.77** 
-0.012 -0.63 
0.000 0.58 
0.000 2.10** 0.000 1.90** 
0.328 0.36 
1.596 1.85** 1.412 2.50*** 
1.559 1.65** 1.370 1.94** 
-0.044 -1.70** -0.035 -1.49* 
-1.330 -2.95*** -1.510 -4.13*** 
0.848 0.93 1.284 1.82** 
3.827 4.50*** 3.534 5.05*** 
3.630 3.69*** 3.249 4.86*** 
0.008 3.37*** 0.009 3.46*** 
0.073 0.09 
0.957 0.60 
-1.424 -0.82 
-0.000 -2.22** -0.000 -2.28** 
-0.000 -1.91** -0.000 -1.87** 
0.000 0.18 -0.000 
-0.000 0.10 -0.000 
1.805 1.35 
2.403 1.56* 
4.588 3.25*** 
2.206 1.56* 
467.3 464.9 
19 13 
0.000 0.000 
0.696 0.692 
0.502 0.482 
0.674 0.603 
0.569 0.529 
10.1562 6.0508 
0.2542 0.6415 
184.3007 169.2490 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.05 in a one-tailed test, ***=p<0.01 in a one-tailed test 
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Furthermore, E-Views carries out two goodness-of-fit tests for binary models: the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (H-L) and Andrews tests. The idea underlying these tests is to 
compare the fitted expected values to the actual values by group. If these differences are 
"large", one rejects the model as providing an inefficient fit to the data. The tables that 
present the H-L and Andrews tests are included in Appendix 4. The chi-squared statistics 
for both tests, along with their respective probabilities, are reported at the end of the 
tables. If the probabilities of both statistics are lower than 0.05, one can suggest that the 
model fits the data well. If only one of the tests has p<0.05, one could not argue with 
confidence that the model provides a good fit to the data. As far as the original model is 
concerned, the H-L and Andrews statistics are 8.6702 and 134.1598 respectively, with 
probability p<0.001 only for the Andrews test. According to the H-L test the original 
specification of the first stage of the model (i. e. the specification that does not account 
for interaction effects) does not fit the data well, while according to the Andrews test the 
opposite is true. Thus, in this case, the two goodness-of-fit tests do not lead to the same 
conclusion and cannot be used to assess whether the model fits the data well. 
Regarding the effect of the explanatory variables on the decision of a hotel company to 
expand, this will be assessed by examining both the coefficients (as well as the 
associated probabilities) and the antilogs of the coefficients. The antilog gives the 
marginal effect of an explanatory variable x on the odds of belonging to one versus the 
other category of the dependent variable (Liao, 1994; Hardy, 1993). In the first column 
of Table 8.1 (Model 1), one can observe that five of the explanatory variables, brand 
growth and international experience, geographic concentration, market segment of 
operation and brand origin are statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level, 
while the control variable RMS is also found to significantly influence the choice 
between franchising and non-franchising at the 1 percent level. 
More specifically, when the original specification is examined, the following 
explanatory variables are found to be statistically significant, although not all of them in 
the hypothesised direction: 
a) Brand Growth: as in the ordered model, brand growth was found to significantly 
influence the modal choice, for hotel brands with annual growth higher than 2.5 percent, 
although in the opposite direction than the one hypothesised. According to the results of 
the first stage, hotel brands with annual growth between 2.5 and 9.5 percent are 5.2 
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times more likely to choose non-franchising over franchising for their development, 
compared to the reference category (i. e. brands with growth lower than 1 percent). 
Likewise, brands with growth higher than 9.5 percent are 5.6 times more likely to 
choose non-franchising (as opposed to franchising) compared to the reference category. 
Thus, the higher the annual growth of an international hotel company, the more likely 
that management contracts or company ownership would be the preferred mode of 
development, as opposed to franchising (see Appendix 4 for the E-views tables, as well 
as the antilogs). Hence H4 is not supported by the original specification of the 1St stage 
binary model (in line with the results of the original specification of the ordered model). 
b) International Experience: The coefficient of INTEXP indicates that there is a 
negative relationship between international experience and mode of development. More 
specifically, an increase in international experience by one more country would reduce 
the odds of choosing a hierarchical mode of development (as opposed to franchising ) by 
a factor of 0.966, or would increase the odds of using franchising (as opposed to non- 
franchising) by 1.035, i. e. by 3.5 percent. Thus H6 is supported. 
c) Geographical Concentration: the results of the first stage are in line with the 
results of the ordered model. More specifically, it is found that the effect of geographical 
concentration is highly significant, although in the opposite direction than it is suggested 
by the relevant theory. The results revealed that the more concentrated the hotel outlets 
in a particular country (i. e. the higher the GDSPRS index) the more likely it is that 
franchising will be the preferred mode of development. As it was suggested in the 
previous chapter, it could be that the proxy used to estimate the effect of geographical 
concentration is not an appropriate measure to capture the effect of monitoring costs on 
the modal choice. Also, the results may be driven by the fact that most of the franchised 
properties are in the USA, where hotel properties are quite concentrated. (It has to be 
reminded that the GDSPRS index is calculated based on the number of hotels per capita 
in a each country. Thus, high GDSPRS indicates high concentration of properties in 
terms of number of hotels. ) 
d) Market Segment (significant at the 10% for the mid-market segment and 1% level 
for the upscale segment): using the antilogs ß, the results indicate that, on average, a 
hotel brand that operates in the mid-market segment is 2.9 times more likely to choose a 
non-franchise agreement (as opposed to franchising), compared to a budget brand, while 
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an upscale brand is 27.4 times more likely to choose a high-control mode (over 
franchising) compared to a budget brand. Hence, H7 is strongly confirmed. (The results 
are similar to those of the ordered model. ) 
e) Country Group of Origin: The effect of brand origin was also found to be highly 
significant (at 0.001 level). According to the results, a hotel brand that originates from a 
Latin-European country (France or Spain) is 37 times more likely to use a non- 
franchising mode compared to a brand that originates from an Anglo-Saxon country. 
(Results similar to the results of the ordered model. ) 
The rest of the explanatory variables (ICRG, LEGRSK, GDP and FSIZE) are not found 
to be statistically significant, when the original specification is used and the same is true 
for the control variable LOCATION, i. e. whether a new hotel is developed in the 
country where the hotel brand operates most of its outlets or in another country does not 
influence the choice between franchising and non-franchising for the development of a 
new property. On the contrary the size of the outlet (control variable RMS) does 
influence the choice between franchising and non-franchising. More specifically, the 
results indicate that the bigger the hotel property to be developed, the more likely it is 
that a hierarchical mode of development will be used. Also, budget hotels are more 
likely to be small than upscale or luxury properties. Thus, there might be a correlation 
between market segment of operation (MKTSGM) and size of the developed property 
(RMS). 
A final step in the analysis of the first stage binary model involves the marginal effect on 
the predicted probabilities of choosing each one of the development modes with a unit 
change in the explanatory variables. For the probabilities calculation, the following 
formulae will be used (Liao, 1994): 
KK 
Pr ob(Y = 1) =1- L(-2ý, ßkxk) = L(L)6kxk) _ 
k=l k=1 
K 
j6kXk 
ek_l (2) 
1 
Pr ob(Y = 0) =1- Pr ob(Y =1) =K 
1+1)6kxk 
ek=l 
K 
1+1: ßkXk 
ek=1 
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where Y=O is the choice of franchise agreements and Y=1 is the choice of non- 
franchising, k=1,..., 15 are the explanatory variables, fik are the estimated coefficients (as 
presented in the estimation output) and xk are the mean values of each explanatory 
variable (expect the one whose effect on the probabilities is being assessed). The L 
function indicates the logistic distribution for the random component E. 
The following table gives the probabilities of choosing a franchise agreement as opposed 
to "non-franchising" when each of the statistically significant variables takes different 
values. More specifically, the continuous variables INTEXP and GDSPRS (international 
experience and geographical concentration) take five different values that correspond to 
the quintiles of their distribution, and the qualitative variables FGR3, FGR4, MIDMKT, 
UPLUX and LATEUROP take the values of 0 and 1. 
Table 8.2: The effect of Brand Growth on the predicted probabilities of choosing 
franchising as opposed to a non franchising development mode 
Pr(Y=O) Pr(Y=1) 
Growth less than 1% (base category) 23.0% 77.0% 
Growth between 2.5% and 9.5% 5.7% 94.3% 
Growth higher than 9.5% 5.8% 94.2% 
Y=O represents franchising, while Y=1 represents a "non-franchising " mode 
It can be noticed in the above table, that hotel brands with annual growth higher than 2.5 
percent are even more likely to use a hierarchical mode of development as opposed to 
franchising, compared to hotel brands in the reference category. Even for hotel brands 
with slow growth (the reference category), the effect of growth rate on the probability of 
using franchising is relatively low. 
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Table 8.3: The effect of Geographical Concentration on the predicted probabilities of 
choosing franchising versus non franchising 
(no of outlets/population) Pr(Y=O) Pr(Y=1) 
GDSPRS= 0.02 3.30% 96.70% 
GDSPRS= 0.17 4.20% 95.80% 
GDSPRS= 0.59 8.00% 92.00% 
Ö GDSPRS= 1.59 31.00% 69.00% r 
GDSPRS= 4.24 97.20% 2.80% 
Y=O represents franchising, while Y=1 represents a non franchising mode 
The use of hierarchical modes is negatively related to the geographical concentration of 
the hotel outlets, opposite to what is suggested by the relevant economic theory. Very 
dispersed brands (GDSPRS=0.02) are more likely to use a hierarchical mode of 
development, while very concentrated brands (GDSPRS=4.24) are more likely to use 
franchising for a new hotel property. Since the proxy is calculated by dividing the 
number of hotels in a country by its population, one could argue that the results support 
a certain rationale, since a hotel brand with more outlets in a particular country may find 
it easier to attract franchisees. An additional reason for the unexpected results could be 
the U. S effect, as it was presented in the previous chapter: the fact that most franchised 
outlets in the sample are located in the U. S., a country where the no of hotel outlets per 
capita is in fact quite high, may bias the effect of geographical concentration on the 
expansion decision. 
Table 8.4: The effect of International Experience on the predicted probabilities of 
choosing franchising versus non franchising 
(in years) Pr(Y=O) Pr(Y=1) 
INTEXP= 8 6.10% 93.90% 
INTEXP= 27 11.00% 89.00% 
INTEXP= 35 14.00% 86.00% 
INTEXP= 38 15.30% 84.70% 
INTEXP= 49 20.80% 79.20% 
Y=O represents franchising, while Y=1 represents a non franchising mode 
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The hypothesis regarding the effect of international experience on the modal choice 
(H6) is also supported in the binary model: the more the international experience of a 
hotel brand, the higher the probability to choose franchising for its expansion and the 
lower the probability to use management contracts or company ownership. 
Table 8.5: The effect of Market Segment and Origin on the predicted probabilities of 
choosing franchising versus non franchising 
Pr(Y=O) Pr(Y=1) 
Upscale brands 1.70% 98.30% 
Mid-market brands 14.40% 85.60% 
Budget brands 32.50% 67.50% 
Latin-europ. Brands 0.60% 99.40% 
Anglo-Saxon brands 18.10% 81.90% 
Y=O represents franchising, while Y=1 represents a non franchising mode 
The findings in Table 8.5 support the relevant hypothesis regarding the positive 
relationship between operation in higher market segments and the use of high-control 
modes. The higher the market segment, the higher the probability that a hierarchical 
mode of development will be used for a new hotel property. In the upscale segment, the 
probability for franchising to be used is only 1.7 percent while the respective probability 
for a budget brand is 32.5 percent. Furthermore, hotel brands that originate from Spanish 
or French countries are more likely to use high-control modes compared to their Anglo- 
Saxon counterparts, (although the probability to use a high-control mode is higher than 
the probability to use franchising in both cases). Hence both hypotheses (H7 and H9) are 
supported in the first stage of the binary model and the results are in line with those of 
the original specification of the ordered model. 
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8.1.2 Interaction Effects between Market Segment/Country Group of 
Origin and Brand Size/Country Risk (The Extended Model) 
In the extended model, the interaction effects between (i) market segment and country 
group of origin of the hotel brand and (ii) country political and economic risk and brand 
size are accounted for. The extended model to be tested takes the following form: 
OM = ßo+ßiICRGD2+ß2ICRGD3+ß3LEGRSK+ßaGDP+/3sFSIZE+ 
ß6FGR2+ß7FGR3+ß8 FGR4+ß9INTEXP+/3ioGDSPRS+ßiiMIDMKT 
+ ß12UPSCALE + ß13LATINEUROPEAN + ßiaRMS + ß, sLOCATION + 
ß16MM 
_LATEU 
+ ß»UP_LATEU + ß18CRD2_FS + ßi9CRD3_FS 
(4) 
When the interaction effects are introduced into the model, all the information criteria 
(HC, AIC and SC) are being improved compared to the original model, while the same 
is true for the McFadden R-squared index. Yet again, the goodness-of-fit tests performed 
by E-Views, i. e. the H-L and Andrews tests give contradictory results, thus, by using 
these tests, one could not be confident regarding how well the extended model fits the 
data (see Appendix 4 for the goodness-of fit output). 
When the extended model is tested the following explanatory variables are found to be 
significant: 
a) Brand size: while the results of the original specification presented earlier did not 
indicate any relationship between the size of the brand and the corporate development 
choice, the extended model suggests that there is a positive relationship between brand 
size and the choice of non-franchising, when country risk is moderate to high, an 
opposite direction than the one suggested by the relative hypothesis (H4). However, the 
results of the interaction effects between size and country risk suggest that as the 
political and economic risks of a country get lower, the relationship between brand size 
and choice becomes negative, i. e. larger hotel companies would prefer to use franchising 
for their expansion, as it is proposed by the respective hypothesis. The coefficients of the 
interaction terms CRD2_FS and CRD3_FS are statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level, suggesting that in countries characterised by low- or very low risk, the effect or 
brand size is different than in high/moderate risk counties. The coefficient of FSIZE3 
(effect of brand size in very low-risk countries) is negative, although very small, 
suggesting that in very low-risk countries, the bigger the hotel brand the higher the 
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probability of using franchising and the lower the probability of using a hierarchical 
mode of development, in line with the relevant hypothesis. Hence H4 is partly 
confirmed when the extended model is examined. 
b) Brand Growth: Regarding the effect of annual brand growth on the expansion 
strategy, the results are in line with those of the original specification and the ordered 
model. More specifically, hotel companies with annual growth between 2.5 and 9.5 
percent are 5 times more likely to expand using "non-franchising" compared to the 
reference category (i. e. the hotel companies with growth less than 1 percent), while 
brands with annual growth higher than 9.5 percent are 4.8 times more likely to use "non- 
franchising" compared to the reference category. 
c) International Experience: As in the original specification international experience 
is found to significantly influence the choice between franchising and non-franchising 
modes of development. Moreover, when the extended model is examined, international 
experience is significant at the 5 percent level (as opposed to the 10 percent in the 
original specification) and the coefficient is higher than the one in the original 
specification: one more year of international experience causes a 4.5% increase in the 
probability of using franchising (as opposed to a hierarchical mode of expansion). Hence 
H6 is supported by the results of the extended model. 
d) Geographical Concentration: The negative and significant coefficient for 
GDSPRS indicates that the more concentrated the hotels in a particular country, the 
higher the probability that the new hotel property will be franchised (again opposite than 
hypothesized by H8). 
e) Market Segment: When the interaction term between market segment and brand 
origin is incorporated in the model, the respective hypothesis (H7) is confirmed, though 
only for upscale brands compared to budget ones. More specifically, the coefficient for 
MIDMKT is positive but non-significant, indicating that the difference in the effect on 
the expansion decision of being a mid-market as opposed to a budget Anglo-Saxon 
brand is not statistically significant. On the other hand it is confirmed that upscale 
Anglo-Saxon brands are 46 times more likely to use a high-control mode as opposed to 
franchising (compared to budget brands). Furthermore, the interaction terms 
MM LATEU and UP_LATEU were not found to be significant, suggesting that the 
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difference in the effect of being in the upscale (or mid-market) rather than in the budget 
segment for Latin-European companies relative to Anglo-Saxon ones is not significant. 
Namely, there is no statistical difference in the way upscale and mid-market Latin- 
European and Anglo-Saxon brands choose between franchising and non-franchising for 
a new hotel development. Indeed, MIDMKT2 (the coefficient for mid-market Latin- 
European brands) is found to be non-significant, whereas UPLUX2 (the coefficient for 
upscale Latin-European brands) is found to be significant at the 5 percent level, 
suggesting that upscale brands originating form Spain or France are more likely to 
choose a non-franchising mode for a new hotel property, compare to a budget brand (as 
was the case for American and British upscale brands. Overall, when the interaction 
effects are taken into account the market segment hypothesis is confirmed: market 
segment is indeed an influencing factor for the expansion strategy of both Anglo-Saxon 
and Latin-European brands and higher market segments are associated with the use of 
higher-control modes of development. 
f) Country Group (Brand Origin): The effect of brand origin was found to be highly 
significant (at 0.001 level), as in the original specification. According to the findings of 
the extended model, a budget hotel brand that originates from a Latin-European country 
(France or Spain) is 38 times more likely to use a non-franchising mode (as opposed to 
franchising) compared to a budget brand that originates from an Anglo-Saxon country 
(North America or United Kingdom). In order to identify the effect of origin on the 
development strategy of mid-market (or upscale) brands, the relevant coefficients and 
their t-values need to be calculated. The effect of being a mid-market Latin-European as 
opposed to a mid-market Anglo-Saxon brand is given by the sum of the LATEUROP 
and MID_LATEU coefficients, while for the upscale brands it is given by the sum of 
LATEUROP and UP_LATEU. In both cases, the coefficient is positive 
(LATEUROP2=4.58 and LATEUROP3=2.206), and significant suggesting that, as in 
the budget segment, Latin-European mid-market and upscale brands are more likely to 
use a high-control mode compared to Anglo-Saxon upscale brands. Thus, when the 
interaction terms are incorporated in the model it is revealed that the effect of origin is 
indeed significant (as suggested also by the original specification), thus H9 is strongly 
supported. 
195 
Expansion Strategies of International Hotel Firms 
8.1.3 The Reduced Model 
In the previous chapter, where the results of the ordered model were presented, a 
reduced model was also assessed, i. e. a model where all the non-significant explanatory 
variables were dropped from the specification. A reduced specification should also be 
examined in the case of the binary model. If one excludes the variables that were not 
found to be statistically significant and reassessed the model, one finds that the results 
are slightly better than the results of the extended model. More specifically, as can be 
seen in the third column of Table 8.1 (Model 3), the information criteria AIC, H-C and 
SC are improved. 
g) Political and Economic Risk: the reduced model provides support for one more 
hypothesis (H1), according to which the higher the country risk the more likely that a 
low-control mode would be chosen for the development of a new hotel outlet. It can be 
seen that the coefficients for ICRGD2 and ICRGD3 are positive and significant at the 5 
percent level, indicating that the lower the politico-economic risk of a country, the 
higher the probability that a high-control model of development will be used, other 
things equal. The probability of using non-franchising is 4.5 times higher in low-risk 
countries compared to high- and moderate- risk countries (the reference category) and 
5.2 times higher in very-low risk countries compared to the reference category. 
Finally, the previously presented equations (2) and (3) will be used to calculate the 
predicted probabilities for the significant explanatory variables. 
Table 8.6: The effect of Country Politico-economic Risk on the predicted probabilities 
of choosing franchising as opposed to a "non franchising" development 
mode 
Pr(Y=O) Pr(Y=1) 
High-Risk Countries (base category) 5.3% 94.7% 
Low-Risk Countries (ICRGD2=1) 1.2% 98.8% 
Very Low-Risk Countries (ICRGD3=1) 1.0% 99.0% 
Y=0 represents franchising, while Y=1 represents a non franchising mode 
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Although the higher the political and economic risk of a country the higher the 
probability of using franchising and the lower the probability of using management 
contracts or company ownership, the effect of risk on the probability of using 
franchising is very low even in high/moderate-risk countries. 
Table 8.7: The effect of Brand Growth on the predicted probabilities of choosing 
franchising as opposed to a non franchising development mode 
Pr(Y=O) Pr(Y=1) 
Growth less than 1% (base category) 7.8% 92.2% 
Growth between 2.5% and 9% 2.0% 98.0% 
Growth higher than 9% 2.1% 97.9% 
Y=O represents franchising, while Y=1 represents a non franchising mode 
It can be noticed in the above table, that hotel brands with annual growth higher than 2.5 
percent are more likely to use a non-franchising mode of development, compared to 
hotel brands in the reference category. Even for hotel brands with slow growth (the 
reference category) the effect on the probability of using franchising is very low. 
Table 8.8: The effect of Geographical Concentration on the predicted probabilities of 
choosing franchising versus non franchising 
(no of outlets/population) Pr(Y=O) Pr(Y=1) 
GDSPRS= 0.02 1.2% 98.8% 
GDSPRS= 0.17 1.5% 98.5% 
E-+ GDSPRS= 0.59 2.9% 97.1% 4 
GDSPRS= 1.59 11.8% 88.2% 
GDSPRS= 4.24 87.9% 12.1% 
Y=O represents franchising, while Y=1 represents a non franchising mode 
Franchising is positively related to the geographical concentration of the hotel outlets, 
opposite to what is suggested by the relevant economic theory. Very dispersed brands 
(GDSPRS=0.02) are more likely to use a hierarchical mode of development, while very 
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concentrated brands (GDSPRS=4.24) are more likely to use franchising for a new hotel 
property. The proxy is calculated by dividing the number of hotels in a country by its 
population, and thus one could argue that the results follow a certain rationale, since a 
hotel brand with more outlets in a particular country may find it easier to attract 
franchisees. 
Table 8.9: The effect of International Experience on the predicted probabilities of 
choosing franchising versus non franchising 
(in years) Pr(Y=O) Pr(Y=1) 
INTEXP= 8 2.0% 98.0% 
INTEXP= 27 3.9% 96.1% 
INTEXP= 35 5.1% 94.9% 
Ö INTEXP= 38 5.7% 94.3% 
r 
INTEXP= 49 8.1% 91.9% 
Y=O represents franchising, while Y=1 represents a non franchising mode 
The hypothesis regarding the effect of international experience on the modal choice 
(H6) is also supported in the binary model: the greater the international experience of a 
hotel brand, the higher the probability of choosing franchising for its expansion and the 
lower the probability of using management contracts or company ownership. 
Table 8.10: The effect of Market Segment and Country Group of Origin on the 
predicted probabilities of choosing franchising versus non-franchising 39 
Pr(Y=O) Pr(Y=1) 
A/S Upscale brands 45.9% 54.1% 
A/S Mid-market brands 94.3% 5.7% 
A/S Budget brands 97.5% 2.5% 
L/E Upscale brands 22.1% 77.9% 
L/E Budget brands 29.6% 70.4% 
Y=O represents franchising, while Y=1 represents a non franchising mode 
39 The probabilities for mid-market Latin-European 
brands are not presented since the coefficient for 
MIDMKT2 was not found statistically significant. 
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The coefficients of MIDMKT, UPLUX and LATEUROP in the reduced model have the 
same interpretation as in the original specification, namely, they indicate the effect of the 
choice of being a mid-market, upscale or Latin-European brand respectively. The reason 
is that the interaction terms MM_LATEU and UP_LATEU have been dropped from the 
analysis, since their coefficients were not found to be statistically significant in the 
extended model. Since the reduced model does not include any interaction variables 
(country risk / brand size or market segment / country group of origin), the above 
mentioned variables do not have the same interpretation as in the extended model. 
Therefore, one cannot calculate predicted probabilities for different brand origins. 
In order for these probabilities to be calculated, the coefficients of the extended model 
were used. As can be seen in Table 8.10, the higher the market segment where a brand 
operates the higher the probability that a high-control mode will be the preferred option 
for both Anglo-Saxon and Latin-European brands. Hence H7 is strongly supported. The 
results also indicate that on average Spanish and French brands are more likely to use 
management contracts or company ownership compared to their American and British 
counterparts (in every market segment), providing support also for hypothesis H9. 
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8.2 Results of the second stage of the analysis (choice 
between management agreements and company 
ownership) 
8.2.1 The original specification 
The second stage of the decision refers to the choice between the two hierarchical modes 
of development, namely the choice between management contracts and company 
ownership. A binary model was estimated again, using the same explanatory variables, 
yet this time the response variable takes the value of zero for management contracts and 
one for company ownership. Moreover, since the observations of franchised outlets are 
not included in the second stage, the number of total observations has been reduced to 
223. The results of the original specification of the second stage model are presented in 
the first column of Table 8.10 (Model 1). 
At first one could notice that the probability of the LR statistic is very close to zero, 
indicating that the model with the explanatory variables fits the data better than the 
model with the intercept only. However, the goodness-of-fit tests calculated by E-Views, 
namely H-L and Andrews tests again provide contradictory results regarding how well 
the model fits the data (see Appendix 5). In the first column of table 8.10 (Model 1), one 
can observe that five of the explanatory variables are found to be statistically significant 
at least at the 10 percent level. Furthermore, the control variable RMS is also found to 
significantly influence the choice between the two hierarchical modes, at the 1 percent 
level. 
More specifically, when the original specification of the second stage is examined, the 
following explanatory variables are found to be statistically significant: 
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Table 8.11: Regression Analysis for the second stage of the binary model: Original 
Specification (Model 1), Extended Model (Model 2) and Reduced Model (Model 3) 
Model 1 
Variables 
ICRG2 
ICRG3 
LEGRSK 
GDP 
FSIZE 
FGR2 
FGR3 
FGR4 
INTEXP 
GDSPRS 
MIDMKT 
UPLUX 
LATEUROP 
RMS 
LOCATION 
MM_LATEU 
UP_LATEU 
CRD2_FS 
CRD3_FS 
FSIZE2 
FSIZE3 
MIDMKT2 
UPLUX2 
LATEUROP2 
LATEUROP3 
0 
LR-statistic 49.929 
Df 15 
Probability 0.0000 
McFadden-R2 0.188 
Akaike info criterion 1.110 
Schwarz criterion 1.355 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.209 
H-L Statistic 
Probability x2 
Andrews Statistic 
Probabili 
Notes: *= D 
2 
Beta t-value 
0.389 0.653 
-0.226 -0.297 
-0.004 0.266 
0.000 1.86** 
0.000 1.88** 
0.535 0.98 
0.466 0.80 
1.238 2.01** 
0.034 1.52* 
0.172 0.44 
-1.772 -2.44*** 
-0.414 -0.59 
2.002 3.68*** 
0.000 0.13 
0.796 1.36* 
4.158 
0.843 
23.415 
0.009 
<. 1 in a one-tailed test, ** D 
Model 2 Model 3 
Beta t-value Beta t-value 
0.832 1.00 
-0.851 -0.79 
-0.000 -0.04 
0.000 2.59*** 0.000 3.88*** 
0.000 2.61*** 0.000 3.28*** 
0.327 0.58 
-0.005 -0.01 
1.978 2.77*** 1.488 2.80*** 
0.019 0.71 
0.552 1.09 
-2.148 -1.00 -2.469 -1.24* 
2.752 1.98** 2.795 2.31** 
6.004 3.86*** 6.081 4.21*** 
-0.000 -0.35 
1.49 2.30** 1.108 2.19** 
-0.907 -0.37 -0.545 -0.26 
-5.578 -2.98*** -5.232 2.19** 
-0.000 -1.13 
0.000 0.54 
71.140 63.132 
19 9 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.268 0.248 
1.051 0.997 
1.357 1.150 
1.174 1.059 
17.913 15.695 
0.022 0.004 
43.112 36.940 
0.000 0.000 
0.05 in a one-tailed test, ***_ D 0.01 in a one-tailed test 
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(a) Level of Economic Development: As in the ordered model, the effect of economic 
development on the modal choice is found to be in the opposite direction to that 
suggested by the relevant theory. Indeed, the results indicate that the higher the level of 
economic development, the higher the probability of choosing company ownership and 
the lower the probability of using a management agreement for a new hotel property. 
Yet the coefficient, although significant at the 5 percent level is very low (close to zero) 
suggesting that the level of economic development can only explain a very small part of 
the choice between management contracts and company ownership. 
(b) Brand Size: the effect of brand size is also opposite than expected, but again the 
coefficient is close to zero (as it was the case in the ordered model). Thus, the 
probability of using company ownership gets slightly higher, the larger the hotel brand 
that develops the new property. 
(c) Brand Growth: when the choice between management contracts and company 
ownership is examined the findings reveal that brand annual growth has an explanatory 
power only when brands with very high annual growth are compared to brands with very 
slow growth. More specifically, using the antilogs (see Appendix 5 for E-views output 
and antilog calculation) it can be argued that hotel brands with annual growth higher 
than 9.5 percent are 3.5 times more likely to use company ownership as opposed to a 
management agreement, compared to the reference category, i. e. brands with annual 
growth less than 1 percent. 
(d) International Experience: the original specification of the second stage indicates 
that one more year of international experience increases by 3.5 percent the odds of 
choosing company ownership over a management agreement for the development of a 
new hotel outlet. 
(e) Market Segment: As can be seen in Table 8.10 the effect of market segment on the 
choice between management contracts and company ownership is significant only for 
mid-market compared to budget brands. More specifically (using the antilog of the 
coefficient of MIDMKT), it is revealed that mid-market brands are on average (i. e. for 
both Anglo-Saxon and Latin-European companies) 0.17 times more likely to choose 
company ownership or mid-market brands are almost 6 times more likely to choose a 
management agreement over company ownership compared to budget brands. The 
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coefficient of UPSCALE is non-significant indicating that, on average, the decision 
between management contracts and company ownership is not different between upscale 
and budget brands. A possible explanation is that the coefficients for MIDMKT and 
UPLUX refer to both Anglo-Saxon and Latin-European brands; if the interaction effects 
are introduced then the coefficients may indicate that different origins have different 
effects that counteract when the average effect is calculated. 
(f) Country Group (Brand Origin): the effect of brand origin is again found to be 
positive and highly significant, indicating that Spanish and French brands are 7.5 times 
more likely to use company ownership over a management agreement, compared to 
American and British brands. 
Overall, the original specification of the second stage of the binary analysis, revealed 
that the odds of using company ownership over management contracts are higher for 
bigger hotel brands, brands with more international experience and brands with annual 
growth higher than 9 percent (compared to brands with growth less than 1 percent. ) 
Furthermore, budget brands and brands that originate from a Latin-European country are 
more likely to choose company ownership as opposed to management contracts, 
compared to mid-market and Anglo-Saxon brands respectively. Finally, it should be 
noticed that the control variable LOCATION also has a positive and significant at the 10 
percent level effect on the choice, since the odds of using company ownership over 
management contracts are 2 times higher if the new hotel is developed in countries other 
than the country where the hotel brand operates most of its hotels. 
8.2.2 The extended model 
The explanatory power of the second stage binary model is again improved, when the 
interaction effects are introduced. More specifically, as can be seen in Table 8.11, the 
information criteria AIC, SC and H-Q are lower than in the case of the original model 
and the McFadden R-squared is improved by 8 percent. Even more important is the fact 
that the goodness-of-fit tests indicate that the extended model provides a good fit to the 
data since both H-L and Andrews tests have chi-squared probabilities lower than 5 
percent (see Table 8.11). 
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When the interaction effects between (i) country group of origin and market segment, 
and (ii) brand size and country risk are incorporated into the analysis, international 
experience becomes non-significant. Moreover, the behaviour of the market segment 
variable changes. Indeed, it is both the upscale and the mid-market segments that present 
differences from the budget segment in the effect on the choice: the coefficient of 
UPLUX is positive and significant at the 5 percent level, suggesting that Anglo-Saxon 
upscale brands are more likely to use company ownership as opposed to management 
contracts, compared to A/S budget brands. On the other hand, the coefficient of 
MIDMKT is non-significant, namely there is no difference on the choice of being a mid- 
market Anglo-Saxon brand as opposed to a budget A/S brand. 
The coefficient of the interaction term UP_LATEU is negative and highly significant, 
indicating that the behaviour of Latin-European upscale brands is different compared to 
Anglo-Saxon ones. On the other hand, the coefficient of the interaction term 
MM_LATEU is non-significant, suggesting that there is no significant difference 
between mid-market Anglo-Saxon and Latin-European brands, regarding their choice 
between management contracts and company ownership. More specifically, UPLUX2 
and MIDMKT2 (the coefficients of upscale and mid-market Latin-European brands 
respectively) are negative and significant and their antilogs reveal that the odds of using 
management contracts over company ownership are 17 times higher for upscale and 21 
times higher for mid-market, compared to budget (Spanish and French) brands. 
As far as the effect of country group of origin is concerned, the extended model reveals 
that both budget and mid-market Latin-European brands are more likely to use company 
ownership as opposed to management contracts for new hotel developments, compared 
to their Anglo-Saxon counterparts (both LATELTROP and LATEUROP2 are positive 
and highly significant). LATEUROP3 (the coefficient that indicates the effect of being 
an upscale Latin-European compared to an upscale Anglo-Saxon brand), although 
positive, is not found to be significant, namely in the upscale segment both 
American/British and French/Spanish brands behave in the same way when they choose 
between company ownership and management contracts. 
204 
Expansion Strategies of International Hotel Firms 
8.2.3 The reduced model 
Before the predicted probabilities of choosing company ownership (Y=1) versus a 
management contract (Y=O) for the significant explanatory variables are calculated, the 
reduced model (Model 3) needs to be estimated. It can be seen from the third column of 
Table 8.11, that when the non-significant explanatory variables are dropped from the 
model, the results are similar to the extended one (Model 2). More specifically, the 
information criteria are improved, and the goodness-of-fit tests have probabilities lower 
than 1 percent indicating that the model fits the data better than the extended one 
(though the McFadden R2 is slightly lower). 
As for the effect of the explanatory variables on the choice, it can be seen that level of 
economic development, brand size and growth, and international experience have the 
same effect as in the previous model. Regarding the market segment variable the results 
reveal that: 
" Both Anglo-Saxon and Latin-European mid-market brands are more likely to choose 
a management agreement over company ownership, compared to budget brands. 
" In the upscale segment, the negative and significant interaction term UP_LATEU 
suggests there is a difference in the effect on the choice of being a Latin-European 
relative to an Anglo-Saxon brand. More specifically, upscale Latin-European brands are 
more likely to choose management agreements over company ownership, compared to 
their budget counterparts, while the opposite is true for Anglo-Saxon brands. 
Finally, the effect of brand origin is in the expected direction, although only as far as 
budget and mid-market brands are concerned: budget and mid-market Latin-European 
brands are more likely to use company ownership over management contracts for their 
new hotel developments, compared to the Anglo-Saxon brands. 
The calculation of the respective predicted probabilities would give the following 
results: 
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Table 8.12: The effect of Level of Economic Development on the predicted 
probabilities of choosing company ownership over management 
contracts 
(GDP per capita) Pr(Y=O) Pr(Y=1) 
GDP = 2072 7.75% 92.25% 
GDP = 7259 6.64% 93.36% 
GDP = 22488 4.18% 95.82% 
GDP = 30316 3.28% 96.72% 
GDP = 36569 2.70% 97.30% 
Y=1 represents C/O, while Y=O represents a MC 
As indicated by the relevant coefficient, the probability to use company ownership is an 
increasing function of the target country's level of economic development. However, 
company ownership seems to be the prevalent choice regardless of the level of 
development (other things equal), since the probability of using a management contract 
for a new development is lower than 10 percent at any level of economic development. 
Table 8.13: The effect of Brand Size on the predicted probabilities of choosing 
company ownership over management contracts 
(Brand Size in rooms) Pr(Y=O) Pr(Y=1) 
FSIZE = 24,186 7.76% 92.24% 
FSIZE = 47,809 6.35% 93.65% 
FSIZE = 55,967 5.92% 94.08% 
FSIZE = 109,200 3.72% 96.28% 
FSIZE = 284,350 0.77% 99.23% 
Y=1 represents C/O, while Y=0 represents a MC 
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Table 8.14: The effect of Brand Growth on the predicted probabilities of choosing 
company ownership over management contracts 
Pr(Y=O) Pr(Y=1) 
Growth less than 1% (base category) 6.04% 93.96% 
Growth higher than 9% 3.15% 96.85% 
Y=1 represents C/O, while Y=0 represents a MC 
The same is true as far as the effect of brand size and brand growth is concerned. Both 
very small as well as very large hotel brands are more likely to choose company 
ownership, when they reach the second stage of the development decision. Moreover, 
hotel brands that experience high annual growth rates are keener in using company 
ownership compared to the reference group (brands with less than 1 percent growth), yet 
in both cases the probability of using management agreements is very low. 
Table 8.15: The effect of Market Segment and Country Group of Origin on the 
predicted probabilities of choosing company ownership over management 
con tracts 
Pr(Y=O) Pr(Y=1) 
A/S Upscale brands 4.15% 95.85% 
A/S Mid-market brands 32.43% 67.57% 
A/S Budget brands 28.07% 71.93% 
L/E Upscale brands 17.98% 82.02% 
L/E Mid-market brands 22.21% 77.79% 
L/E Budget brands 3.04% 96.96% 
Y=1 represents C/O, while Y=0 represents a MC 
When it comes to the choice of using a higher control mode of development, i. e. 
company ownership or management contracts, the following observations can be made 
regarding the effect of market segment and country group of origin: 
" The market segment hypothesis (H7) is only partly supported, since upscale 
Anglo-Saxon (A/S) companies are 16 times more likely to use company ownership over 
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a management agreement for the development of a new hotel property, compared to 
budget ones. However the hypothesis is not confirmed when mid-market A/S brands are 
compared to budget brands. 
" Furthermore, the hypothesis does not hold when the development decision of 
Latin-European companies is examined: both mid-market and upscale Latin-European 
brands are more likely to use management contracts compared to budget brands. 
" The comparison between origins reveals that Latin-European companies, 
especially in the budget and mid-market segments, present a higher probability of using 
company ownership compared to their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. (One should not 
compare the respective probabilities for the upscale segment, since the coefficient of 
LATEUROP3, i. e. the coefficient that indicates the difference in the effect of being an 
upscale Latin-European brand compared to an upscale Anglo-Saxon brand, was not 
found to be statistically significant. ) Hence, the hypothesis for the effect of country 
group of origin (H9) is also supported in the second stage of the binary model. 
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8.3 Discussion of the results of the two-stage model 
Since the results of the reduced models in both stages are better than the results of the 
original specifications (where the interaction effects have not been introduced in the 
analysis), the results of the reduced models will be directly presented. It can be 
concluded from the presentations of the results in the previous sections, that the reduced 
specification provides better fit for the data than the original or the extended ones, and 
thus the discussion hereafter as well as the conclusions in the next chapter will be based 
on the results of the reduced specification. 
(a) Country-specific variables 
At the first stage, where the choice between franchising and "non-franchising" is 
assessed, only one out of the three country specific variables was found to influence the 
expansion decision, and the same is true for the second stage. More specifically, country 
political and economic risk is found to be a highly significant factor, since the use of 
hierarchical modes (as opposed to franchising) is 5 times higher in countries with very 
low risk compared to countries with high/moderate risk. Yet, if a hotel company chooses 
to use a high-control mode for its development, then country risk does not influence the 
choice at the second stage, i. e. country risk does not affect the choice between company 
ownership and management agreements. Thus the relevant hypothesis (HI) is supported 
since country risk is an influential factor when the choice between "market" and 
"hierarchy" is made. 
The level of economic development is the country specific factor that influences the 
choice at the second stage of the decision. Indeed, although the level of economic 
development is not found to be significant when the choice between franchising and 
non-franchising is under examination, it seems to have an effect when a company that 
has chosen to use a hierarchical mode of development considers the use of management 
contracts over company ownership. Contrary to that predicted by the relevant theory, the 
results revealed that the higher the level of economic development the more likely it is 
that company ownership will be the preferred mode of development (as opposed to a 
management contract). 
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(b) Firm-Specific Variables 
As far as the firm-specific variables are concerned, the results indicate that all the 
variables have an influence on the choice in at least one of the two stages, although not 
always in the hypothesised direction. 
" Brand size is again found to be significant in both stages, although in the opposite 
direction than expected; the larger the brand, the higher the probability that a 
hierarchical mode will be chosen for the development of a new hotel property, other 
things equal. Furthermore, company ownership is the preferred mode when the second 
stage of the decision is reached. Yet, it should be noted that the effect of brand size on 
the modal choice is very weak, since the relevant coefficients were almost zero in both 
stages. 
" The results are similar as far as the effect of brand growth is concerned. Hotel brands 
with annual growth higher than 2.5 percent are 4 times more likely to choose a high- 
control mode for their development, as opposed to a franchise agreement, compared to 
brands with slow annual growth (less than 1 percent), opposite than expected. Moreover, 
at the second stage, it is suggested that high-growth brands (higher than 9.5 percent) may 
behave differently than the slow-growth ones, since they have a higher probability of 
choosing company ownership over a management agreement. Combining the results of 
both stages, it can be argued that high-growth firms are more likely choose a hierarchical 
mode of expansion compared to a slow-growth firm. Hence H5 is not supported. 
" The hypothesis that examines the effect of international experience (H6) is supported 
by the findings of the 1St stage model: the higher the international experience of a hotel 
company the more likely that franchising will be chosen as opposed to a high-control 
mode. Thus, the results are in line with the argument that firms with presence in more 
countries may find it easier to attract franchisees and also easier to assess their effort and 
their performance than companies with presence in less countries. 
However, it should be noted that the effect of brand size, growth and international 
experience on the second stage of the development decision could be explained by 
different arguments from those used to justify their effect on the choice between 
"market" and "hierarchical" modes. More specifically, if at the first stage of the decision 
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a hotel company has decided to use a hierarchical mode rather than franchising for a new 
hotel property, it could be that at the second stage, there are other issues to be taken into 
consideration, such as financial constraints. It could be that larger hotel companies with 
more international experience are more willing to invest financial resources for their new 
hotel developments. On the other hand, smaller hotel companies may not have the 
financial strength to participate with significant amounts of equity in their new 
developments. 
" Another hypothesis that is supported by the findings of the binary model is that hotel 
brands in higher market segments are more likely to expand using a hierarchical mode 
than a franchise agreement, while the opposite is true for hotel brands in lower market 
segments (H7). In particular, it was found that the odds of choosing a hierarchical mode 
of development over franchising for an Anglo-Saxon hotel brand in the upscale segment 
would be 46 times higher compared to a budget brand, while at the same time for an 
upscale Latin-European brand they would be 11 times higher. (Although no difference 
was found between the effect of being a mid-market as opposed to a budget brand, the 
results still support the hypothesis, as long as there is a significant difference between 
the effect of being an upscale as opposed to a budget brand, on the choice between 
"market" and "hierarchy". ) 
In the second stage of the decision, the results reveal that when Anglo-Saxon brands 
decide to use a hierarchical mode of expansion, upscale brands will be more likely to 
choose company ownership, compared to budget ones, while mid-market brands will be 
more likely to choose management contracts. As far as Latin-European brands are 
concerned, both mid-market and upscale brands are keener on using management 
contracts as opposed to company ownership, compared to their budget counterparts. 
Thus the market segment hypothesis is supported only as far as the first stage of the 
development decision is concerned. That is, market segment of operations is a 
significant factor for the expansion decision only as far as the choice between "market" 
and "hierarchy" is concerned. Overall, since market segment is found to be significant at 
the first stage, it can be argued that H7 is supported, since the main theoretical argument 
of TCE and AT refers to the different features between "market" and "hierarchy". 
" As for the country group of origin, the findings support the hypotheses that Anglo- 
Saxon brands are less likely to use a hierarchical mode and more likely to use 
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franchising, than their Latin-European counterparts, other things equal. More 
specifically, the odds of choosing a hierarchical mode of development over franchising 
are 38 times higher for a budget Spanish or French brand than it is for an American or 
English brand and even higher when mid-market brands are considered. 
" Finally, geographical concentration is found to be significant at the first stage of the 
modal choice; that is, when hotel companies decide whether franchising or "non- 
franchising" will be used for the development of a new hotel property, geographical 
concentration seems to favour the use of the former, contrary to what is suggested by the 
theoretical framework of this study. As it was argued in the previous chapter, where the 
results of the ordered model were presented, it could be the findings are biased by the 
fact that most franchised outlets in this sample are located in the U. S. where hotel 
properties are concentrated (many hotel properties per capita). 
Overall, the two-stage binary model (especially as fat as the first stage of the decision is 
concerned) provides similar results to those of the ordered model. In both cases the only 
country-specific hypothesis that is supported is the one that refers to the effect of country 
political and economic risk on the expansion decision. Regarding the firm-specific 
hypotheses, both models provide support for the effect of international experience and 
more importantly the effect of market segment and country group of origin. 
The most important additional information provided by the two-stage binary model is 
related to the fact that more hypotheses are confirmed at the first stage, compared to the 
second one, suggesting that transaction cost economics and agency theory provide a 
better explanation for the first stage of the corporate development decision (i. e. when the 
choice between "market" and hierarchy is made), than of the second stage (choice 
between "hierarchical" modes). This is actually a conclusion one would expect, since the 
contribution of transaction cost economics in the economic theory is based on the 
presentation and analysis of the features that distinguish "market" from "hierarchy" and 
their implications for the organisation. 
Table 8.16 presents the results of the two-stage model regarding the nine hypotheses of 
this study. The table is actually based on the findings of the first stage of the model, 
since, as already explained earlier in this section, this is actually the stage where the 
validity of TCE and AT is assessed. 
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Table 8.16: Summary of the results of the two-stage binary model 
H h ejected ypot eses Supported 
Significant Non-signi scant 
Negative correlation between political and  
economic risk and use of high control modes 
Positive correlation between legal risk and 
use of high control modes 
Negative correlation between the level of  
economic development of the target market 
and the propensity to use a high-control mode 
Negative correlation between hotel brand size  
and the proclivity to use a high control mode 
Negative correlation between hotel brand 
growth and the proclivity to use a high control  
mode 
Negative correlation between brand's int'l  
experience and the proclivity to use a high 
control mode 
Positive correlation between the market 
segment in which a hotel brand operates and  
the use of a high control mode 
Positive correlation between geographic 
concentration of hotel properties and the use 
 
of a high control mode 
Latin-European companies are more likely to 
use company ownership, while Anglo-Saxon 
 
are more likely to use a lower-control mode 
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CHAPTER 9: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
9.1 Introduction 
The current study examines the decision of international hotel companies to expand 
using "market" versus hierarchical modes of development. So far, there is only limited 
empirical evidence with respect to the entry mode or corporate development decision of 
service firms (Alon and McKee, 1999; Erramilli, 1990 and 1991; Erramilli and Rao, 
1990 and 1993; Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque 1995), while the studies that focus 
specifically on the hotel industry are even fewer (Contractor and Kundu, 1998a and 
1998b; Dunning and McQueen, 1982; Erramilli, Agarwal and Chev, 2002; Kehoe, 
1996). 
The development of a robust theoretical framework, combining both Transaction Cost 
Economics and Agency Theory, with respect to the expansion strategy of international 
hotel firms, was a primary objective of this study. As an extensive analysis in the 
literature review showed, TCE suggests that the international hotel company must trade- 
off the costs of proprietary knowledge leakage and free riding, as well as problems 
associated with tacit knowledge and information impactedness, against the benefits 
achieved by the use of the high-powered incentives of franchising. Agency Theory 
suggests that company ownership and management contracts are more likely to create 
moral hazard than franchising, and therefore incur high costs of monitoring agents' 
behaviour. However, while franchising will attenuate the moral hazard problem, it may 
create incentives for free riding by the franchisee. Which organisational mode the hotel 
company should choose for its expansion depends on the costs associated with each 
form. 
Management contracts and franchising agreements, although both contractual modes, are 
characterised by certain features that differentiate them and imply the need to treat each 
mode in a different way. Management contracts have certain characteristics that classify 
them towards the "hierarchical" mode of organisation, since the hotel operator maintains 
ownership of the intangibles, including transaction-specific assets, such as pre-opening 
costs as well as non-specific codified assets (e. g. computer reservation systems). Under 
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franchising the right to use these intangibles is acquired by the franchisee as part of the 
franchise "package". In that case the company retains control over the brand, while the 
franchisee is in charge of the daily operations, the human and codified assets and in most 
cases also the physical assets. Thus, franchising takes a form similar to subcontracting, 
which is an organisational form very close to the "market" one. 
In the following section, a summary of the study will be presented, including the main 
methodological issues, as well as the main findings. Subsequently, the validity of 
Transaction Cost Economics and Agency Theory regarding the corporate development 
decision will be discussed, followed by the contribution of this study to the previous 
knowledge as far as the entry mode and the expansion decision of international hotel 
firms are concerned. Finally, the limitations that were encountered during this study, 
along with the identification of areas of further research, will be presented in the last two 
sections of this chapter. 
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9.2 Summary of the study 
This study applied both TCE and AT in order to identify the factors that influence the 
expansion strategy of international hotel firms. In this section an overview of the present 
research study will be provided, with respect to the theories applied, the methodological 
issues of the study, as well as the findings that were revealed through the data analysis. 
9.2.1 Theoretical framework and methodological approach 
So far several theories have been applied by previous researchers, when examining the 
entry mode choice of international firms. Although both Organisational Capabilities 
Theory and Internalisation Theory are among the most commonly used, it was argued in 
the respective chapter (Chapter 3), that the former presents many similarities to 
Transaction Cost Economics and thus would not provide any additional explanation 
regarding the expansion decision, while the latter, although it provides a comprehensive 
explanation for the existence of the firm, its application in this study would require the 
treatment of management contracts as a non-equity, collaborative agreement, namely a 
"market" mode, rather than a "hierarchical" one. 
Drawing from both TCE and AT, several factors that may influence the expansion 
strategy of international hotel firms were identified and the respective hypotheses were 
formulated. Three of the hypotheses, the ones that refer to the influence of brand growth, 
proprietary knowledge (operationalised using the market segment where the brand 
operates) and country group of origin of the brand, have not been examined by previous 
studies in the hotel industry. 
A central issue regarding the hypotheses formulation is that franchising is considered as 
the "default" choice, i. e. the normally preferred option, since it represents the "market" 
mode. According to TCE, one needs to consider using a "hierarchy" mode only when the 
"market" mode of organisation becomes more costly to use (Williamson, 1985). 
As far as data analysis is concerned, two different approaches were followed and two 
different models were tested respectively. First, an ordered logit model was tested and 
subsequently a two-stage binary model was examined. In the first case it was assumed 
that international hotel companies develop their expansion strategy at a single stage, 
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where the choice is made among all the available alternatives (in the case of this study, 
company ownership, management contracts and franchise agreements). The ordered 
logit model was used instead of the multinomial logit one, since the latter would fail to 
account for the information conveyed by the ordinal nature of the data, and thus could 
not test for the hypothesis that the three development modes (franchising, management 
contracts and company ownership) constitute a set of increasing control modes. 
For the two-stage model to be applied, it was assumed that the expansion strategy is 
formulated in two consecutive stages: at the first stage, the hotel executives choose 
between high- and low- control modes, i. e. between franchising and "non-franchising" 
and at the second stage a choice is made between the two high-control modes, i. e. 
management contracts and company ownership, in cases where the low-control mode 
has been rejected at the first stage. 
An interesting point regarding both models is the introduction of interaction effects 
between certain independent variables. The first interaction effect examined whether 
there was a relationship between the politico-economic risk of a country and the brand 
size, while the second assessed whether the effect of market segment of operations is 
influenced by the country group of origin of the brand. 
9.2.2 Main findings of the study 
When the one-stage ordered model was employed, five out of the nine hypotheses were 
supported. More specifically, the results revealed that there is indeed a positive 
relationship between country politico-economic risk and the use of lower control 
modes, that is, franchising will be the preferred option in high-risk countries. Hence, 
support is provided for the hypothesis that in markets characterised by a high degree of 
political and economic instability, hotel firms would be more likely to opt for a lower 
resource commitment organisational mode of development, which would allow for 
lower switching costs and less volatile rents in the presence of undesirable situations. 
The findings are consistent with what previous studies in the hotel industry proposed 
(Contractor and Kundu, 1998a and 1998b; Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque, 1995). 
The rest of the location (country) - specific hypotheses were not supported by the results 
of the one-stage analysis. Legal risk was not found to be a significant factor in 
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determining the expansion strategy, although the reason for the finding might have been 
the use of a proxy that cannot actually capture the effect of legal risk. (It has to be noted 
at this stage, that in the context of this study, legal risk refers to both local regulations 
and policies regarding trademark and intellectual property rights protection, as well as to 
court enforcement and thus the number of patents filed in each country were used to 
measure the legal protection of intellectual property. It could be argued that the fact that 
numerous patents are filed in a country indicates confidence regarding patent protection 
and thus confidence regarding intellectual knowledge protection in general. ) 
The level of economic development on the other hand, was found to influence the 
modal choice but in the opposite than expected direction. Yet, the effect of this variable 
was found to be very weak and could have occurred due to the fact the majority of the 
observations in this study refer to developed countries. 
The results of the study indicate that the firm-specific variables are more important 
determinants of the corporate development decision than country specific variables, 
since four out of the six firm-specific hypotheses were confirmed. More specifically, the 
results support the hypothesis according to which hotel brands with more international 
experience tend to favour the use of franchising, rather than the use of higher-control 
modes, contrary to the results of previous studies in the manufacturing, as well as the 
hotel industry. Indeed, a hotel company with limited international experience may find it 
more difficult to attract and select qualified agents (i. e. franchisees), as well as to assess 
their performance, than to employ staff and monitor their effort, and therefore may 
prefer to opt for a more hierarchical (high-control) mode. 
Brand size was found to have an opposite than hypothesised but again very weak effect 
on the modal choice, while brand growth was found to have mixed effects on the 
choice. Hotel brands with medium annual growth rate (i. e. growth rate between 1 and 
2.5 percent) were found to expand using more franchising compared to hotel brands with 
growth rate less than 1 percent, while the opposite is true for hotel brands with very high 
growth rates (i. e. annual rate higher than 9 percent). Thus, the results of the study could 
not lead to a solid conclusion with respect to the effect of brand growth on the corporate 
development decision. It could be that both FSIZE and FGR have a curvilinear effect on 
the choice, in line with the suggestion of Shane (1998). 
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The most valuable findings revealed in this study refer to the importance of proprietary 
knowledge (market segment of operation) on the expansion strategy of international 
hotel firms. The findings provided support that in higher market segments of operation 
(upscale and luxury segments), it is more likely that a high-control mode of development 
will be preferred (as opposed to franchising). Hence, the results are in line with the main 
transaction cost argument, that upscale hotel brands would expand using a hierarchical 
mode. The services provided by upscale and luxury brands require specialised 
knowledge and managerial expertise both of which are associated with high levels of 
human asset specificity and information impactedness, a situation that favours the use of 
high-control modes. 
As for the effect of geographic concentration on the choice of organisational mode of a 
new hotel property, it was not supported by the results of the ordered model. Although 
most of the previous studies confirm the agency theoretic arguments regarding the effect 
of monitoring costs on the choice between franchising and company ownership, in the 
current study the results indicated that the more dispersed the hotel properties in a 
particular country, the more likely it is that a hierarchical mode will be chosen over 
franchising. As already explained, this unexpected finding may have been the result of 
the use of a proxy that could not capture the effect of geographical dispersion on the 
modal choice. An alternative explanation would be related to the sample structure, 
namely the fact that most franchised outlets in the sample are located in the U. S., a 
country where the number of hotels per capita (GDSPRS index) is high. That is, in the 
country where the majority of the franchised hotels of this sample are located, there are 
high levels of both geographic concentration and the use of franchising. This "US effect" 
may have biased the results of the study. 
Finally, with respect to the country group of origin, the findings indicate that Anglo- 
Saxon brands are less likely to use company ownership and more likely to use 
franchising, than their Latin-European counterparts, but only in the budget segment. 
Hence, the results are in line with the hypothesis that American and British hotel 
companies, which are more familiar with the use of low-control modes, are less willing 
to invest equity capital for their expansion, while for French and Spanish companies 
high control is still associated with equity participation, rather than with management 
contracts. 
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It could be that Anglo-Saxon firms are more aware of the value of their intangible assets, 
since they have stronger brand recognition, compared to the brand name of the Latin- 
European companies, and thus they employ an aggressive, rather than a defensive use of 
their properties by splitting the real-estate from the management business. Marriott and 
Hyatt are two sound examples of U. S. -originated companies that have realised the 
potential benefits of separating ownership from control. 
One could argue that Accor brands, such as Sofitel, Novotel and This have also gained 
strong brand names during the last couple of decades in the international arena. Yet, it 
appears that the Accor management follow the same strategy for both its upscale and its 
budget brands, trying to develop as many hotel operations possible through owning the 
properties. It seems they feel they need to defend the economic rents from their 
intangible assets by owning the properties. The desire of Latin-European companies to 
own and manage the hotel properties is an area that needs further examination, as it will 
be pinpointed later on, in the relevant section of this chapter. 
The application of the two-stage model provided similar results to those of the ordered 
model. It has to be noted here, that the comparison of the findings between the two 
models, actually refers to the ordered model and the first stage of the two-stage binary 
model. Indeed, as already explained in the previous chapter (Ch. 8), it is at the first, 
rather than the second stage, where the validity of the theoretical framework of this 
study is evaluated, since at the first stage the choice between "market" modes and 
hierarchical modes is examined (franchising vs. "non-franchising"). 
As far as the results of the two stage model are concerned, the only country-specific 
hypothesis supported by the data analysis was the one that tested the effect of politico- 
economic risk on the choice between franchising and "non-franchising". Regarding the 
firm-specific ones, the findings provided support for the influence of international 
experience, market segment of operation and country group of origin, while the effect of 
brand growth was partly confirmed. 
The most interesting result of the two-stage model is related to the importance of the 1St 
stage of the decision, namely the stage where the hotel company decides between the use 
of a low- versus a high-control mode of expansion (i. e. franchising versus "non- 
franchising"). While the 2nd stage binary model provides satisfactory goodness-of-fit, 
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only 25 % of the variation in the choice between company ownership and management 
contracts is explained by the explanatory variables, and thus it can be concluded that the 
influence of the examined factors on the choice between those two organisational modes 
is of only limited importance in this decision by international hotel companies. 
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9.3 Validity of the theoretical framework 
The power of Transaction Cost Economics and Agency Theory to predict the expansion 
strategy of international hotel firms is supported by the empirical results of this study. 
More specifically, this study provides clear empirical evidence that the degree of 
proprietary content and idiosyncratic knowledge embedded in the service provided by 
the hotel company is one of the most important factors to define international hotel 
expansion strategy. The higher the market segment of operation, the higher the 
specialised skills and managerial expertise required in order for the developed hotel to 
operate according to standards, the more likely it is that a hierarchical mode will be 
applied for the development of the property. 
In addition, it is suggested that hotel brands originating from Latin-European countries, 
(in the present study Spain and France), are on average more inclined to use higher- 
control modes of development than brands originating from Anglo-Saxon countries (in 
this study North America or England). However, when the effect of market segment is 
combined with the effect of country group of origin it is revealed that this is the case 
only as far as budget brands are concerned. 
This is actually an issue that requires further examination: why would a budget hotel 
brand choose to expand using company ownership, since the service provided by budget 
brands is easy to document and to transfer from the franchisor to the potential franchisee 
through operating manuals and staff training at a low marginal cost? As already 
explained in previous chapters, the only Latin-European budget brand in the sample is 
Ibis (an Accor brand), and thus the corporate development decision of budget Latin- 
European brands in the sample is totally influenced by the expansion strategy of Accor. 
Nevertheless, one would be interested in finding out why this international hotel 
company would choose to expand its most popular budget brand, i. e. Ibis Hotels, using 
company-owned outlets. 
In theory there are two possible reasons why a company would prefer to acquire 
properties instead of signing a management or franchise contract. The first comes from 
the area of financial management and refers to the expectation that the property market 
will go up and thus the hotel company will gain value. Hence, it could be that the Accor 
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management expects that the property market in France and in certain other countries 
where they own the hotels will be go up and the company's assets will benefit from that 
development in the future. 
The second reason why a company like Accor would choose company ownership for the 
expansion of its budget brands comes from the marketing area. More specifically, 
owning a brand allows a company to better exploit the monopoly rents of the property, 
rather than when renting it to others through a management contract or when signing a 
franchise agreement, because a budget brand that is not well-known cannot attract 
franchisees. French budget brands, like Ibis, do not have such a strong brand name and 
recognition outside France, as the North American and British brands (e. g. Holiday Inn 
Express, Days Inn and Howard Johnson), and thus French hotel firms may find it 
difficult to attract franchisees that would agree with the required revenue structure. 
Expansion by purchase may also have the effect of increasing the property portfolio 
even if the ultimate aim is to sell the outlets to franchisees. 
The issue of brand strength and its importance for the choice among alternatives modes 
of expansion is something that cannot be tested using secondary data. Thus in the 
context of this study it was not possible to test whether the brand strength of Anglo- 
Saxon as opposed to Latin-European brands have influenced their expansion decisions. 
The appropriate method to test an issue like that would have been the collection of 
primary data and the application of a case study method, which would reveal more in- 
depth information regarding the effect of brand strength and could lead to valuable 
conclusions in that area. 
A comparison between the one-stage and the two-stage model reveals that, contrary to 
what was found by Gatignon and Anderson (1988) in their study in the manufacturing 
industry, the expansion strategy in the hotel industry does not clearly appear to be a two- 
stage, rather than a one-stage, process. The theoretical model based on Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE) and Agency Theory (AT) did not provide a better explanation for the 
corporate development decision, when that decision was modelled in two stages. 
Hence, one could conclude that from a TCE and AT perspective, company ownership 
and management contracts are more like two alternatives modes of development; that is, 
there may be no obvious TCE or AT factors that would favour the use of management 
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contracts over company ownership. A possible explanation for the inability of the 
second stage analysis to provide a solid explanation for the choice between management 
contracts and company ownership may be the choice of independent variables that have 
been included in the model. The assessment of the strategic choice between the two 
hierarchical modes of expansion may require different explanatory variables from those 
used to explain the choice between market and hierarchical modes. 
Hence, no evidence was found to support that when a hotel company decides to develop 
a new hotel property, the choice of organisational mode to be applied is made in two 
consecutive steps. In other words, it appears that the company may well consider all the 
alternative modes (company ownership, management contracts and franchising) and 
decide which one to apply for the development of the new outlet according the specific 
circumstances in the target country and the characteristics of the hotel brand. 
However, although there is no evidence to support the prevalence of the two-stage model 
over the one-stage, it has to be noted that the first stage of the two-stage model was 
found to provide more support on the theoretical framework of this study that the one- 
stage ordered model. Thus, it could be that the most important decision the hotel 
executives make regarding the expansion of their hotel brands refers to the choice 
between "market" and hierarchical modes. 
The results of the previous chapters (Ch. 7 and 8) reveal that TCE and AT explain nearly 
70% of the choice between franchising and "non-franchising" (first stage of the two- 
stage model), whereas at the one-stage ordered model they explain only 50% of the 
choice among the three expansion modes. Yet, the second stage of the two-stage model 
is considerable less helpful in explaining the choice between the two hierarchical modes, 
i. e. management contracts and company ownership, since it explains only 20% of the 
variation. There is obviously a reason why this is the case: TCE and AT may not be 
capable to distinguish between the hierarchical modes, namely the theoretical foundation 
of transaction costs and agency theory cannot provide sufficient reasoning why a 
hierarchical mode would be superior to another hierarchical mode. 
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9.4 Main contribution of the study 
This study makes an important contribution in the existing literature both conceptually 
and methodologically. In fact, this is the first study to argue that management contracts, 
although a non-equity40 mode of organisation, should be viewed as a more hierarchical 
form of organisation and to provide empirical support for that statement. Previous 
research considered franchising and management contracts as two alternative forms of 
contractual agreements that both lie towards the "market" mode of organisation, whereas 
an application of transaction cost theory supports the view that management contracts is 
a "hybrid" mode that should be placed further towards the "hierarchy" end. 
Both the theoretical framework and the empirical evidence support the main argument of 
this study with respect to the differences that exist between franchising and management 
contracts. Indeed, the results of the ordered model and the first stage binary model 
suggest that franchising is chosen in different situations than management contracts. 
Hence, although there are similarities between franchising and management contracts, 
the distinguishing features are strong enough to justify a different evaluation and 
treatment. 
Furthermore, what is being examined in this study is the expansion strategy of 
international hotel firms, rather than the decision to enter new markets. Consequently, no 
distinction is made between home and foreign countries. It is argued in the context of 
this study, that truly multinational companies do not have a "home" country. This is 
especially true when the hotel industry is under examination. Most of the international 
hotel brands change ownership fairly easily and in short periods of time and develop 
their hotel portfolios under different company profiles and corporate cultures. 
A final conceptual contribution of this study refers to the use of explanatory variables 
that have not been tested before in the hotel industry (not even in the service sector in 
general). Brand growth was one of these variables. Although the effect of firm growth 
has been tested in the manufacturing industry, this is not the case as far as the hotel 
industry is concerned. Unfortunately, the results of the data analysis could not provide 
40 Management contracts nowadays may require an equity investment on behalf of the international 
company, yet the proportion in the total equity is quite small and refers usually to pre-opening expenses. 
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clear evidence to support the effect of brand growth on the expansion strategy of 
international hotel companies. 
Country group of origin of the brand is another variable that was introduced by this 
study. Previous studies were focused on the effect of cultural distance between the home 
country and the country where a new outlet was going to be developed, however most of 
them could not provide empirical evidence to support their hypotheses. None of the 
studies so far, has included any proposition or evidence regarding how the country of 
origin of an international hotel company influences its entry mode or expansion 
decision. Is it possible that a hotel brand that has originated from the U. S., the pioneer 
country in the application of franchising, would be more inclined to use this mode 
compared to hotel brands that have originated from other countries, such as the Latin- 
European ones? The results of this study provide empirical support for the importance of 
this variable in the corporate development of international hotel firms. 
Most importantly, this study is the first to test the effect of market segment of operations 
on the expansion strategy (or entry mode choice). This is a vital contribution of the 
present study, considering that market segment represents the level of proprietary 
content (tacit knowledge) and asset specificity, dimensions that are crucial in every 
study that applies the transaction cost theory. The results of the data analysis support the 
suggestion that the degree of proprietary content and idiosyncratic or tacit knowledge 
embedded in the service provided by the hotel company is one of the most important 
factors to define international hotel expansion strategy both in the one-stage and the two- 
stage approach. Indeed, the higher the market segment of operation, the higher the 
specialised skills and managerial expertise required in order for the developed hotel to 
operate according to standards, therefore the more likely that a hierarchical mode will be 
applied for the development of the property. 
In addition, this study makes the following two methodological contributions in the area 
of entry mode and corporate development analysis. First, it introduces interaction effects 
between certain explanatory variables. Erramilli and Rao (1993) were the first to 
recognise that possible interactions between explanatory variables may influence the 
initial effect individual variables have on the modal choice. This study is the first study 
in the hotel industry that examines interactions between the effect of (i) brand size and 
country politico-economic risk and (ii) market segment and country group of origin, on 
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the expansion decision. In both cases it was found that when the interaction terms are 
introduced in the model, there is a different effect of the explanatory variables on the 
development decision. 
Last but not least, this study is the first to apply a two-stage analysis in the examination 
of corporate strategy in the hotel industry. There is no study so far in the service sector 
to propose a two-stage model for the entry mode or expansion strategy of service firms. 
Although the results of the data analysis do not support the application of a two-stage 
process in the strategic choice of hotel companies, it provides some evidence suggesting 
the treatment of management contracts as a "hierarchical" mode of development. That is, 
it is recognised that the vital decision for the hotel companies is whether to employ a 
"market" as opposed to a hierarchical mode of development. If the hierarchical mode has 
been chosen, then the choice between a management agreement and company ownership 
is of less importance from a TCE/AT perspective. 
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9.5 Limitations 
Transaction Cost Economics and Agency Theory provide an appropriate framework for 
understanding the way in which an international hotel company makes decisions 
regarding its mode of corporate development. However, expansion in a new market 
depends not only on the international hotel firm's preferences, but also on the strategic 
choices of the second party in the transaction, i. e. the potential franchisee or property 
owner. Yet, in the context of this study it has not been possible to incorporate in the 
analysis the preferences of the second party, and thus their influence on the mode of 
expansion had to be disregarded. 
The examination of the effect the second party would have in the expansion strategies of 
international hotel firms would require a different research design altogether, maybe in 
the form of a case study approach. Yet, the distance between the researcher's residence 
and the international companies' headquarters rendered this type of research impossible, 
due to high financial and time constraints. Moreover, hotel companies consider such data 
as highly confidential and would it have been extremely difficult to get access to their 
database. 
In addition, the simultaneous analysis of both contracting parties in the transaction (i. e. 
the hotel company and the property owner/potential franchisee) would probably require 
a different theoretical approach as well. Thus, for example, a game theoretic approach 
would be more appropriate, which requires different theoretical background and 
qualifications with respect to the researcher, suggesting that this could have been a 
research topic for other researchers in more economics-oriented disciplines. 
Another limitation of this analysis refers to the implicit assumption that the decision to 
develop a new property in a particular market has already been made. Thus, no possible 
interactions between the decision to expand and modes of development have been 
considered. Moreover, it is assumed that the hotel company, having decided to undertake 
new operations in a given market, has a certain range of choices. This ignores possible 
government restrictions or governmental policies that make certain modes more 
desirable. 
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Perhaps the most troubling limitation is caused by the composition of the sample. 
Although most of the data were obtained from secondary sources, the information 
regarding the mode of operation of the examined outlets had to be provided by the hotel 
companies. Non-random sampling became a necessity since the research was restricted 
to hotel brands that agreed to provide the relevant information. For example, Ibis is the 
only budget Latin-European brand in the sample, and American brands represent 90 
percent of the franchised hotels. Thus, the results may not be as representative as they 
would have been if more companies had been included in the study. 
One final limitation refers to the use of proxies to measure some of the explanatory 
variables. Although similar proxies have been used in the past by recognised researchers, 
they do not necessarily constitute valid measures. Among those, the proxy that has been 
used to assess the effect of geographical dispersion is the most worrying. An effort was 
made for the development of a more appropriate measure, compared to the ones used in 
previous studies; however, this measure was far from ideal in terms of reflecting the 
effect that monitoring costs may have on the development choice. 
A more appropriate measure would have been, for example, the average distance among 
all the hotel properties in a country or in certain regions around the world (e. g. North- 
America, Europe, Southeast Asia). Yet, the application of such a measure would require 
the availability of specific data on every hotel property in each company's system, not 
only data on the hotels that started their operation within the examination period (1998- 
2000). Unfortunately, this level of information would not have been possible to obtain. 
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9.6 The way forward 
As already explained in the previous section, this study examines the expansion strategy 
of international hotel firms, taking into consideration only the strategic choice of the 
hotel company that seeks to develop new operations and ignoring the preferences and 
the availability of potential hotel owners and investors. An interesting area of analysis 
would be the identification of variables that affect the choice of impendent hotel owners 
and franchisees to co-operate with an international hotel company. For this research to 
be undertaken, a completely different research methodology would be required. A 
possible approach would be the application of case study analysis, where each company 
would be one case study, where the researcher would identify how the hotel companies 
approach or are being contacted by potential franchisees/hotel owners and what 
difficulties they face when they attempt to employ the preferred strategy. One could also 
conduct a survey of current franchisees and property owners that have entered a 
management contract with an international hotel company, in order to examine the 
factors that influence their choice to co-operate with a particular hotel company under a 
certain organisational mode. 
Furthermore, one could try to improve the sample of the study, in order to get findings 
that would be more representative of the hotel population. Additional observations could 
include either more hotel brands (and outlets) for the same time period, i. e. improved 
cross-sectional data, or data on new hotel developments that took place within a longer 
time frame (i. e. longitudinal data). 
In addition, more interaction effects, between country-specific and firm-specific 
variables could be incorporated in the sample. The results of this study indicated that the 
higher the country risk, the more likely it is that franchising will be the preferred mode 
of development. On the other hand, it was found that upscale and luxury brands favour 
the use of hierarchical modes, such as company ownership and management contracts. 
What would be the effect on the modal choice if an upscale brand would like to develop 
new operations in a high-risk country? The introduction of interaction terms between 
two individual explanatory variables would provide unique results regarding the 
simultaneous effect of those variables on the expansion strategy of international hotel 
firms. 
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The results of the last hypothesis that examines the effect of the country group of origin 
on the modal choice revealed that there is some kind of cultural effect that needs to be 
examined in a more systematic way. More specifically, during the data inspection it 
became apparent that Spanish and French companies were more inclined in using 
company ownership for their budget brands, compared to American and British 
companies, who favoured the use of franchising. It would be quite interesting for future 
researchers to set up a study that would examine this issue in more detail, maybe in a 
form of a more qualitative analysis, for example application of a case study that would 
compare the strategy of an established U. S. -originated budget brand, like Holiday Inn 
Express, and a French-originated budget brand, like Ibis. A study like that could reveal 
areas of concern for the hotel companies that have not yet been incorporated in any 
theoretical analysis. 
Finally, one could apply a theoretical framework, similar to the one developed in the 
context of this study, for the examination of the expansion strategies that are followed in 
different service sectors. One could then identify areas where hotel companies present 
similarities to companies from other service sectors and areas that suggest there are 
significant differences between hotel firms and other service companies. 
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APPENDIX 1 
September 9,2004 
Ms. 
Director International Hotel Development Planning 
Marriott Hotels & Resorts 
Bowater House West, 
114 Knightsbridge 
London SW1X 7XH 
Subject: Research on International Hotel Co orate Development 
Dear Ms. 
I got your name and contact details from Mr. Nihal Sirisena, with whom I am currently working on 
a case study regarding hotel development. He advised me to contact you regarding a request for 
information on your brand. I am a researcher at the University of Surrey, School of Management 
Studies for the Service Sector, and we are working on a project regarding corporate development of 
international hotel companies. We are particularly interested in the factors that influence the choice 
of hotel firms between management contracts and franchise agreements for new hotel development. 
So far there has been only a very limited research on this subject, and thus we believe that our study 
will shed some important light on expansion decision-making. 
The empirical part of this study will be conducted using published data for the most part. However, 
some of the information required for our study is not available from published sources. It would be 
invaluable for this research if you or a colleague were able to find the time to provide us with the 
information presented on the next page. If you are able to do this, please return the attached sheets 
duly completed to the address above. Alternatively, if you have the same information in any other 
form (hard copy or electronic), would you kindly just mail or e-mail it to us? 
Your help would be very much appreciated. If you are able to do assist us, we will be happy to send 
you a summary of our fmdings. 
We would like to assure you that all the data you provide will be treated as strictly confidential, and 
the name of the company or brand will not be mentioned in any of our published material. 
If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
With many thanks for your help, in anticipation, 
Sincerely, 
Irini Dimou 
PhD Researcher 
Email: I. Dimou@surrey. ac. uk 
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REQUIRED INFORMATION REGARDING 
MARRIOTT HOTELS & RESORTS 
1. Are there any companies that operate as Marriott's franchisees in certain areas? If yes, 
please state where those companies are based and for which areas they are 
responsible. 
2. When did Marriott first operate outside USA? 
3. The following list presents the new hotel developments for Marriott Hotels & Resorts 
in the period between mid-1998 and March 2001, as derived from the comparison of 
two editions of International Hotel Directory (Travel and Tourism Intelligence, 1998 
and 2001). (New developments include existing properties that have become part of 
your system during that period. ) Could you please indicate for each new hotel 
property the organisational mode under which it operates? Please give F for the 
outlets that operate under a franchise agreement (where Marriott is the franchisor), 
MC for outlets under management contract (i. e. Marriott is the operating company) 
and CO for company ownership (including leased properties), where Marriott is both 
owner (or lessee) and manager. For countries with more than one new development 
please indicate how many hotels operate under each mode, e. g., China: 2 CO, 1 MC. 
For the new developments in Canada please indicate how many operate under each 
mode, in each province, e. g., Ontario: 1 MC, 2 CO. 
(If the information exists in a hard copy or electronic form, we will be happy to complete 
the tables below ourselves if you kindly send us the information. ) 
COUNTRY 
Canada (6) 
Chile (1) 
China (3) 
Czech Republic (1) 
Costa Rica (1) 
Ecuador (1) 
ORGANISATIONAL 
MODE 
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El Salvador (1) 
France (1) 
Germany (2) 
India (1) 
Israel (1) 
Italy (1) 
Japan (1) 
Mexico (1) 
Netherland Antilles (1) 
Panama (1) 
Peru (1) 
Qatar (1) 
Romania (1) 
Russia (2) 
South Korea (2) 
Spain (1) 
UK (11) 
Vietnam (1) 
247 
REQUIRED INFORMATION REGARDING RENAISSANCE HOTELS 
1. Are there any companies that operate as Renaissance's master franchisees in certain 
areas? If yes, please state where those companies are based and for which areas they 
are responsible. 
2. When did Renaissance first operate outside the USA? 
3. The following list presents the new hotel developments for Renaissance in the period 
between mid-1998 and March 2001, as derived from the comparison of two editions 
of International Hotel Directory (Travel and Tourism Intelligence, 1998 and 2001). 
(New developments include existing properties that have become part of your system 
during that period. ) Could you please indicate for each new hotel property the 
organisational mode under which it operates? Please give F for the outlets that operate 
under a franchise agreement (where Renaissance is the franchisor), MC for outlets 
under management contract (i. e. Renaissance is the operating company) and CO for 
company ownership (including leased properties), where Renaissance is both owner 
(or lessee) and manager. For countries with more than one new development please 
indicate how many hotels operate under each mode, e. g., UK: 2 CO, 2 MC. For the 
new developments in the US please indicate how many operate under each mode, in 
each state (or region), e. g., California: 1 MC, 2 CO. 
(If the information exists in a hard copy or electronic form, we will be happy to complete 
the tables below ourselves if you kindly send us the information. ) 
COUNTRY 
Brazil (1) 
Canada (1) 
China (1) 
India (1) 
Israel (1) 
Turkey (2) 
UK (4) 
USA (11) 
ORGANISATIONAL MODE 
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REQUIRED INFORMATION REGARDING RAMADA INTERNATIONAL 
1. Could you also give us the following information regarding Ramada 's master 
franchisees: where are those companies based and for which areas they are 
responsible? 
2. The following list presents the new hotel developments for Ramada International in 
the period between mid-1998 and March 2001, as derived from the comparison of the 
two editions of International Hotel Directory (Travel and Tourism Intelligence, 1998 
and 2001) and from the company's website. (New developments include existing 
properties that have become part of your system during that period. ) Could you please 
indicate for each new hotel property the organisational mode under which it operates? 
Please give F for the outlets that operate under a franchise agreement (where Ramada 
is the franchisor), MC for outlets under management contract (i. e. Ramada is the 
operating company) and CO for company ownership (including leased properties), 
where Ramada is both owner (or lessee) and manager. For countries with more than 
one new development please indicate how many hotels operate under each mode, e. g., 
China: 2 CO, 2 MC. 
(If the information exists in a hard copy or electronic form, we will be happy to complete 
the tables below ourselves if you kindly send us the information. ) 
COUNTRY 
China (4) 
Indonesia (1) 
Qatar (1) 
Switzerland (2) 
ORGANISATIONAL MODE 
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REQUIRED INFORMATION REGARDING RITZ-CARLTON HOTELS 
1. When did Ritz-Carlton first operate outside USA? 
2. The following list presents the new hotel developments for Ritz-Cartlon in the period 
between mid-1998 and March 2001, as derived from the comparison of the two 
editions of International Hotel Directory (Travel and Tourism Intelligence, 1998 and 
2001) and from the company's website. (New developments include existing 
properties that have become part of your system during that period. ) Could you please 
indicate for each new hotel property the organisational mode under which it operates? 
Please MC for outlets under management contract (i. e. Ritz-Cartlon is the operating 
company) and CO for company ownership (including leased properties), where Ritz- 
Cartlon is both owner (or lessee) and manager. (For countries with more than one new 
development please indicate how many hotels operate under each mode, e. g., 
Germany: 1 CO, 1 MC. ) 
COUNTRY 
Egypt (1) 
Germany (2) 
Jamaica (1) 
Japan (1) 
USA (1) 
ORGANISATIONAL MODE 
250 
REQUIRED INFORMATION REGARDING COURTYARD HOTELS 
1. Are there any companies that operate as Courtyard's master franchisees in certain 
areas? If yes, please state where those companies are based and for which areas they 
are responsible. 
2. When did Courtyard first operate outside the US? 
3. The following list presents the new hotel developments for Courtyard in the period 
between mid-1998 and March 2001, as derived from the comparison of two editions 
of International Hotel Directory (Travel and Tourism Intelligence, 1998 and 2001). 
(New developments include existing properties that have become part of your system 
during that period. ) Could you please indicate for each new hotel property the 
organisational mode under which it operates? Please give F for the outlets that operate 
under a franchise agreement (where Courtyard is the franchisor), MC for outlets under 
management contract (i. e. Courtyard is the operating company) and CO for company 
ownership (including leased properties), where Courtyard is both owner (or lessee) 
and manager. For countries with more than one new development please indicate how 
many hotels operate under each mode, e. g., Germany: 2 CO, 1 F. For the new 
developments in the US and Canada please indicate how many operate under each 
mode, in each state (or region), and for Canada in each province, e. g., California: 1 
MC, 2 CO, Ontario: IF, 1 CO 
(If the information exists in a hard copy or electronic form, we will be happy to complete 
the tables below ourselves if you kindly send us the information. ) 
COUNTRY ORGANISATIONAL 
MODE 
Argentina (1) 
Australia (1) 
Austria (1) 
Canada (3) 
Germany (3) 
Mexico (1) 
USA (78) 
1 
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APPENDIX 2 
THE COMPOSITE RISK RATING 
The method of calculating the Composite Political, Financial, and Economic Risk Rating 
remains unchanged. The political risk rating contributes 50% of the composite rating, while the financial and economic risk ratings each contribute 25%. 
The following formula is used to calculate the aggregate political, financial and economic risk: 
CPFER (country X) = 0.5 (PR + FR + ER) 
where 
CPFER = Composite political, financial and economic risk ratings 
PR = Total political risk indicators 
FR = Total financial risk indicators 
ER = Total economic risk indicators 
The highest overall rating (theoretically 100) indicates the lowest risk, and the lowest rating 
(theoretically zero) indicates the highest risk. 
As a general guide to grouping countries on the basis of comparable risk, the individual risk of 
individual countries can be estimated using the following fairly broad categories of Composite 
Risk. 
Very High Risk 00.0 to 49.5 points 
High Risk 50.0 to 59.5 points 
Moderate Risk 60.0 to 69.5 points 
Low risk 70.0 to 79.5 points 
Very Low Risk 80.0 to 100 points 
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APPENDIX 3: E-VIEWS OUTPUT - ORDERED MODEL 
ORDERED MODEL - ORIGINAL SPECIFICATION 
Dependent Variable: OM 
Method: ML - Ordered Logit 
Sample: 1487 ---- -- --; - -- ý 
Included observations: 487 
Number of ordered indicator values :3 
Convergence achieved after 11 iterations 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. Antilog (ß) 
ICRGD2 0,326868 0,419019 0,78008 0,4353 1,3866 
ICRGD3 -0,171659 0,528723 -0,324666! 0,7454' 0,8423 
LEGRSK 0,003560 0,010455 0,340523 0,7335 1,0036 
GDP 0,000019 2,10E-05 0,883924 0,3767 1,0000 
FSIZE 0,000005 2,58E-06 1,900639 0,0573 1,0000 
FGR2 -0,303993 0,577711 -0,526203 0,5987 0,7379 
FGR3 1,068209 0,488364 2,187321 090287' 2,9102 
FGR4 0,853355 0,547907 1,55748 0,1194 2,3475 
INTEXPY -0,011450 0,013346 -0,857929 0,3909 0,9886 
DHOTELS -1,405234 0,289238 -4,858391 0,000 0,2453 
MIDMKT 0,286917 0,478981 0,599015 
_0,5492 
1,3323 
UPLUX 2,658030 0,436223 6,093286 0,0000 14,2682 
LATEUROP 3,285711 0,454182 7,234347 0,0000v 26,7280 
RMS 0,002435 0,000904 29694397 0,0071 1,0024 
C_ORIG -0,015563 0,46907 -0,033179 0,9735 0,9846 
Limit P oints 
LIMIT I: C(l6) 29376145 0,79068 3,005193 
__0,0027-, LIMIT 2: C(17) 5,795852 0,840003 6,899799 0,0000 
Akaike info criterion 1,127827 Schwarz criterion 1,274030 
Log likelihood -257,626 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1,185261 
Restr. log likelihood -468,5888 Avg. log likelihood - --0,529006 LR statistic (15 df) 421,9256 LR index (Pseudo-R2) _ 
0,4502091 
Probability(LR stat) 0,00000 
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ORDERED MODEL - EXTENDED 
Omitted Variables: MM LATEU UP L ATEU CRD2 FS CRD3 FS 
Log likelihood ratio 56,94034 Probabilit y 
-0,00000 
Dependent Variable: OM 
Method: ML - Ordered Logit 
Sample: 1 487 
Included observations: 487 
Number of ordered indicator values: 3 
Convergence achieved after 12 iterations 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. Antilog P 
ICRGD2 
ICRGD3 
1,27599 
0,61064 
0,55828 
0,66616 
2,28559 
0,91666 
0,02230 3,58224 
0,35930 1,84160 
LEGRSK 
GDP 
-0,00799 
0,00005 
0,01196 
0,00002 
-0,66816 0,50400 0,99204 
2,27471 0,02290 ; 1,00005 
FSIZE 0,00001 0,00000 3,63880 0,00030 1,00001 
` FGR2 -0,64204 0,63516 -1,01082 0,31210+ 0,52622 
FGR3 
FGR4 
0,40120 
1,06882 
0,54727 
0,58622 
0,73309 
1,82326 
0,46350 1,49361 
0,06830 2,91194 
INTEXPY -0,02177 0,01469 -1,48205 0,13830 0,97847 
DHOTELS -0,69914 0,30014 -2,32941 0,01980.0,49701 
MIDMKT 1,13288 0,79487 1,42524 0,15410 3,10458 
UPLUX 5,17261 0,62340 8,29748 0,00000 176,37369 
LATEUROP 7,02209 0,83690 8,39058 0,00000! 1121,13181 
RMS 0,00178 0,00094 1,90894 0,05630,1,00179 
CORIG 
MMLATEU 
UP_LATEU 
1,03363 
_2559042 
-6,33254 
0,50620 
1,09242 
1,03338 
2,04196 
-2,37126 
-6,12802 
0,0412.0 2,81126 
0,07499 0,017_70 
0,00000 0,00178 
CRD2FS -0,00001 0,00000 -3,63024 0,00030 0,99999 
CRD3 FS -0,00001 0,00000 -2,50790 0,01210" 0,99999 
Limit Points 
LIMIT 1: C(20) 
_ 
5,32183 0,99070 5,37176 0,00000 
- 
000 
LIMIT 2: C(21) 9,16898 1,07868 8,50020 0,00000' 
Akaike info criterion 1902733 Schwarz criterion 
1,20794Y 
Log likelihood -229,15580 Hannan-Quinn criter. 
1,09828 
' 
Restr. log likelihood -468,58880 _ 
Avg. log likelihood -0,47055 
LR statistic (19 df) 478,86590 LR 
index (Pseudo-R2) 0,51097 
stat) 0,00000 , 00000 
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ORDERED MODEL - REDUCED 
1 
Redundant Variables: ICRGD3 LEGRSK FGR3 
Log likelihood ratio 
Dependent Variable: 
1,664808 
OM 
I Method` ML - Ordered Logit 
Sample: 1 487 
Included observations: 487 
Probability 
-- I 
Number of ordered indicator values: 3 
Convergence achieved after 12 iterations 
Covariance matrix computed using second der ivatives 
ICRGD2 
GDP 
FSIZE 
FGR2 
FGR4 
INTEXPY 
DHOTELS 
MIDMKT 
UPLUX 
LATEUROP 
RMS 
C OBIG 
MM LATEU 
UP LATEU 
CRD2_FS 
CRD3_FS 
Coefficient Std. Error ' z-Statistic Prob. 
0.987329 
0, oo00sg 
0,0000 l3 
-1.003685 
0,765652 
-0,022571 
-0,729119 
1,260844 
5,270935 
7,123136 
0.001834 
0,983572 
-2,848107 
-6,449921 
-0,000012 
-0,000009 
0,423213 
0,000018 
0,000004 
0,426778 
0,386421 
0,014455 
0,299672 
0,776667 
0,587250 
0,797412 
0,000928 
0,464781 
1,07E+00 
9,98E-01 
3,44E-06 
3,65E-06 
Limit Points 
LIMIT_ 1: C(17) 
LIMIT 2: C(1 8) 
4,904095 0,905261 4- 
8,739054I 0,0000! 8,766076 
Akaike info criterior. 1,018432 
Log likelihood -229,9882 
Restr. log likelihood -468,5888 
LR statistic (16 df) 477,2011 
Probability(LR stat) 0,00000 
1,003092 
Schwarz criterion ii: 1,173234 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 1,079244 
Avg. log likelihood 0,47226 
LR index (Pseudo-R2) 0,50919' 
Antilog ß 
2,332939 0,0197 2,6841; 
3,257174 0,0011 1,0001 
3,540407 0,0004 1,0000 
-2,351774 0,0187 0,3665', 
1,981393 
-1,56141 
-2,433057 
ý 
-, 1,623404 
8,975621, 
8,932822 
1.977209 
2,116204; 
-2,668629 
-6,460512 
-3,50328 
-2,4957261 
ý- 
0,644786 
0,0475 2,1504 
0,1184 0,9777 
0,0150 0,4823 
0,1045 3,5284 
0,0000 194,5978 
0,0000 1240,3340 
0,048 1,0018 
0,0343 2,6740 
0,0076 0,0580 
0,0000 0,0016 
0,0005 1,0000 
O, 0126; 1,0000 
5,417325 ý_0,0000 ; 
-f 
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APPENDIX 4: E-VIEWS OUTPUT- 1ST STAGE BINARY MODEL 
1ST STAGE BINARY MODEL - ORIGINAL SPECIFICATION 
Dependent Variable: OM 
Method: ML - Binary Logit 
Sample: 1 487 
Included observations: 487 
Convergence achieved after 12 iterations 
I Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Variable Coefficient 
C -2,702849 
ICRGD2 -0,281657 
ICRGD3 -0,621632 
LEGRSK -0,00537 
GDP 
_ 
0,000018 
FSIZE 0,000003 
FGR2 0,26168 
FGR3 1,602259 
FGR4 1,575015 
INTEXPY -0,034231 
GDSPRS -1,643946 
MIDMKT 1,055811 
UPLUX 3,309034 
LATEUROP 3,609645 
RMS 0,008149 
FOREIGN -0,471005 
Mean dependent var 0,457906 
S. E. of regression 0,260541 
Sum squared resid 31,97222 
Log likelihood 
Restr. log likelihood 
LR statistic (15 df) 457,1665 
Probability(LR stat) 0,00000 
Obs with Dep=O 
Obs with Dep=1 
Std. Error 
1,343439 
0,679325 
0.867983 
0,016658 
3,32E-05 
4,17E-06 
0,836247 
0,802683 
0,898359 
0,023558 
0,407799 
0,713222 
0.726477 
0,762001 
0,002539 
0.792524 
z-Statistic 
-2,011889 
-0,414613 
-0,71618 
-0,322365 
0,533072 
0,758374 
0,312922 
1,99613 
1,753214 
-1,453062 
-4,03126 
1,48034 
4,554908 
Prob. I Antilog 0 
0,0442 1 
0,6784!, 
0,4739 
QA17 
-+ 0,7472 
0559 40 i 
0.4482, 
i 
0,7543' 
0,0459 
0,0796 
0,1462 
0,0001 
0,1388 
0,0000 
4,737059 ý 0,0000 
3,209156 1 0,0013 
-0,594311 0,5523 
0,0670 
0,7545 
0,5371 
0,9946 
1,0000 
1,0000 
1,2991 
4,9642 
4,8308 
0,9663 
051932 
2,8743 
27,3587 
36,9529 
1,0082 
0,6244 
S. D. dependent var0,4987; 
--r Akaike info criterion 0,506166 
Schwarz criterion 0,643 768 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0560222, 
Avg. log likelihood -0,22023 
McFadden R-square 
r_ 
0,680642' 
2641 Total obs 487 
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1ST STAGE BINARY MODEL - EXTENDED 
Omitted Variables: MM_LATEU UP LATEU CRD2 FS CRD3 FS 
F-statistic 
Log likelihood ratio 
5,936662 
10,09979 
Probability 
Probability 
Dependent Variable: OM 
Method: ML - Binary Logit 
Sample: 1 487 
Included observations: 487 
Convergence achieved after 12 iterations 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
-2,796231 0,0052,0,0127 
1,247643 0,2122 3,2216 
1,163779 0,2445 4,0870 
-0,625854 0,5314; 0,9877 
0,582985 r 0,5599 1,0000 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 1 z-Statistic Prob. Antilog 
-4,36801 1,56211 
ICRGD2 I 1.16987 
ICRGD3 
LEGRSK 
GDP 
FSIZE 
0,93766 
1,40782 1,20969 
-0,01238 0,01978 
0,00002 0,00004 
0,000011 0,00001 
FGR2 0,32811 0,91765 
FGR3 1,59607 0,86228 
FGR4 1,55871 0,94429 
INTEXPY l -0,04365 0,02571 
DHOTELS -1,32990 
MIDMKT 0,84779 
UPLUX 3,82700 
0,45055 
0,91155 
0.85059 
LATELTROP 3,63033 0,98468 
MM LATEU I 0,95715I 1,59338 
UP_LATEU -1,42436 1,74857 
CRD2_FS -0,000010 0,00000 
CRD3 FS -0,000019 0,00001 
RMS 0,00812 0,002411 
FOREIGN 0,07312 0,86206 
0,000115 
0,03878 
L 
--- 
2,097961 0,0359 1,0000 
0,357552 ý 0,7207 1,3883 
1,850994 0,0642 4,9336 
1,650662 0,0988' 4,7527 
-1,697642 0,0896 0,9573 
-2,951715 0,00321 0,2645 
0,930054 0,3523 2,3345 
4,499242' 0,0000 45,9245 
35686808 0,0002ý 37,7252 
0,600703 0,5480' 2,6043 
-0,8145851 0,4153 0,24071 
-2,21468 
-1,906806 
3,368759 
0,084816 
Mean dependent varl 0,457906 S. D. dependent var 
S. E. of regression_ 0,255245 Akaike info criterion 
Sum squared resid 30,42512 Schwarz criterion 
Log likelihood =102,2016 Hannan-Quinn criter. -- --F 
Restr. log likelihood -335,8348 _Avg. 
log likelihood -0,20986 
L_R statistic (19 df) 467,2663 McFadden R-squared 0,695679 
Probability(LR stat) 0,000000 
0,0268 1,0000 
0,0565 1,0000 
0,0008 1,0082 
0,9324 1,0759 
0,498737 
0,501855 
0,673857, 
0,569424 
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1ST STAGE BINARY MODEL - REDUCED 
Redundant Variables: LEGRSK GDP FGR2 MM_LATEU UP LATEU C ORIG 
F-statistic 
Log likelihood ratio 
0,063938 
2,395132 
L_ 
Probability 
Probability 
Dependent Variable: OM 
Method: ML - Binary Logit 
Date: 05/16/03 Time: 15: 07 
Sample: 1 487 
Included observations: 487 
Convergence achieved after 12 iterations 
--- .. __ 
-+---- 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Variable 
C 
ICRGD2 
ICRGD3 
FSIZE 
FGR3 
FGR4 
INTEXPY 
DHOTELS 
MIDMKT 
UPLUX 
LATEUROP 
CRD2_FS 
CRD3_FS 
RMS 
Coefficient 
-3,94535 
1,49402 
1,65041 
0,000008 
1,41166 
1,37036 
-0,03532 
-1,50974 
1,28369 
3,53419 
3,24943 
-0,000010 
-0,000017 
0,00850 
Mean dependent var 0,457906 
S. E. of regression 0,253725 
Sum squared resid 30,45012 
Log likelihood -103,3992 
Restr. log likelihood -335,8348 
LR statistic (13 df) 464,8712 
Probability(LR stat) 0,000000 
Obs with Dep=O 
Obs with Dep=1 
264 
223 
Std. Error 
1,070179 
0,744866 
0,933668 
0,000004 
0,564173 
0,705121 
2,005755 
1,767663 
1,903818 
2,50217 
1,943431 
0,023712 -1,489476 
0,365652 -4,128901 
0,705221 1,820263 
0,700424 5,045785 
0,668765 4,858849 
0,000004 -2,27836 
0,000009 
0,002455 
-1,872268 
3,46014 
S. D. dependent var 
Akaike info criterion 
Schwarz criterion 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 
Avg. log likelihood 
0,0002 0,019 
--- -- 0,0449 4,455 
0,0771 5,209 
0,0569 1,000 
0,0123 4,103 
0,0520 3,937 
0,1364 0,965 
0,0000 0,221 
- -- - -- - O, 06 87,3,610 
050000T 34,267 
0,0000', 25,776 
-- ý-- - -- - 0,0227: 15 
0,0612 1,000 
0,0005' 1,009 
0,49874 
0,48213 
0,60253 
0,529431 
-0,21232 } 
McFadden R-squared 0,69211 
Total obs 
263 
-ý 
z-Statistic 
_i 
0,99897 
0,88002 
Prob. Antilog 
-_ -_--Y 
J=3,686623 
--ý- 
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APPENDIX 5: E-VIEWS OUTPUT- 2ND STAGE BINARY MODEL 
2ND STAGE BINARY MODEL - ORIGINAL SPECIFICATION 
Dependent Variable: OM 
Method: ML - Binary Logit 
Sample: 1 223 
Included observations: 223 
Convergence achieved after 11 iterations 
-ý 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Probabilil Antilog ß 
c 
ICRGD2 
ICRGD3 
LEGRSK 
GDP 
FSIZE 
FGRD2 
FGRD3 
FGRD4 
INTEXPY 
DHOTELS 
MIDMKT 
UPLUX 
LATEUROP 
RMS 
C OBIG 
Mean dependent var 
S. E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log likelihood 
Restr. log likelihood 
LR statistic (15 df) 
Probability(LR stat) 
Obs with Dep=O 
-4,715848 1,19735 
0,388496 0,594698 0,653267ý 0,5136* 1,4748 
-0,226405 0,763674 -0,296468 0,7669 ý 0,7974 - -- -- -t- 0,003819 0,014364 0,265876 0,7903' 1,0038 
4.99E-05 
7,69E-06 
0,534951 
0,46615 
1,238293 
0,033945 
0,171903 
-1,771526 
-0,414302 
2.001891 
0.000142 
0.796436 
0,282511 
0.413585 
35,40788 
-107,7893 
-132,754 
49,92946 
o, oooo 
160 
Obs with Dep=1 63 
2.69E-05 
4,08E-06 
0,546507 
0.580806 
0,614889 
0,02227 
0,389694 
0,725913 
0,698512 
0,542823 
0.001119 
0.585976 
-3,938571 0,0001' 0,0090 
-1,857753 
0,0632 1,0000 
1,884048 0,05961 1,0000 
-- - --- -ý - 0,978855 
- 
0,3277- , 1,7074 
- - ---- -- ý 0,802591 0,4222 1,5938 
2,013 847 0,044Ö 
ý 
3,4497 
1,524258 0,1274 1 1,0345 
0,441121 0,65911 1,1876 
-2,440411 0,01471,0,1701 
-0,593121 0,5531 0,6608 
3,687925 0,00021 7,4030 
--ý-- - --- 0,126603 0,8993 1,0001 
- --ý 1,359163 0,1741 2,2176 
S. D. dependent var 0,4512 
Akaike info criterion 1,110218 
Schwarz criterion 1,3546781 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 1,208905 
Avg. log likelihood -0,48336µ- 
McFadden R-squared 
Total obs 
265 
0,188053 
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2ND STAGE BINARY MODEL - ORIGINAL SPECIFICATION 
GOODNESS OF FIT TEST 
Dependent Variable: OM 
Method: ML - Binary Logit 
Sample: 1 223 
Included observations: 223 
Andrews and Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Tests 
Grouping based upon predicted ris k (randomize ties) 
Quantile of Risk Dep=O Dep=1 Total H-L 
1 
Low 
0,0178 
High 
0,0931 
Actual 
22 
Expect 
20,6624 
Actual 
0 
Expect Obs Value 
ý 
-- 
22' 1,42414 1,337561 
2 0,0932 0,1047 20 19,8564 2 2,14361 22,0,01066 
3 0,1051 0,1296 19 19,4763 3 2,5237 22 0,10154 
4 
5 
0,1299 
0,1549 
0,1548 
0,215 
19 
18 
19,7355 
18,0252 
4 
4 
3,26445_r 23 0,19315 
3,97475 1,22 0,0002 
6 0,2159 0,2732 15 16,776 7 5,22403 
_22 
0,79177 
7 0,2755 0,3349 15 15,9602 8 7,03984_ 
-- - 
23j 0,18872 
8 
_ 
0,3413 0,4388 16 13,4245 6 8,57548 22I 1,2676 
9 
10 
0,4402 
0,6702 
0,6613 
0,8757 
10 
6 
10,6977 
5,38572 
12 
17 
11,3023 
17,6143 
22i 0,08857 
23 
4 
0,09148 
Total 160 160 63 4,15783 63' 223 
H-L Sta tistic: 4,1578 
J 
ob. Chi-Sq(8) Pr 0,8426 
Andrew s Statistic: 23,4151 Prob. Chi-S 10 
0,0093 
267 
1,855188 
0,8324081 0,836738 
-0,850581 ý 1,082282 
-050006671 0,017112 
7,99E-051 3,08E-05 
1,96E-05 ý 7,52E-06 
0,327039' 0,563199 
-0,0052711 0,629746 
1,978001 1 0,714977 
1,89E-021 2,67E-02 
5,52E-01 ý 5,08E-01 
-2,15E+00 I 2,16E+00 
2,75E+00 I 1,39E+00 
6,003712 ý 1,5561 ý 3,858178 
-0,0004241 0,001213 1 -0,349493 
1,48891 j 0,646156 ý 2,304259 
-059064871 2,461735 ý -0,368231 
-5,57829 1 1,869081 
0,0000 ý 8,60E-06 
5,32E-06 ý 9,85E-06; 
0.282511 
32,47337 
-97,18404 Hannan-Quinn criter. 
-132,754 Avg. log likelihood 
McFadden R-squared 
2ND STAGE BINARY MODEL - EXTENDED Omitted Variables: MM LATEU UP LATEU CRD2_FS CRD3 FS 
Dependent Variable: OM 
Method: ML - Binary Logit 
Sample: 1 223 
Included observations: 223 
Convergence achieved after 12 iterations 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
4,586103 
21,21048 
_ý_ Coefficient Std. Error 
_Lz-Statistic 
Prob. Antilog 
Probability 
Probability 
268 
-4,6661181 0,0000 0,0002 
0,994825 0,3198 2,2988I 
-0,785915 ý 0,4319 ; 0,4272 ý 
-0,0390021 0,9689 0,9993 
2,593844 0,0095 ý 1,0001 
2,610902 0,00901 1,0000j 
0,58068 0,5615+ 1,3869 
-0,00837[ 0,9933 1 0,9947 iTt 
2,766524 ý_0,0057 i 7,2283 
0,708565 i 0,47861 1,0191 
0,001446 
0,000288 
0,0476 15,6773 
--- 0,0001 404 
--- - 0,7267,0,9996I 
_ý - -- 1 
0,0212 4,4323 
0,4039 0,7127 
-2,98451 ý 0,0028 0,0038I - -r 1 
-1,1320691 0,2576] 1,0000iß -- -- ýý 0,5888' 1,0000 
S. D. dependent var 0,451234 
Akaike info criterion 1,050978 
Schwarz criterion 1,356554 
1,174337 
-0,435803 
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2ND STAGE BINARY MODEL - EXTENDED 
GOODNESS OF FIT TEST 
Dependent Variable: OM 
- --ý --- -- 
I 
Method: ML - Binary Logit 
Sample: 1 223 
Included observations: 223 
Andrews and Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Tests 
Grouping based upon predicted risk (randomize ties) 
iI. 
- -- _-. 
Quantile of Risk 
. 
Dep=O Dep=1. 
"Total _H-L 
F ýý_ __ Low High Actual Expect Actual Expect Orbs Value 
0,001 
2ý0,039 
3ý0,0673 
0,0383 
0,0671 
0,0922 
22 
21 
21 
21,458 
20,752 
20,23 
4 0,094 0,1499 22 20,218 
5 0,1518 0,2025 
__ 
17 18,11 
6 0,2041 I, 0,2561 16 16,807 
71 0.2601 
8 10,3555 
910,4 88 6 
M 0,6873 
0,346 
0,488 
0,6856 
0.9656 
10 
12 
16 
3 
16,129 
Total 
H-L Statistic: 
Andrews Statistic: 
160 
17,913 
43,112 
12,905 
9,8156 
3,5737 
160 
0 0,542 
1 1,2476 
--- 4 1 1,7696 
112,78161 
5'3,8896. 
6 5,193' 
13 6,871 
10 
6 
9,0949 
12,184 
20 
63 
19,426 
22i 0,5557 
-- - 22 0,0521 
22,0,364 
23 1,2981 
22,0,3851 
22 0,1641 
23 7,7961 il 
22_ 011535_ 
22 7,0355 
23 0,109 
63 223 17,913 
Prob. Chi-Sq(8 0,0219 
Prob. Chi-Sq(1 0,0000 
270 
2ND STAGE BINARY MODEL - REDUCED 
Redundant Variables: ICRGD2 ICRGD3 LEGRSK FGRD2 FGRD3 
INTEXPY DHOTELS CR62 FS CRD3 FS RMS 
F-statistic 0,613778 Probability 0,801207 
Log likelihood ratio 8,007595 Probability T 0,628095 
Sample: 1 223 
Included observations: 223 - 
Convergence achieved after 12 iterations 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic ProbabilitiAntilog 0 
- 
C -7,60597 1,62584 -4,678164 0,0000 0,00 
GDP 0,00007 0,00002 3,875234 0,0001 1,00 
FSIZE 0,00002 0,00001 3,282643 0,0010 1,00 
FGRD4 1,48780 0,53090 2,802399 0,0051 4,43 
MIDMKT -2,46873 1,63785 -1,234448 051970, 0,08 
UPLUX 2,79506 1,20828 2,313263 0,0207 16,36 
LATEUROP 6,08124 1,44403 4,211309 0,0000 437,57 
MM LATEU 
UP LATEU 
-0,54465 
-5,23212 
2,10563 
1,62679 
-0,258663 
-3,216216 
0,7959 
0,0013 __0,58 0,01 
C ORIG 1,10790 0,50683 2,185949 0,0288 3,03 
Mean dependent var 0,282511 S. D. dependent var 0,451234 
S. E. of regression 0,396316 Akaike info criterion 0,9972 
Sum squared resid 33,45522 Schwarz criterion 1,149988 
Log likelihood -101,1878 Hannan-Quinn triter, 1,05888 _ Restr. log likelihood -132,754 Avg. log likelihood -0,45376 
LR statistic (9 df) 
Probability(LR stat) 
63,13235 
0,00000 
McFadden R-squarec 
--4 
0,247779 
1 
Obs with Dep=0 160 Total obs 223 
Obs with Dep=1 63 I 
271 
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NUMBERING 
AS ORIGINAL 
2ND STAGE BINARY MODEL -_REDUCED 
GOODNESS OF FIT TEST 
iI 
Dependent Variable: OM 
Method: ML - Binary Logit 
Sample: 1 223 
Included observations: 223 
ý- 
I 
Andrews and Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Tests 
Grouping based upon predicted risk (randomize ties) 
Quantile of Risk 
2 
3 
5 
6 
9 
10 
Low 
0,001 
0,049 
0,0893 
0,1279 
0,1626 
0,2133 
0,2634 
0,3194 
0.4372 
High 
0,0426 
0,0893 
0,1224 
0,1625 
0,2095 
0,2622 
0,3149 
0,4303 
0,6754 
Actual 
22 
21 
21 
0.6906 0,9735 
160 Total 
H-L Statistic: 
Andrews Statistic: 
15,6953 
36,9401 
Dep=O Dep=1 Total H-L 
Expect ý Actual Expect_ 
_ 
Obs Value 
21,3674 0 
20.4163 1 
17 
19 
15 
12 
17 
2 
14 
19,7025 
19,5924 
17,9544 
16.7933 
16,2818 
13,5139 
1075574 1 
3,82049 
160 
60 
3 
0,63259 22 0,65132 
1,58368 22 0,23181 
2,29746 22 0,81816 
3,40757: 23 2,3153 
4,04555 !, 22 0,3311 
5.20671 22'', 1,96315 
}} 6,71818' 23' 0,34548 
10,8,48614 i 22 ý 0,43965 
5 11,4426 
63 
21 ý 19,1795 23 1,04027 
63 
22' 7,55901 
223 15,695 3 
---! -1 Prob. Chi-Sq(8) ! 0,0470 
Prob. Chi-Sq(10) 0,0001 
274 
